Det blev ingen uppdatering igår tyvärr, men här är ett nytt dokument!
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Wednesday, 15 November 2006, 11:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2016
TAGS AJ, PGOV, PREL, EPET, ENRG, RU
SUBJECT: BP AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENT SAYS AZERBAIJAN MOVING
SLOWLY TO ADDRESS GAS PROBLEM
REF: ANKARA 006396
Classified By: Ambassador Anne. E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a November 10 Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing, outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward told the Ambassador that according to SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev, Turkey had not agreed to forego its contracted for 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries as a way of helping Azerbaijan and Georgia with their winter gas problems, although they were willing to defer delivery of some amounts if the contracted for price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meters remained the same. Woodward said that Turkey was declaring itself ready to receive Shah Deniz gas, although he himself had doubts. He said that a joint BP-SOCAR working group would start work soon to discuss ways of redressing possible GOAJ domestic gas shortages in winter 2007. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On November 10 the Ambassador attended an Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing headed by outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward. Other attendees were incoming BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader, BP Group Azerbaijan Director for Communications and External Affairs Clare Bebbington, UK Ambassador Laurie Bristow, UK EconOff, and Econoff as notetaker.
READ-OUT OF TU-GOAJ MEETING
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (C) Woodward gave a read-out of his November 2 meeting with SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev. This meeting, prompted by the visit to Azerbaijan of BP Executive Vice-President and Deputy Chief Executive of Exploration and Production Andy Inglis, occurred right after Abdullayev had returned from Turkey with Deputy Prime Minister Abid Sharifov, where they had notified Turkey of intended delays in GOAJ 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries. Abdullayev, fresh off the plane, provided Woodward and Inglis a read-out of his Turkey meeting with Energy Minister Gular and Botas. Rovnaq told them that Botas would not sign the document he had brought, in which Turkey was asked to agree to GOAJ providing no Shah Deniz gas in 2007 and in which the GOAJ sought to re-open Shah Deniz price negotiations. Turkey insisted on receiving its contracted for 2007 three billion cubic meters (bcm) of Shah Deniz gas at the agreed upon price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meter (tcm), but said it did not have to receive it all in 2007. It proposed that it could take half (1.5 bcm) in winter 2007, with the rest to be received in 2008 or 2009, at the contracted price of USD 120/tcm. Abdullayev told Inglis that he had gotten Turkey to agree that it would be a transit country for Shah Deniz gas (vice a buyer-seller).
¶4. (C) During this November 2 meeting with Abdullayev and Sharifov, Energy Minister Gular also said that Turkey was ready to receive Shah Deniz gas. In this regard, Woodward said that he thinks that Botas will ask for commissioning gas during the week of November 13-17. As to how ready Turkey actually is to receive Shah Deniz gas, Woodward said that the BP opinion is that Botas still has a lot of work to do to complete the pipeline to include work on the valve stations, and that if the work were done in accordance with international standards then the pipeline might not be ready until spring 2007. However, he added that “it was not inconceivable†that Botas could “rush finish†the job so that it would be ready to receive gas shortly, although the pipeline would not meet international standards.
ACG PROBLEM RESOLUTION
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Woodward said that during the recent visit of BP Executive Inglis, BP had given both President Aliyev and SOCAR President Abdullayev a copy of a BP ‘white paper’ on the way forward for Azerbaijan in the energy sector, (a copy of which he gave to the Ambassador), with the focus on four main themes:
- ACG Maximum Development: Resolving current issues associated with ACG to maximize recovery - Short/medium/long term gas issues: Short-term - how to address this winter’s gas needs; Medium/Long-term: how best
BAKU 00001661 002 OF 003
to identify and exploit GOAJ gas reserves - SOCAR: how to help make SOCAR an energy company that meets international standards - BP Social Programs: putting a ‘harder edge’ on them, to help build capacity in Azerbaijan
¶6. (C) Woodward said that there were a series of outstanding ACG-related issues the resolution of which involved billions of dollars and which the AIOC partners were trying to resolve with SOCAR in a package, vice individually. In the November 2 meeting between SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and BP executive Inglis, Abdullayev said that he would head the SOCAR ACG steering group dealing with these problems, and that SOCAR VP Elshad Nassirov would be the SOCAR working level representative. Abdullayev also said he would head the SOCAR team on the BP-SOCAR gas working group, with Nassirov again the working-level representative. Woodward said that Abdullayev had an unrealistic expectation of how quickly these outstanding ACG issues could be resolved: whereas BP thinks that a framework within which to discuss the issues could be agreed upon by January, with actual negotiations over these issues lasting up to six months, Woodward said that Abdullayev told Inglis that the issues could be solved ‘within a few days.’
¶7. (C) Woodward said that Abdullayev did not show much willingness to engage with BP re Azerbaijan’s short-term (Winter 07) gas problems, contending that AIOC giving SOCAR more associated ACG gas could solve the problem. (Note: AIOC is scheduled to give 1.4 bcm of associated ACG gas to SOCAR in 2007; SOCAR is arguing that AIOC does not need to re-inject any ACG associated gas back into the well, and wants 3 bcm). Woodward said that all sides seemed to be waiting for the results of the President Aliyev-President Putin meeting in Moscow, although he himself doubted whether the two would reach any definitive agreement, as everyone is waiting to see the results of the various CIS bilateral Gazprom negotiations, to see if the USD 230/tcm level will hold.
BP GEORGIA GAS READOUT
----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Woodward said he and his replacement Bill Schrader had just returned from Georgia, where they had met separately with the Georgian Energy Minister, Environment Minister and Prime Minister, among others. At these meetings the Georgian proposal of a November three-way gas-focused Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian ministerial-level meeting in Tblisi or Ankara was discussed, although nothing definite had been agreed to by all parties. In their meetings, the GOG interlocutors had referred to Turkey’s Summer 2007 ‘agreement in principle’ to supply Georgia from its own Shah Deniz gas, although Woodward said in his opinion all Turkey had agreed to at that time was a ‘bring us a proposal and we’ll have a look at it’ type agreement. Woodward said that the GOG Energy Minister had told him that GA would not buy gas from Gazprom at USD 230/tcm, and that Turkey would supply GOG with 1.5 bcm in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM was more realistic, saying that perhaps Georgia could get 0.8 to 1.2 bcm from Turkey in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM seemed more relaxed about the upcoming winter gas situation than did the Energy Minister, and more concerned about Shah Deniz Stage Two-related issues, stating that, inter alia, Georgia and Azerbaijan should look at gas storage issues together, vice separately. Woodward said he got the impression that GOG was more concerned about the economics of gas purchases from Gazprom than the supply itself, and he noted that despite the intense rhetoric flowing between Russia and Georgia, the energy continues to flow.
SD PRODUCTION
------------------------
¶9. (C) Woodward agreed that Shah Deniz was experiencing production delays, but said that other issues would play a more determinative role in deciding where Shah Deniz gas went, such as the GOG technical capacity to uptake Shah Deniz gas at its border with Azerbaijan. He said that the Gas Pressure Reduction and Metering Station at Pump Station One in Georgia has a maximum daily design throughput of 4.0 million cubic meters, equivalent to 1.46 bcm/a at one hundred percent load (note: this compares to currently contracted
BAKU 00001661 003 OF 003
quantities which build up to around 08. bcm/a by 2011). As such, he said that part of the work of the SOCAR-BP gas working group that would be meeting imminently would be to model how much gas Georgia could uptake from Azerbaijan from a technical viewpoint. He noted that in addition to the SCP (i.e. Shah Deniz) pipeline, there was also the possibility of transferring gas from Azerbaijan to Georgia through the Azerbaijani gas system. As for Shah Deniz gas itself, Woodward said that as soon as the first two of the four wells start flowing (mid-November and late December respectively), will it be clear how quickly and how much production will be available for winter 2007.
