NEW DOCUMENT - I am WikiLeaks!
Don't forget to Mirror WikiLeaks
---------------
VZCZCXRO5952
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #3969 0481658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171655Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2923C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 013969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM CH EUN
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA
REF: USEU 133
Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is an action request for all Embassies
in EU countries to reiterate our position that the EU should
retain its arms embargo on China. Spanish officials,
including the Spanish Foreign Minister, signaled a possible
review of the arms embargo under Spain's Presidency of the
EU. Although USEU reports that there is no active discussion
of this in Brussels (reftel), we believe it is important to
reiterate that the U.S. remains firmly opposed to any lifting
of the embargo. END SUMMARY.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (U) Spanish Ambassador to China Carlos Blasco told Chinese
journalists on January 21 that "we hope to intensify talks on
lifting the (arms) embargo." Subsequently, when asked about
these comments at a January 26 press conference, Spanish
Foreign Minister Moratinos stated that his government would
be "reviewing the decision" on and "weighing the pros and
cons" of lifting the arms embargo.
¶3. (C) The EU imposed the arms embargo on China, alongside a
similar U.S. arms embargo, following the violent suppression
of protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The last major
push to lift the EU arms embargo came in late 2004/early
¶2005. France and Germany were strong proponents of lifting
the embargo at the time. In the end, a combination of our
public and private opposition, NGO pressure, and the passage
of a Chinese anti-secession law authorizing the use of force
against Taiwan persuaded EU governments to maintain the
embargo.
¶4. (C/REL EU MEMBER STATES) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are asked
to approach host government at the appropriate level to
reaffirm U.S. opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo,
and solicit host government views on the issues, using the
below talking points:
-- We are concerned by recent comments suggesting that the EU
may consider lifting its arms embargo on China.
-- The United States position on an arms embargo has not
changed since the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989 or since
the last time the EU considered lifting the ban in 2004: We
continue to believe that lifting the embargo is not
warranted, on either human rights or security grounds.
-- In terms of human rights, the Chinese Government's actions
over the last few months have ignored international concern
over specific human rights cases, including the harsh
sentencing of Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison and the
execution of British citizen Akmal Shaikh. Public comments
at this time from senior European officials suggesting that
the EU may seek to lift the arms embargo undercut these
international concerns regarding Beijing's human rights
practices.
-- We refer you to the Department of Defense's annual PLA
Military Power Report, which highlights the increased
capabilities of Chinese military forces. Lifting the arms
embargo would have serious implications for the security and
stability of the Pacific region.
-- (If the EU's Code of Conduct is brought up) We believe
that the Code of Conduct and 'toolbox' of export controls
cannot replace the embargo.
-- We should continue to discuss the requirements of security
and stability in East Asia in the context of the U.S.-EU
strategic dialogue on Asia.
¶5. (U) Please slug all responses for EUR/ERA, EAP/CM, PM/RSAT
and ISN/RA. Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
CLINTON
Visar inlägg med etikett Beatrice Ask. Visa alla inlägg
Visar inlägg med etikett Beatrice Ask. Visa alla inlägg
onsdag 15 december 2010
fredag 10 december 2010
A cyber war? I am WikiLeaks!
Yes, there is something really big going on. I would rather call these current events a revolution. A revolution of freedom of speach, freedom of expression and freedom of mind. So, keep up the good work here, and spread the mirrors anywhere you possible can!
And by the way, to me it seems very strange organizing this Openleaks. And why doesn't the source in this article from SvD
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/wikileaks-far-konkurrens_5799861.svd
openly tell us his/hers namn? It smells all funny gags here...
This is my contribution today!
----------------
Friday, 11 January 2008, 11:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000125
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/MLS, P, DRL
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2028
TAGS PREL, PHUM, CH, BM
SUBJECT: MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA’S EFFORTS ON BURMA
REF: 07 BEIJING 7197
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) Summary: China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current “standstill†in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw China’s attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) MFA Asia Department Counselor Yang Jian and Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Asia scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang met HFAC professional staff members Eric Richardson and Dennis Halpin and SFRC professional staff member Frank Januzzi on January 10-11.