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Before determining what steps to take to redress any possible winter 07 gas shortages in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Azerbaijan first needs to assess its current gas balance and possible alternative supply options. In this regard it is encouraging to hear that the joint BP-SOCAR gas working group is scheduled to meet the week of November 12. Woodward however was disparaging of the selection of SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and Deputy Prime Minister Sharifov as the GOAJ officials sent to Ankara to deal with the Turkish government (indeed, a Statoil representative told the Ambassador that Abdullayev had taken the wrong version of the Shah Deniz contract to the discussions), and despaired of any solution to the short-term regional problem occurring if management of the issue stayed at the SOCAR level. As such, he requested USG help in convincing Turkey to meet with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Now that Turkey is doing so (see reftel), Embassy will seek to ensure that the GOAJ participates at the appropriate level. END COMMENT. DERSE
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lördag 18 december 2010
onsdag 15 december 2010
I am WikiLeaks - the revolution goes on!
NEW DOCUMENT - I am WikiLeaks!
Don't forget to Mirror WikiLeaks
---------------
VZCZCXRO5952
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #3969 0481658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2923C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 013969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM CH EUN
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA
REF: USEU 133
Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is an action request for all Embassies
in EU countries to reiterate our position that the EU should
retain its arms embargo on China. Spanish officials,
including the Spanish Foreign Minister, signaled a possible
review of the arms embargo under Spain's Presidency of the
EU. Although USEU reports that there is no active discussion
of this in Brussels (reftel), we believe it is important to
reiterate that the U.S. remains firmly opposed to any lifting
of the embargo. END SUMMARY.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (U) Spanish Ambassador to China Carlos Blasco told Chinese
journalists on January 21 that "we hope to intensify talks on
lifting the (arms) embargo." Subsequently, when asked about
these comments at a January 26 press conference, Spanish
Foreign Minister Moratinos stated that his government would
be "reviewing the decision" on and "weighing the pros and
cons" of lifting the arms embargo.
¶3. (C) The EU imposed the arms embargo on China, alongside a
similar U.S. arms embargo, following the violent suppression
of protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The last major
push to lift the EU arms embargo came in late 2004/early
¶2005. France and Germany were strong proponents of lifting
the embargo at the time. In the end, a combination of our
public and private opposition, NGO pressure, and the passage
of a Chinese anti-secession law authorizing the use of force
against Taiwan persuaded EU governments to maintain the
embargo.
¶4. (C/REL EU MEMBER STATES) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are asked
to approach host government at the appropriate level to
reaffirm U.S. opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo,
and solicit host government views on the issues, using the
below talking points:
-- We are concerned by recent comments suggesting that the EU
may consider lifting its arms embargo on China.
-- The United States position on an arms embargo has not
changed since the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989 or since
the last time the EU considered lifting the ban in 2004: We
continue to believe that lifting the embargo is not
warranted, on either human rights or security grounds.
-- In terms of human rights, the Chinese Government's actions
over the last few months have ignored international concern
over specific human rights cases, including the harsh
sentencing of Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison and the
execution of British citizen Akmal Shaikh. Public comments
at this time from senior European officials suggesting that
the EU may seek to lift the arms embargo undercut these
international concerns regarding Beijing's human rights
practices.
-- We refer you to the Department of Defense's annual PLA
Military Power Report, which highlights the increased
capabilities of Chinese military forces. Lifting the arms
embargo would have serious implications for the security and
stability of the Pacific region.
-- (If the EU's Code of Conduct is brought up) We believe
that the Code of Conduct and 'toolbox' of export controls
cannot replace the embargo.
-- We should continue to discuss the requirements of security
and stability in East Asia in the context of the U.S.-EU
strategic dialogue on Asia.
¶5. (U) Please slug all responses for EUR/ERA, EAP/CM, PM/RSAT
and ISN/RA. Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
CLINTON
Don't forget to Mirror WikiLeaks
---------------
VZCZCXRO5952
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #3969 0481658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171655Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2923C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 013969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM CH EUN
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA
REF: USEU 133
Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is an action request for all Embassies
in EU countries to reiterate our position that the EU should
retain its arms embargo on China. Spanish officials,
including the Spanish Foreign Minister, signaled a possible
review of the arms embargo under Spain's Presidency of the
EU. Although USEU reports that there is no active discussion
of this in Brussels (reftel), we believe it is important to
reiterate that the U.S. remains firmly opposed to any lifting
of the embargo. END SUMMARY.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (U) Spanish Ambassador to China Carlos Blasco told Chinese
journalists on January 21 that "we hope to intensify talks on
lifting the (arms) embargo." Subsequently, when asked about
these comments at a January 26 press conference, Spanish
Foreign Minister Moratinos stated that his government would
be "reviewing the decision" on and "weighing the pros and
cons" of lifting the arms embargo.
¶3. (C) The EU imposed the arms embargo on China, alongside a
similar U.S. arms embargo, following the violent suppression
of protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The last major
push to lift the EU arms embargo came in late 2004/early
¶2005. France and Germany were strong proponents of lifting
the embargo at the time. In the end, a combination of our
public and private opposition, NGO pressure, and the passage
of a Chinese anti-secession law authorizing the use of force
against Taiwan persuaded EU governments to maintain the
embargo.
¶4. (C/REL EU MEMBER STATES) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are asked
to approach host government at the appropriate level to
reaffirm U.S. opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo,
and solicit host government views on the issues, using the
below talking points:
-- We are concerned by recent comments suggesting that the EU
may consider lifting its arms embargo on China.
-- The United States position on an arms embargo has not
changed since the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989 or since
the last time the EU considered lifting the ban in 2004: We
continue to believe that lifting the embargo is not
warranted, on either human rights or security grounds.
-- In terms of human rights, the Chinese Government's actions
over the last few months have ignored international concern
over specific human rights cases, including the harsh
sentencing of Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison and the
execution of British citizen Akmal Shaikh. Public comments
at this time from senior European officials suggesting that
the EU may seek to lift the arms embargo undercut these
international concerns regarding Beijing's human rights
practices.
-- We refer you to the Department of Defense's annual PLA
Military Power Report, which highlights the increased
capabilities of Chinese military forces. Lifting the arms
embargo would have serious implications for the security and
stability of the Pacific region.
-- (If the EU's Code of Conduct is brought up) We believe
that the Code of Conduct and 'toolbox' of export controls
cannot replace the embargo.
-- We should continue to discuss the requirements of security
and stability in East Asia in the context of the U.S.-EU
strategic dialogue on Asia.
¶5. (U) Please slug all responses for EUR/ERA, EAP/CM, PM/RSAT
and ISN/RA. Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
CLINTON
ditt å datt
Hoppsan en sån dag! Skulle man kunna säga... Repliksvar på Anna Hedhs och Margareta Winbergs debattartikel i SvD (Brännpunkt 14/12) och håller alla tummar för att man tar in och publicerar den i morgon!
Min lilla privata tanke ser ungeför ut så här:
Hedh och Winberg påstår att de “tar strid mot sexhandeln i Europa” och blandar genast ihop begreppen. Den svenska sexköpslagen går inte att exportera till EU, därför att folket i de olika medlemsstaterna vet bättre. De kan nämligen se skillnaden våra svenska representanter inte kan! Och varför, kan man då fråga sig? Jo, deras politiker blandat inte samman begreppen “sexarbete” och “trafficking”.
Trafficking är ren slavhandel. Mycket kortfattat: mänsklig flyttbar arbetskraft, där arbetarna lever under omänskliga förhållanden. Denna slavhandel innehåller allt från barnsoldater, sexarbete, hemstädning, byggnadsarbete och så vidare…
Sexarbete är ett frivilligt yrke, där utövaren tar och får betalt för sin tjänst. Han, eller hon, är professionellt yrkesarbetande.
Denna skillnad klarar det Europeiska folket av att göra, oavsett om de lever i Tyskland, Belgien eller England. Varför klarar inte det svenska folket detta? Eller snarare, varför tror våra politiskt utsända att vi inte klarar att göra skillnaden mellan yrke och slaveri?
Hedh och Winberg påstår dessutom att orsaken till att Hedhs moralpredikan inför parlamentet skulle vara att de övriga europeiska politikerna och tjänstemännen, själva nyttjar sexarbetares tjänster och av denna orsak skulle vara mindre benägna att fatta beslut som den svenska sexköpslagen skulle ligga till grund för.
Detta är inte sant! Orsaken till varför europeiska parlamentsledamöter inte vill lagstifta om att införa den svenska sexköpslagen, är för att frågan inte handlade om detta överhuvudtaget!
Frågan rörde eventuell kriminalisering av köp av sexuella tjänster av ett människohandelsoffer, det vill säga en person som utsatts för trafficking!
Det medlemsländerna nu kommit överrens om är att enligt liggande förslag “redovisa de åtgärder som de gör för att kriminalisera den som medvetet köper sexuella tjänster av ett människohandelsoffer.” Margareta Winberg med svenska kollegor gör allt de kan för att i svenska medier och gentemot de svenska väljarna framstå som vinnare i ett mindre slag, när de i själva verket förlorat hela kriget!
Detta är helt pinsamt bara.
När upphörde slavhandeln i Västeuropa? När lagstiftade Sverige mot slaveri? Första gången det förbjöds var 1335. Därefter återkom slaveriet och slavhandeln under 1600-talet för att upphöra totalt 1813. Den 9e oktober 1847 friköptes de sista slavarna på Saint Barthélemy, i Karibien. Sedan dess har Sverige och svenska folket inte bedrivit slavhandel. Sägs det.
Det är bara det att slavhandeln ser annorlunda ut idag…
Vi behöver inte en lag som förbjuder sexarbete, varken för säljare eller köpare. Det vi behöver är färre morallagar och större frihet åt folket!
Vi kan exportera jämlikhet, vapen, järn och äldreomsorg till alla världens olika länder, men vi kan inte exportera “vår” moral! Framförallt inte när den är förljugen och enbart etablerad i mindre kretsar av lobbyister och svagsinta tjänstemän…
Sexköpslagen är ett hån mot den fria kvinnan och hennes val; ett hån mot den fria mannen och hans val; ett hån mot det svenska folket som inte tillåts tänka själva!
Min lilla privata tanke ser ungeför ut så här:
Hedh och Winberg påstår att de “tar strid mot sexhandeln i Europa” och blandar genast ihop begreppen. Den svenska sexköpslagen går inte att exportera till EU, därför att folket i de olika medlemsstaterna vet bättre. De kan nämligen se skillnaden våra svenska representanter inte kan! Och varför, kan man då fråga sig? Jo, deras politiker blandat inte samman begreppen “sexarbete” och “trafficking”.
Trafficking är ren slavhandel. Mycket kortfattat: mänsklig flyttbar arbetskraft, där arbetarna lever under omänskliga förhållanden. Denna slavhandel innehåller allt från barnsoldater, sexarbete, hemstädning, byggnadsarbete och så vidare…
Sexarbete är ett frivilligt yrke, där utövaren tar och får betalt för sin tjänst. Han, eller hon, är professionellt yrkesarbetande.
Denna skillnad klarar det Europeiska folket av att göra, oavsett om de lever i Tyskland, Belgien eller England. Varför klarar inte det svenska folket detta? Eller snarare, varför tror våra politiskt utsända att vi inte klarar att göra skillnaden mellan yrke och slaveri?
Hedh och Winberg påstår dessutom att orsaken till att Hedhs moralpredikan inför parlamentet skulle vara att de övriga europeiska politikerna och tjänstemännen, själva nyttjar sexarbetares tjänster och av denna orsak skulle vara mindre benägna att fatta beslut som den svenska sexköpslagen skulle ligga till grund för.
Detta är inte sant! Orsaken till varför europeiska parlamentsledamöter inte vill lagstifta om att införa den svenska sexköpslagen, är för att frågan inte handlade om detta överhuvudtaget!
Frågan rörde eventuell kriminalisering av köp av sexuella tjänster av ett människohandelsoffer, det vill säga en person som utsatts för trafficking!
Det medlemsländerna nu kommit överrens om är att enligt liggande förslag “redovisa de åtgärder som de gör för att kriminalisera den som medvetet köper sexuella tjänster av ett människohandelsoffer.” Margareta Winberg med svenska kollegor gör allt de kan för att i svenska medier och gentemot de svenska väljarna framstå som vinnare i ett mindre slag, när de i själva verket förlorat hela kriget!
Detta är helt pinsamt bara.
När upphörde slavhandeln i Västeuropa? När lagstiftade Sverige mot slaveri? Första gången det förbjöds var 1335. Därefter återkom slaveriet och slavhandeln under 1600-talet för att upphöra totalt 1813. Den 9e oktober 1847 friköptes de sista slavarna på Saint Barthélemy, i Karibien. Sedan dess har Sverige och svenska folket inte bedrivit slavhandel. Sägs det.
Det är bara det att slavhandeln ser annorlunda ut idag…
Vi behöver inte en lag som förbjuder sexarbete, varken för säljare eller köpare. Det vi behöver är färre morallagar och större frihet åt folket!
Vi kan exportera jämlikhet, vapen, järn och äldreomsorg till alla världens olika länder, men vi kan inte exportera “vår” moral! Framförallt inte när den är förljugen och enbart etablerad i mindre kretsar av lobbyister och svagsinta tjänstemän…
Sexköpslagen är ett hån mot den fria kvinnan och hennes val; ett hån mot den fria mannen och hans val; ett hån mot det svenska folket som inte tillåts tänka själva!
tisdag 14 december 2010
nog faan är det rädsla alltid...
http://brihed.blogspot.com/2010/12/%C3%A4r-ni-r%C3%A4dda-f%C3%B6r-calle-rehbinder.html
Det blir nästan skrattretande...
Citerar här Xenonexia's blogginlägg från ovan. "Det här är inte första gången. Även i januari i år stängdes Calles och Jennies konton ner. Den gången skrevs det en hel del på deras bloggar, samt i piratsfären. Något mindre tycker jag inte att vi ska kunna förvänta oss denna gången. Hjälp till att ta strid mot den amerikanska censurhysterin och den kristna högerns galenskaper som påverkar såväl Facebook som Apple och många andra stora amerikanska företag. Det kan även vara så att Calle varit väldigt frispråkig rörande Wikileaksaffären och att någon har lackat till på grund av detta. I så fall hoppas jag verkligen att där finns stöd att tillgå. En stark yttrandefrihet är den bästa skyddsmekanismen för att skapa och bevara ett öppet, fritt och demokratiskt samhälle. Utan yttrandefriheten är samhället förlorat."
VAD FAAN pysslar Facebook med?!
Det blir nästan skrattretande...
Citerar här Xenonexia's blogginlägg från ovan. "Det här är inte första gången. Även i januari i år stängdes Calles och Jennies konton ner. Den gången skrevs det en hel del på deras bloggar, samt i piratsfären. Något mindre tycker jag inte att vi ska kunna förvänta oss denna gången. Hjälp till att ta strid mot den amerikanska censurhysterin och den kristna högerns galenskaper som påverkar såväl Facebook som Apple och många andra stora amerikanska företag. Det kan även vara så att Calle varit väldigt frispråkig rörande Wikileaksaffären och att någon har lackat till på grund av detta. I så fall hoppas jag verkligen att där finns stöd att tillgå. En stark yttrandefrihet är den bästa skyddsmekanismen för att skapa och bevara ett öppet, fritt och demokratiskt samhälle. Utan yttrandefriheten är samhället förlorat."
VAD FAAN pysslar Facebook med?!
Godtyckligheten råder!