“Bold Measures†Necessary to Prevent Further Turmoil
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶3. (C) Counselor Yang Jian told the HFAC and SFRC staff members January 11 that China would like to see the Burmese Government take “bold measures†to improve the livelihood of the Burmese people and achieve national reconciliation through dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy supporters as well as ethnic minority groups. Counselor Yang stated that the Chinese accept the Burmese regime’s so-called “roadmap†to democracy as the best route to democracy and national reconciliation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said the Burmese government exerts control over society only on the surface and the potential for “lots of trouble†persists. Zhai said the regime’s inept handling of the economy costs it legitimacy. Even if the Burmese generals and Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a healthy dialogue, economic problems could throw the country into turmoil.
Encouraging Signs but Current Standstill
----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Yang said despite the potential for further trouble, the Chinese government is encouraged by a number of developments since the disturbances in August and September, including the visits of UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, the appointment of Labor Minister Aung Kyi (who Yang believes is “close to the core†of the Burmese regime) as a liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, and the release of detainees. Yang said that during VFM Wang Yi’s November 2007 visit to Burma (reftel), Wang shared with senior Burmese leaders China’s analysis, again suggesting more attention to the livelihood of the Burmese people, dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, and more interaction with ASEAN. Yang said that, based on the regime’s positive language about the dialogue, China had been optimistic it would succeed. In light of the current “standstill†in Burma, however, China is thinking about what other steps now to take with the regime.
China’s “Extraordinary†Efforts
-------------------------------
¶5. (C) Yang recounted China’s efforts to improve the situation in Burma. She said that after China and Russia in January 2007 vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan traveled to Burma in February to hold “extraordinary†discussions with the regime’s senior leaders. Tang suggested that Senior General Than Shwe and other Burmese leaders improve Burma’s domestic and international situation. Yang said lower level Burmese officials, hesitant to approach senior leaders with critical advice, were pleased with China’s approach to Than Shwe.
¶6. (C) Scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang January 10 separately echoed the view that China is making great efforts to influence Burma positively while adhering to its policy of non-interference. Zhai said China has delivered indirect but clear signals to Asian countries and the United States on the need for greater openness in Burma. Zhai highlighted Premier Wen Jiabao’s November 19 speech at the National University of Singapore. (Note: Wen’s speech included the following: “Only an open and inclusive nation can be strong and
BEIJING 00000125 002 OF 003
prosperous; cutting off contacts with the outside world can make a country backward.â€)
Direct U.S.-Burma Dialogue
--------------------------
¶7. (C) During the Wang Yi visit, Burmese leaders expressed interest in more discussions with the United States. Noting that USG officials have suggested Burmese officials contact our Embassy in Rangoon, Yang said Burma preferred the format of the June 2007 talks in Beijing. China views the June meetings between the Burmese delegation and State Department officials as a “bilateral confidence building measure,†Yang said.
Continued Support for Gambari
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Yang said China will continue to support UN Special Advisor Gambari’s mission, though she noted that the Burmese Government is unhappy with Gambari because Burmese leaders believe they followed Gambari’s suggestions during his first visit but then received only further opprobrium. Yang said Burmese leaders are unhappy about the UN “Group of Friends†on Burma. While China is open to multilateral means to address the situation in Burma, China believes Burma’s acceptance of these means is the key to success. For example, China would like ASEAN to play a more constructive role, Yang said, but ASEAN is divided over how to address Burma. Older ASEAN member countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, favor a hard-line approach. Newer ASEAN members, such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, support a more moderate stance towards Burma.
No Sanctions
------------
¶9. (C) MFA’s Yang reiterated that China remains opposed to additional sanctions, which she said will not spur further dialogue, but instead make the regime look further inward and give it an excuse for hard-line polices. Despite China’s opposition to sanctions, Yang stressed that the United States and China have similar goals for Burma, including stability, democracy and development. Therefore, China and the United States should show unity, particularly in the UN, in addressing the situation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said that because China foremost values stability in Burma, China does not wish to see a sudden change in the Burmese regime. In that light, China fears the pressure of more sanctions may only bring further civil unrest.
China’s attention drawn away from Burma
---------------------------------------
¶10. (C) CICIR’s Zhai said China would like to see ASEAN play a larger role on Burma partly because domestic events in China, including the National People’s Congress in March and the Olympics in August, are increasingly consuming China’s attention. Zhai said recent protests in Vietnam over the South China Sea and the turmoil in Pakistan have also drawn China’s and international attention away from Burma.