Min vän och politiske medkämpe, Carl Johan Rehbinder, har fått sitt konto på Facebook avaktiverat utan förklaring.
http://tantrikblog.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/avstangd-fran-failbookfuckbook-igen/
Det är fullständigt orimligt att agera så! En förklaring är på sin plats!
Här kan du läsa vilka som står bakom Facebook i Sverige och vår uppmaning till dig lyder: TA KONTAKT MED DESSA PERSONER! Ring dem, mejla dem - och sprid därefter deras kontaktuppgifter vidare på din blogg eller andras! Kräv att Calle Rehbinders Facebook-konto ska återaktiveras/återskapas i det befintliga skick det var när avstängningen inträffade!
http://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/facebooks-e-post-och-telefonnummer-sokes/
Men vad vet vi egentligen? Det kanske börjar bli dags att se sig om efter en annan kontaktyta? En annan mer öppen och tolerant community? Det är ju trots allt så att det är vi användare av de sociala medierna, bloggarna, cyber världen här - DET ÄR VI SOM ÄGER!!! Och bestämmer vi oss för att förändra våra "internetvanor" så gör vi det och då kan Facebook stå där och stampa...
VI KRÄVER ETT ÖPPET, TOLERANT OCH FRITT INTERNET!
Ett rum där det är högt i tak och där godtyckligheten inte råder!
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FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3857
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5302
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0602
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0372
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1260
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 1305
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1900
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0266
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0660
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1008
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2779
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1396
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0353
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 1489
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0506
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0238C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM VE SP
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. STATE 154674
¶B. MADRID 2123
¶C. MADRID 2077
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4B AND D.
¶1. (C) Charge d'Affaires delivered ref a demarche November 23
to MFA Secretary of State for Iberoamerica Trinidad Jimenez
and the Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo.
Drawing also on information provided by WHA/AND concerning
Chavez' ties to Iran and increased narcotics trafficking from
Venezuela, the Charge urged that Spain continue to speak out
publicly in support of democracy in Venezuela, as FM
Moratinos did when Chavez threatened RCTV.
¶2. (C) Jimenez demurred, saying Spain was trying to avoid
being drawn into more public controversy with Chavez
following the King's rebuke (ref b) and despite Chavez'
continued rhetorical provocation. Jimenez said public
opposition from Spain would only help Chavez whip up his
supporters for the constitutional referendum. Pressed by the
Charge to help the EU develop a constructive position,
Jimenez said that Spain would try to do something, but would
want to avoid an appearance of directly interfering in
Venezuela's internal affairs. She said a possibility was to
get a statement at the EU or European Parliament level.
Jimenez also said the Spanish Government was working behind
the scenes, feeding information to journalists on the threat
to democracy in Venezuela.
¶3. (C) Jimenez noted that post-Santiago Spain had received
messages of solidarity from virtually every government in
Latin America. She said Chavez (whom she described as a
"clown") was isolated. Alluding to the "Kings' Club" Jimenez
said the Saudis had given Chavez the cold shoulder at the
recent OPEC meeting because of his rudeness to Juan Carlos.
She said even Evo Morales was signaling by his body language
in Santiago that Chavez was embarrassing him.
¶4. (C) Jimenez agreed the proposed constitutional reforms
would be a severe setback for democracy and noted that recent
polls suggested that opposition was growing in Venezuelan
society against the proposed changes to the constitution.
She added, however, that it was tough for a government to
lose a referendum and predicted a close vote. Sandomingo
said fraud was a real possibility. Jimenez mentioned she had
met with the opposition during her recent visit to Caracas
(ref c), and although disorganized it was getting better and
finally trying to articulate a position. She also said even
high oil prices could not sustain Chavez' fiscal
irresponsibility; Spanish businessmen and independent
analysts told her an economic collapse was a high possibility
with 24 months.
LLORENS
http://tantrikblog.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/avstangd-fran-failbookfuckbook-igen/
Det är fullständigt orimligt att agera så! En förklaring är på sin plats!
Här kan du läsa vilka som står bakom Facebook i Sverige och vår uppmaning till dig lyder: TA KONTAKT MED DESSA PERSONER! Ring dem, mejla dem - och sprid därefter deras kontaktuppgifter vidare på din blogg eller andras! Kräv att Calle Rehbinders Facebook-konto ska återaktiveras/återskapas i det befintliga skick det var när avstängningen inträffade!
http://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/facebooks-e-post-och-telefonnummer-sokes/
Men vad vet vi egentligen? Det kanske börjar bli dags att se sig om efter en annan kontaktyta? En annan mer öppen och tolerant community? Det är ju trots allt så att det är vi användare av de sociala medierna, bloggarna, cyber världen här - DET ÄR VI SOM ÄGER!!! Och bestämmer vi oss för att förändra våra "internetvanor" så gör vi det och då kan Facebook stå där och stampa...
VI KRÄVER ETT ÖPPET, TOLERANT OCH FRITT INTERNET!
Ett rum där det är högt i tak och där godtyckligheten inte råder!
---------------------
Dagens dokument från WikiLeaks: I AM WIKILEAKS/Jag är Spartacus - glöm inte bort att fortsätta spegla WikiLeaks på alla upptänkliga vis!
VZCZCXRO6809
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #2159 3311416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271416Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3857
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5302
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0602
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0372
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1260
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 1305
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1900
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0266
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0660
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1008
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2779
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1396
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0353
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 1489
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0506
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0238C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM VE SP
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. STATE 154674
¶B. MADRID 2123
¶C. MADRID 2077
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4B AND D.
¶1. (C) Charge d'Affaires delivered ref a demarche November 23
to MFA Secretary of State for Iberoamerica Trinidad Jimenez
and the Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo.
Drawing also on information provided by WHA/AND concerning
Chavez' ties to Iran and increased narcotics trafficking from
Venezuela, the Charge urged that Spain continue to speak out
publicly in support of democracy in Venezuela, as FM
Moratinos did when Chavez threatened RCTV.
¶2. (C) Jimenez demurred, saying Spain was trying to avoid
being drawn into more public controversy with Chavez
following the King's rebuke (ref b) and despite Chavez'
continued rhetorical provocation. Jimenez said public
opposition from Spain would only help Chavez whip up his
supporters for the constitutional referendum. Pressed by the
Charge to help the EU develop a constructive position,
Jimenez said that Spain would try to do something, but would
want to avoid an appearance of directly interfering in
Venezuela's internal affairs. She said a possibility was to
get a statement at the EU or European Parliament level.
Jimenez also said the Spanish Government was working behind
the scenes, feeding information to journalists on the threat
to democracy in Venezuela.
¶3. (C) Jimenez noted that post-Santiago Spain had received
messages of solidarity from virtually every government in
Latin America. She said Chavez (whom she described as a
"clown") was isolated. Alluding to the "Kings' Club" Jimenez
said the Saudis had given Chavez the cold shoulder at the
recent OPEC meeting because of his rudeness to Juan Carlos.
She said even Evo Morales was signaling by his body language
in Santiago that Chavez was embarrassing him.
¶4. (C) Jimenez agreed the proposed constitutional reforms
would be a severe setback for democracy and noted that recent
polls suggested that opposition was growing in Venezuelan
society against the proposed changes to the constitution.
She added, however, that it was tough for a government to
lose a referendum and predicted a close vote. Sandomingo
said fraud was a real possibility. Jimenez mentioned she had
met with the opposition during her recent visit to Caracas
(ref c), and although disorganized it was getting better and
finally trying to articulate a position. She also said even
high oil prices could not sustain Chavez' fiscal
irresponsibility; Spanish businessmen and independent
analysts told her an economic collapse was a high possibility
with 24 months.
LLORENS
torsdag 9 december 2010
Operation Payback - I am WikiLeaks
Fortsätt kampen för ett fritt internet, en fri samtid och den fria tanken! Spegla WikiLeaks arbete på din blogg, hemsida, på insändare och länkar på Facebook!
Mejla din lokala politiker, ta kontakt med likasinnade på nätet/i verkligheten, diskutera och låt detta 1a Nätkrig :-) inte tystna!
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
Jag ställer mig positiv till den hackerattack (Operation Payback) som skedde under natten mot justitieminister Beatrice Ask, Claes Borgström med flera, därför att de förspråkar inte det fria och genomlysta samhället.
Här är dagens bidrag:
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell’s current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than “co-opt†the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell’s oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell’s oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell’s Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
¶3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF’s performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, “Boyloaf†was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been “settledâ€. End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell’s Concessions in Nigeria?
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM’s interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON’s prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister’s office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting “from Russia.†(Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn’t clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria’s ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of “surface to air missiles (SAMs)†to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has “intelligence†that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is “leaky.†She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
Mejla din lokala politiker, ta kontakt med likasinnade på nätet/i verkligheten, diskutera och låt detta 1a Nätkrig :-) inte tystna!
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
Jag ställer mig positiv till den hackerattack (Operation Payback) som skedde under natten mot justitieminister Beatrice Ask, Claes Borgström med flera, därför att de förspråkar inte det fria och genomlysta samhället.
Här är dagens bidrag:
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell’s current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than “co-opt†the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell’s oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell’s oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell’s Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
¶3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF’s performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, “Boyloaf†was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been “settledâ€. End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell’s Concessions in Nigeria?
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM’s interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON’s prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister’s office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting “from Russia.†(Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn’t clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria’s ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of “surface to air missiles (SAMs)†to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has “intelligence†that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is “leaky.†She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
onsdag 8 december 2010
I am Spartacus - Jag är WikiLeaks
From "I am Spartacus" to "Jag är Wikileaks"
För att spegla WikiLeaks - Klicka på länken nedan och välj ett eget dokument att lägga upp:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
Här är mitt bidrag för idag:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIO DE JANEIRO 000357
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV ASEC BR
SUBJECT: (C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT"
REF: A. (A) RIO 329
¶B. (B) RIO 346 Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne for reasons 1.4 (b, d )
¶1. (C) Summary: Rio Principal Officer, accompanied by PAO, met on 23 October with XXXX (strictly protect), XXX for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. XXXX has long ICRC experience in conflict zones. It is his assessment that the situation in many Rio favelas today is, for all practical purposes, a full-blown internal armed conflict, and not simply an urban crime problem. While XXXX recognizes he can say nothing of the sort publicly, and that the de jure definition in International Humanitarian Law for "internal armed conflict" may not describe precisely the violence in Rio, he makes a compelling case. The corollary is that the ICRC is quietly working in Rio favelas in much the way it does in other war zones - attempting to establish "humanitarian spaces" for treating or evacuating the wounded,facilitating release of captives, getting services and supplies to civilians isolated by violence, and requesting access (not yet granted) to gang members in prison populations. The dichotomy of extensive armed conflict raging in a celebrated and highly developed megacity in an economically powerful democracy may be becoming more than Brazilians can absorb, and frustration and the focusing effect of the 2016 Olympics in Rio seem to be galvanizing the public and state and federal governments to seek decisive action. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a 23 October meeting with Principal Officer and PAO sought by ICRC XXXX in Rio de Janeiro, XXXX, XXXXX made a compelling argument that the continuing violence in Rio,s favelas constitutes, for all practical purposes, a full-blown "internal armed conflict." XXXX said he would never take such a position publicly, given Brazilian sensitivities, nor does he argue that Rio,s violence matches in every detail the de jure definition of "internal armed conflict" under International Humanitarian Law. (Note: The relevant definition is in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. End Note.) Nonetheless, in its main features -- i.e., organized factions holding the monopoly on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for ICRC to operate as though in a war zone to create "humanitarian spaces" -- the gang warfare in Rio,s favelas resembles other situations worldwide that are formally recognized by governments and international organizations as internal armed conflicts, XXX said. XXXX speaks with conviction, reflecting his long ICRC experience in conflict zones, including in Haiti, in Uganda and in Sierra Leone,s civil war. In the course of the discussion, XXX made the following specific observations: --Currently ICRC operates in 7 Rio favelas: Mare, Parada de Lucas, Cidade de Deus, Cantagalo, Pavao/Pavaozinho, Complexo de Alemao, and Vila Vintem. State Security Secretary Jose Beltrame is the ICRC,s senior interlocutor in Rio. ICRC also has asked for access to the state prison system, which has not yet been accepted (although he noted that there was support at federal level, including from Justice Minister Tarso Genro); --The ICRC works to create "humanitarian spaces" in favela conflict areas, proceeding cautiously, first using local NGOpartners such as AfroReggae and Luta Pela Paz. In concrete examples, this has meant trying to convince gang factions to recognize certain places -- e.g., schools, clinics -- as "safe areas," working to establish mechanisms to locate and negotiate release of hostages, bringing basic supplies (including food and water) to civilians who are regularly isolated by the most extreme violence inside areas XXX called "favelas within favelas." ICRC is also working with former staffers of Doctors Without Borders to address treatment and evacuation of wounded or deceased persons, XXXX said. He noted MSF closed its operation in the notorious Complexo de Alemao favela when it was not regularly able to fulfill its mandate of treating wounded citizens, owing to the grim fact that the lethality of the conflict in Rio,s favelas leaves mostly dead victims; --Now ICRC is building up its own network. Increasingly, its delegates speak directly with leaders of gangs and militias, as well as with police. Contact with gang members is not direct initially, but word of ICRC interest in contacting specific gang leaders is passed through mediators, and mutually acceptable conditions are set for a meeting. ICRC uses clearly marked vehicles and communicates its movements in advance to all sides, just as in other war zones where it operates; --ICRC also works on health initiatives as well as education, but XXXXX allowed that such activities were, in part, "cover" for ICRC,s efforts to protect civilians from violence; --In prisons, ICRC is concerned primarily with the human rights situation, and with violence driven by gang dynamics. There is also an opportunity to meet with imprisoned gang faction leaders to emphasize that ICRC,s work in favelas is not political, and is intended to alleviate suffering of citizens. And there is the humanitarian issue of facilitating contact with prisoners by family members who may not be able to visit prisons because of factional violence (e.g., A family member from a favela controlled by one gang may put themselves and their incarcerated relative at risk if they attempt to enter a prison dominated by a rival gang.); --XXXX applauds the state Favela Pacification Program (FPP) and the community-based Police Pacification Units (UPP) and sees their value in extending government control and reducing the stigma of living in favelas, but does not believe that the plan is sufficient to fundamentally change the security situation, at least not for several years (ref A); --ICRC must be sensitive and low-profile in its work, and XXXX pointed out his staff is "hidden" in the basement of the historical headquarters building of the Brazilian Red Cross national organization. The Brazilian Red Cross is increasingly engaged by ICRC to assist in its efforts in the favelas.
¶3. (C) Comment: One does not have to completely agree with XXXX assessment to concede that this battle-hardened ICRC professional makes a cogent case for viewing the situation in many of Rio,s favelas as one of sustained internal armed conflict, as opposed to simply urban criminal violence. The Rio combatants are, of course, rival criminal gangs, militia groups, and the police, as opposed to political or ethnic factions. But in the gangs, complete control of geographic areas (Rio Governor Sergio Cabral recently referred to gang-dominated favelas as "occupied territories"), their relatively elaborate command and control structures, their powerful military weaponry, and in the horrendous body count they leave behind, Rio,s gangs do resemble combatants in recognized internal armed conflicts worldwide. A signal distinction is that Rio,s internal armed conflict is not generalized throughout a national or even regional theater. Instead, it is occurring within relatively discreet urban pockets (though violence can spill outside favelas), spread throughout a celebrated and highly developed megacity, one of two (with Sao Paulo) in a democratic country with one of the world,s largest economies. That cruel and decades-old dichotomy may have become, finally, more than Rio residents and Brazil,s leaders can absorb, and their frustration and the focusing energy of the 2016 Olympics seem to be galvanizing state, municipal and federal government. There is a growing consenus that now is the time to confront the plague of violence in Rio in a decisive manner, but it remains to be seen whether Rio,s Favela Pacification Program, possible new federal-level public security initiatives, and additional funding for public security will be sufficient to help Rio de Janeiro quell its long internal armed conflict. HEARNE
För att spegla WikiLeaks - Klicka på länken nedan och välj ett eget dokument att lägga upp:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
Här är mitt bidrag för idag:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIO DE JANEIRO 000357
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV ASEC BR
SUBJECT: (C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT"
REF: A. (A) RIO 329
¶B. (B) RIO 346 Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne for reasons 1.4 (b, d )
¶1. (C) Summary: Rio Principal Officer, accompanied by PAO, met on 23 October with XXXX (strictly protect), XXX for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. XXXX has long ICRC experience in conflict zones. It is his assessment that the situation in many Rio favelas today is, for all practical purposes, a full-blown internal armed conflict, and not simply an urban crime problem. While XXXX recognizes he can say nothing of the sort publicly, and that the de jure definition in International Humanitarian Law for "internal armed conflict" may not describe precisely the violence in Rio, he makes a compelling case. The corollary is that the ICRC is quietly working in Rio favelas in much the way it does in other war zones - attempting to establish "humanitarian spaces" for treating or evacuating the wounded,facilitating release of captives, getting services and supplies to civilians isolated by violence, and requesting access (not yet granted) to gang members in prison populations. The dichotomy of extensive armed conflict raging in a celebrated and highly developed megacity in an economically powerful democracy may be becoming more than Brazilians can absorb, and frustration and the focusing effect of the 2016 Olympics in Rio seem to be galvanizing the public and state and federal governments to seek decisive action. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a 23 October meeting with Principal Officer and PAO sought by ICRC XXXX in Rio de Janeiro, XXXX, XXXXX made a compelling argument that the continuing violence in Rio,s favelas constitutes, for all practical purposes, a full-blown "internal armed conflict." XXXX said he would never take such a position publicly, given Brazilian sensitivities, nor does he argue that Rio,s violence matches in every detail the de jure definition of "internal armed conflict" under International Humanitarian Law. (Note: The relevant definition is in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. End Note.) Nonetheless, in its main features -- i.e., organized factions holding the monopoly on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for ICRC to operate as though in a war zone to create "humanitarian spaces" -- the gang warfare in Rio,s favelas resembles other situations worldwide that are formally recognized by governments and international organizations as internal armed conflicts, XXX said. XXXX speaks with conviction, reflecting his long ICRC experience in conflict zones, including in Haiti, in Uganda and in Sierra Leone,s civil war. In the course of the discussion, XXX made the following specific observations: --Currently ICRC operates in 7 Rio favelas: Mare, Parada de Lucas, Cidade de Deus, Cantagalo, Pavao/Pavaozinho, Complexo de Alemao, and Vila Vintem. State Security Secretary Jose Beltrame is the ICRC,s senior interlocutor in Rio. ICRC also has asked for access to the state prison system, which has not yet been accepted (although he noted that there was support at federal level, including from Justice Minister Tarso Genro); --The ICRC works to create "humanitarian spaces" in favela conflict areas, proceeding cautiously, first using local NGOpartners such as AfroReggae and Luta Pela Paz. In concrete examples, this has meant trying to convince gang factions to recognize certain places -- e.g., schools, clinics -- as "safe areas," working to establish mechanisms to locate and negotiate release of hostages, bringing basic supplies (including food and water) to civilians who are regularly isolated by the most extreme violence inside areas XXX called "favelas within favelas." ICRC is also working with former staffers of Doctors Without Borders to address treatment and evacuation of wounded or deceased persons, XXXX said. He noted MSF closed its operation in the notorious Complexo de Alemao favela when it was not regularly able to fulfill its mandate of treating wounded citizens, owing to the grim fact that the lethality of the conflict in Rio,s favelas leaves mostly dead victims; --Now ICRC is building up its own network. Increasingly, its delegates speak directly with leaders of gangs and militias, as well as with police. Contact with gang members is not direct initially, but word of ICRC interest in contacting specific gang leaders is passed through mediators, and mutually acceptable conditions are set for a meeting. ICRC uses clearly marked vehicles and communicates its movements in advance to all sides, just as in other war zones where it operates; --ICRC also works on health initiatives as well as education, but XXXXX allowed that such activities were, in part, "cover" for ICRC,s efforts to protect civilians from violence; --In prisons, ICRC is concerned primarily with the human rights situation, and with violence driven by gang dynamics. There is also an opportunity to meet with imprisoned gang faction leaders to emphasize that ICRC,s work in favelas is not political, and is intended to alleviate suffering of citizens. And there is the humanitarian issue of facilitating contact with prisoners by family members who may not be able to visit prisons because of factional violence (e.g., A family member from a favela controlled by one gang may put themselves and their incarcerated relative at risk if they attempt to enter a prison dominated by a rival gang.); --XXXX applauds the state Favela Pacification Program (FPP) and the community-based Police Pacification Units (UPP) and sees their value in extending government control and reducing the stigma of living in favelas, but does not believe that the plan is sufficient to fundamentally change the security situation, at least not for several years (ref A); --ICRC must be sensitive and low-profile in its work, and XXXX pointed out his staff is "hidden" in the basement of the historical headquarters building of the Brazilian Red Cross national organization. The Brazilian Red Cross is increasingly engaged by ICRC to assist in its efforts in the favelas.
¶3. (C) Comment: One does not have to completely agree with XXXX assessment to concede that this battle-hardened ICRC professional makes a cogent case for viewing the situation in many of Rio,s favelas as one of sustained internal armed conflict, as opposed to simply urban criminal violence. The Rio combatants are, of course, rival criminal gangs, militia groups, and the police, as opposed to political or ethnic factions. But in the gangs, complete control of geographic areas (Rio Governor Sergio Cabral recently referred to gang-dominated favelas as "occupied territories"), their relatively elaborate command and control structures, their powerful military weaponry, and in the horrendous body count they leave behind, Rio,s gangs do resemble combatants in recognized internal armed conflicts worldwide. A signal distinction is that Rio,s internal armed conflict is not generalized throughout a national or even regional theater. Instead, it is occurring within relatively discreet urban pockets (though violence can spill outside favelas), spread throughout a celebrated and highly developed megacity, one of two (with Sao Paulo) in a democratic country with one of the world,s largest economies. That cruel and decades-old dichotomy may have become, finally, more than Rio residents and Brazil,s leaders can absorb, and their frustration and the focusing energy of the 2016 Olympics seem to be galvanizing state, municipal and federal government. There is a growing consenus that now is the time to confront the plague of violence in Rio in a decisive manner, but it remains to be seen whether Rio,s Favela Pacification Program, possible new federal-level public security initiatives, and additional funding for public security will be sufficient to help Rio de Janeiro quell its long internal armed conflict. HEARNE
måndag 6 december 2010
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-------
Här följer kopierad text av ett (1) dokument:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002561
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SY KU IR TU
SUBJECT: THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS
NEIGHBORS, PART II
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (U) This is the second of two cables reviewing Iraq's
relations with key neighboring countries. this cable focuses
on Iraq's relations with Syria, in the wake of the August 19
bombings.
¶2. (C) Summary: Iraq's improving relations with its
neighbors in 2008 and early 2009 represented a critical
element in its efforts to maintain security and stability and
normalize its position in the Gulf and the broader region.
The August 19 bombings -- targeting the MFA, and by extension
Iraq's improving relations with its neighbors -- represent a
serious setback and have alarmed senior Iraqi officials,
suggesting that Iraqi Sunni Arab neighbors in particular now
view those earlier gains as "reversible." These fears help
explain the rapid deterioration in relations with Syria and
the GOI's demand that the UN intervene to investigate the
August 19 bombings, so as to put Syria on notice that the
international community is scrutinizing its use of Iraqi
Ba'athist proxies to interfere in Iraq. Iraq's relations
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey are covered in Part I
of this message. End Summary.
PROGRESS WITH THE NEIGHBORS, 2008-09
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) From 2008 through much of the summer, Iraq's
relations with its neighbors were on a positive trajectory
overall. The breakthroughs in regional engagement began in
the fall of 2008 (following sustained USG pressure), with the
UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait all sending ambassadors to Baghdad,
along with Jordan, the Arab League, and Syria. Iraq also
began its regular participation in the GCC 3 in 2008. While
there was less formal movement in 2009, the positive trend
continued, as the GOI named 58 new ambassadors and the
Egyptian government took steps to return its ambassador. The
continuing signs of improvement in security in Iraq in 2008
and the first half of 2009 provided a growing sense that Iraq
was becoming a much more secure place and getting strong
enough to ward off, or at least better control, neighbors'
meddling in its internal affairs.
¶4. (C) However, not all the trendlines were positive during
this period. Despite pressure from us, the Saudis refused to
send an ambassador (although they received Iraq's ambassador
in Riyadh), reflecting Riyadh's and King Abdullah's, in
particular, deep-seated doubts about a Shia-led democracy in
Iraq. Relations with other key countries in the region,
including Syria, Kuwait, and even Turkey, also experienced
varying degrees of drag on positive movement, ranging from
foreign fighters issues in Syria to Chapter VII issues in
Kuwait and water shortfalls from Turkey. The perception
among many Iraqis during this period was that despite the
gains in normalization and regional integration, Iraq was a
pitiful (former) regional giant, preyed upon and held back in
various ways by neighbors intent on keeping it weak and
taking advantage of it.
AUGUST 19: A THREAT TO NORMALIZATION TRENDS
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The August 19 bombings which severely damaged the MFA
and the Ministry of Finance buildings and Baghdad's
residents' sense of improving security, brought these
negative trendlines into sharp relief. The bombings undercut
the perception of normalization that had become a commonplace
over the past eighteen months (and undercut PM Maliki's
platform of having delivered on security). Iraqis, both
official and unofficial, believe it was no accident that one
of the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
Qof the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
damage, is the MFA, symbol of Iraq's efforts to build
relations with its neighbors and normalize its position in
the region.
¶6. (C) In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, FM Zebari
made accusations that one or more of the neighboring
countries had conspired with al-Qaeda, possibly using
proxies, to support the bombings. In a meeting with the
Ambassador, PM Maliki referred to a "momentum of
interference" that was building in the lead-up to the January
national elections. Zebari described the next 5-6 month
time-frame as "a period of maximum danger" for Iraq. The
bombings were meant to convey the perception -- welcomed by
some neighbors, he insisted -- that the security and
normalization in Iraq of the past two years were "reversible."
DO THE NEIGHBORS HAVE IT IN FOR IRAQ?
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Iraqi contacts speculated that regional unease about
BAGHDAD 00002561 002 OF 002
a Shia-led Iraqi government, and about the democratic
character of that government, a model that could eventually
undermine the legitimacy of more autocratic regimes in the
region, helped explain why some neighbors would prefer a weak
and unstable Iraq, where security and political gains of the
past two years are rolled back. Acting NSC Advisor Dr. Safa
al-Sheikh described the neighbors as bent on intervening in
Iraq, especially in the months leading up to the January 2010
elections. While some used proxies to foment violence,
others restricted themselves to money, media (propaganda),
and meddling, all designed to help shape electoral
coalitions, and block or further individual political
careers, in order to better control Iraq and keep it weak,
politically fractured, and pliable, insisted al-Sheikh. PM
Maliki told the Ambassador that neighbors feared a resurgent
Iraq that would capture too much of "the limelight."
According to Maliki, neighbors also feared Iraq's "golden
connection between Shia and Sunni Islam," a legacy that gives
Iraq special precedence in the region. His argument is based
on a well-acknowledged fact that Iraq is the grand junction
of Shia and Sunni Islam as well as of the Arab world and
Persia, making it, therefore, both strategically vital but
also vulnerable. The view of key contacts here is that some
of Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors have concluded that in a
stable, peaceful Iraqi democracy, Sunni political power in
Iraq would be finished. These Arab neighbors, therefore,
conclude that the only way the Sunnis will ever come back
into power in Iraq is in the wake of a period of sustained
instability and violence that de-legitimizes democratic
governance and the Shia as Iraqi political leaders.
RELATIONS WITH SYRIA IN CRISIS
------------------------------
¶8. (C) Relations with Syria suffered the most precipitous
decline in the wake of the attacks, with mutual recalls of
Ambassadors and public statements making clear the GOI felt
Syria was complicit. While Syrian support for Iraqi
Ba'athists has long been a significant bilateral irritant,
the GOI's public claim that Syrian-based insurgents were
responsible for August 19 represented a significant shift.
To the al-Maliki government, the problem was now seen as an
existential threat to the state and the GOI could no longer
treat the issue with routine diplomacy, especially given
fears these attacks were only the first wave. According to
Maliki and al-Sheikh, senior Iraqi security officers had seen
a growing body of intelligence in the months leading up to
attacks indicating significant cooperation between Iraqi
Ba'athists and al-Qaeda, although Sheikh acknowledged that
the proof for Iraqi Ba'athist involvement in the August 19
bombings had been assembled "somewhat quickly." He explained
that at the cell level, Ba'athists participate with some
al-Qaida groups -- usually disguising their Baathist
sympathies -- and often dominate the local groups because
they have highly prized skills such as experience handling
weapons and explosives.
¶9. (C) Iraqi officials make clear that despite the current
problems with Syria, they foresee the possibility of improved
relations in the future. PM Maliki recently stated that Iraq
wanted a harder-line USG policy toward Syria only to the
extent it would help compel Syria to stop misbehaving and be
a better neighbor. The problem, according to Maliki and
others, is that Syria is a neighborhood menace with a history
of fomenting violence and inciting instability in the region
-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
Q-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
of diplomacy. Iraq's problem is that it is too weak on its
own to intimidate Syria into behaving. With no troops "to
mass on the border" as a threat, as Turkey had once done, and
taking his cue from Lebanon's experience following the Hariri
assassination, Maliki felt he had no recourse but to take the
issue to the UNSC, hoping this diplomatic "stick" might
persuade Bashar and his regime to back off. Iraq is looking
to the United States and other members of the P-5 to endorse
the appointment by the UNSYG of a senior official to
investigate the August 19 bombings and external support for
terrorism in Iraq. (NOTE: Not all Iraqi officials agreed
with the PM's approach. On September 5, Iraq's three
presidents -- Talabani, Hashimi and Abd al-Mahdi -- issued a
statement calling for containing tension between Iraq and
Syria through diplomatic channels, an obvious rejection of
Maliki's insistence on UN involvement. END NOTE.)
¶10. (U) Iraq's relations Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and
Turkey are covered in Part I of this message.
HILL
Den här bloggen finns enbart till för att förklara för världens makthavare och världens folk att MÄNNISKAN ÄR FÖDD FRI.
Därför väljer jag att publicera Wikileaks dokument här. Jag hoppas kunna publicera minst ett dokument per dag, i syfte att spegla Wikileaks, så att Wikileaks aldrig upphör existera!
TA DEL AV REVOLUTIONEN - sätt upp en blogg, hemsida och publicera dessa dokument! Vi är alla fria och ingen makthavare ska ta den friheten från oss!
Själv tillhör jag Liberaldemokraterna i Sverige och det vi sätter främst på schemat är individens rätt till FRIHET!
www.liberaldemokraterna.com
-------
Här följer kopierad text av ett (1) dokument:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002561
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SY KU IR TU
SUBJECT: THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS
NEIGHBORS, PART II
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (U) This is the second of two cables reviewing Iraq's
relations with key neighboring countries. this cable focuses
on Iraq's relations with Syria, in the wake of the August 19
bombings.
¶2. (C) Summary: Iraq's improving relations with its
neighbors in 2008 and early 2009 represented a critical
element in its efforts to maintain security and stability and
normalize its position in the Gulf and the broader region.
The August 19 bombings -- targeting the MFA, and by extension
Iraq's improving relations with its neighbors -- represent a
serious setback and have alarmed senior Iraqi officials,
suggesting that Iraqi Sunni Arab neighbors in particular now
view those earlier gains as "reversible." These fears help
explain the rapid deterioration in relations with Syria and
the GOI's demand that the UN intervene to investigate the
August 19 bombings, so as to put Syria on notice that the
international community is scrutinizing its use of Iraqi
Ba'athist proxies to interfere in Iraq. Iraq's relations
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey are covered in Part I
of this message. End Summary.
PROGRESS WITH THE NEIGHBORS, 2008-09
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) From 2008 through much of the summer, Iraq's
relations with its neighbors were on a positive trajectory
overall. The breakthroughs in regional engagement began in
the fall of 2008 (following sustained USG pressure), with the
UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait all sending ambassadors to Baghdad,
along with Jordan, the Arab League, and Syria. Iraq also
began its regular participation in the GCC 3 in 2008. While
there was less formal movement in 2009, the positive trend
continued, as the GOI named 58 new ambassadors and the
Egyptian government took steps to return its ambassador. The
continuing signs of improvement in security in Iraq in 2008
and the first half of 2009 provided a growing sense that Iraq
was becoming a much more secure place and getting strong
enough to ward off, or at least better control, neighbors'
meddling in its internal affairs.
¶4. (C) However, not all the trendlines were positive during
this period. Despite pressure from us, the Saudis refused to
send an ambassador (although they received Iraq's ambassador
in Riyadh), reflecting Riyadh's and King Abdullah's, in
particular, deep-seated doubts about a Shia-led democracy in
Iraq. Relations with other key countries in the region,
including Syria, Kuwait, and even Turkey, also experienced
varying degrees of drag on positive movement, ranging from
foreign fighters issues in Syria to Chapter VII issues in
Kuwait and water shortfalls from Turkey. The perception
among many Iraqis during this period was that despite the
gains in normalization and regional integration, Iraq was a
pitiful (former) regional giant, preyed upon and held back in
various ways by neighbors intent on keeping it weak and
taking advantage of it.
AUGUST 19: A THREAT TO NORMALIZATION TRENDS
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The August 19 bombings which severely damaged the MFA
and the Ministry of Finance buildings and Baghdad's
residents' sense of improving security, brought these
negative trendlines into sharp relief. The bombings undercut
the perception of normalization that had become a commonplace
over the past eighteen months (and undercut PM Maliki's
platform of having delivered on security). Iraqis, both
official and unofficial, believe it was no accident that one
of the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
Qof the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
damage, is the MFA, symbol of Iraq's efforts to build
relations with its neighbors and normalize its position in
the region.
¶6. (C) In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, FM Zebari
made accusations that one or more of the neighboring
countries had conspired with al-Qaeda, possibly using
proxies, to support the bombings. In a meeting with the
Ambassador, PM Maliki referred to a "momentum of
interference" that was building in the lead-up to the January
national elections. Zebari described the next 5-6 month
time-frame as "a period of maximum danger" for Iraq. The
bombings were meant to convey the perception -- welcomed by
some neighbors, he insisted -- that the security and
normalization in Iraq of the past two years were "reversible."
DO THE NEIGHBORS HAVE IT IN FOR IRAQ?
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Iraqi contacts speculated that regional unease about
BAGHDAD 00002561 002 OF 002
a Shia-led Iraqi government, and about the democratic
character of that government, a model that could eventually
undermine the legitimacy of more autocratic regimes in the
region, helped explain why some neighbors would prefer a weak
and unstable Iraq, where security and political gains of the
past two years are rolled back. Acting NSC Advisor Dr. Safa
al-Sheikh described the neighbors as bent on intervening in
Iraq, especially in the months leading up to the January 2010
elections. While some used proxies to foment violence,
others restricted themselves to money, media (propaganda),
and meddling, all designed to help shape electoral
coalitions, and block or further individual political
careers, in order to better control Iraq and keep it weak,
politically fractured, and pliable, insisted al-Sheikh. PM
Maliki told the Ambassador that neighbors feared a resurgent
Iraq that would capture too much of "the limelight."
According to Maliki, neighbors also feared Iraq's "golden
connection between Shia and Sunni Islam," a legacy that gives
Iraq special precedence in the region. His argument is based
on a well-acknowledged fact that Iraq is the grand junction
of Shia and Sunni Islam as well as of the Arab world and
Persia, making it, therefore, both strategically vital but
also vulnerable. The view of key contacts here is that some
of Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors have concluded that in a
stable, peaceful Iraqi democracy, Sunni political power in
Iraq would be finished. These Arab neighbors, therefore,
conclude that the only way the Sunnis will ever come back
into power in Iraq is in the wake of a period of sustained
instability and violence that de-legitimizes democratic
governance and the Shia as Iraqi political leaders.
RELATIONS WITH SYRIA IN CRISIS
------------------------------
¶8. (C) Relations with Syria suffered the most precipitous
decline in the wake of the attacks, with mutual recalls of
Ambassadors and public statements making clear the GOI felt
Syria was complicit. While Syrian support for Iraqi
Ba'athists has long been a significant bilateral irritant,
the GOI's public claim that Syrian-based insurgents were
responsible for August 19 represented a significant shift.
To the al-Maliki government, the problem was now seen as an
existential threat to the state and the GOI could no longer
treat the issue with routine diplomacy, especially given
fears these attacks were only the first wave. According to
Maliki and al-Sheikh, senior Iraqi security officers had seen
a growing body of intelligence in the months leading up to
attacks indicating significant cooperation between Iraqi
Ba'athists and al-Qaeda, although Sheikh acknowledged that
the proof for Iraqi Ba'athist involvement in the August 19
bombings had been assembled "somewhat quickly." He explained
that at the cell level, Ba'athists participate with some
al-Qaida groups -- usually disguising their Baathist
sympathies -- and often dominate the local groups because
they have highly prized skills such as experience handling
weapons and explosives.
¶9. (C) Iraqi officials make clear that despite the current
problems with Syria, they foresee the possibility of improved
relations in the future. PM Maliki recently stated that Iraq
wanted a harder-line USG policy toward Syria only to the
extent it would help compel Syria to stop misbehaving and be
a better neighbor. The problem, according to Maliki and
others, is that Syria is a neighborhood menace with a history
of fomenting violence and inciting instability in the region
-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
Q-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
of diplomacy. Iraq's problem is that it is too weak on its
own to intimidate Syria into behaving. With no troops "to
mass on the border" as a threat, as Turkey had once done, and
taking his cue from Lebanon's experience following the Hariri
assassination, Maliki felt he had no recourse but to take the
issue to the UNSC, hoping this diplomatic "stick" might
persuade Bashar and his regime to back off. Iraq is looking
to the United States and other members of the P-5 to endorse
the appointment by the UNSYG of a senior official to
investigate the August 19 bombings and external support for
terrorism in Iraq. (NOTE: Not all Iraqi officials agreed
with the PM's approach. On September 5, Iraq's three
presidents -- Talabani, Hashimi and Abd al-Mahdi -- issued a
statement calling for containing tension between Iraq and
Syria through diplomatic channels, an obvious rejection of
Maliki's insistence on UN involvement. END NOTE.)
¶10. (U) Iraq's relations Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and
Turkey are covered in Part I of this message.
HILL
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