Including democracy supporters slows down roadmap
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶11. (C) Zhai said that including the democratic opposition and ethnic groups in the so-called roadmap to democracy at this stage would slow down the process, yet Zhai asserted that “if Senior General Than Shwe is rational,†he will include the democratic opposition to increase the legitimacy of the current regime.
USG should assure safe future for Burmese generals
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶12. (C) CICIR’s Zhang said that the United States should “play two hands†with the Burmese Government. Zhang said the United States has been sufficiently critical of the regime and now should send messages, via China if necessary, to reassure Burmese military leaders that their personal security would not be imperiled in a democratic transition. Zhang said that guaranteeing the safe future of the current military leadership is the key to “unlocking the deadlock.â€
¶13. (U) HFAC and SFRC staff members did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.
BEIJING 00000125 003 OF 003
RANDT
And by the way, to me it seems very strange organizing this Openleaks. And why doesn't the source in this article from SvD
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/wikileaks-far-konkurrens_5799861.svd
openly tell us his/hers namn? It smells all funny gags here...
This is my contribution today!
----------------
Friday, 11 January 2008, 11:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000125
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/MLS, P, DRL
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2028
TAGS PREL, PHUM, CH, BM
SUBJECT: MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA’S EFFORTS ON BURMA
REF: 07 BEIJING 7197
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) Summary: China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current “standstill†in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw China’s attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) MFA Asia Department Counselor Yang Jian and Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Asia scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang met HFAC professional staff members Eric Richardson and Dennis Halpin and SFRC professional staff member Frank Januzzi on January 10-11.
“Bold Measures†Necessary to Prevent Further Turmoil
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶3. (C) Counselor Yang Jian told the HFAC and SFRC staff members January 11 that China would like to see the Burmese Government take “bold measures†to improve the livelihood of the Burmese people and achieve national reconciliation through dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy supporters as well as ethnic minority groups. Counselor Yang stated that the Chinese accept the Burmese regime’s so-called “roadmap†to democracy as the best route to democracy and national reconciliation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said the Burmese government exerts control over society only on the surface and the potential for “lots of trouble†persists. Zhai said the regime’s inept handling of the economy costs it legitimacy. Even if the Burmese generals and Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a healthy dialogue, economic problems could throw the country into turmoil.
Encouraging Signs but Current Standstill
----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Yang said despite the potential for further trouble, the Chinese government is encouraged by a number of developments since the disturbances in August and September, including the visits of UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, the appointment of Labor Minister Aung Kyi (who Yang believes is “close to the core†of the Burmese regime) as a liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, and the release of detainees. Yang said that during VFM Wang Yi’s November 2007 visit to Burma (reftel), Wang shared with senior Burmese leaders China’s analysis, again suggesting more attention to the livelihood of the Burmese people, dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, and more interaction with ASEAN. Yang said that, based on the regime’s positive language about the dialogue, China had been optimistic it would succeed. In light of the current “standstill†in Burma, however, China is thinking about what other steps now to take with the regime.
China’s “Extraordinary†Efforts
-------------------------------
¶5. (C) Yang recounted China’s efforts to improve the situation in Burma. She said that after China and Russia in January 2007 vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan traveled to Burma in February to hold “extraordinary†discussions with the regime’s senior leaders. Tang suggested that Senior General Than Shwe and other Burmese leaders improve Burma’s domestic and international situation. Yang said lower level Burmese officials, hesitant to approach senior leaders with critical advice, were pleased with China’s approach to Than Shwe.
¶6. (C) Scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang January 10 separately echoed the view that China is making great efforts to influence Burma positively while adhering to its policy of non-interference. Zhai said China has delivered indirect but clear signals to Asian countries and the United States on the need for greater openness in Burma. Zhai highlighted Premier Wen Jiabao’s November 19 speech at the National University of Singapore. (Note: Wen’s speech included the following: “Only an open and inclusive nation can be strong and
BEIJING 00000125 002 OF 003
prosperous; cutting off contacts with the outside world can make a country backward.â€)
Direct U.S.-Burma Dialogue
--------------------------
¶7. (C) During the Wang Yi visit, Burmese leaders expressed interest in more discussions with the United States. Noting that USG officials have suggested Burmese officials contact our Embassy in Rangoon, Yang said Burma preferred the format of the June 2007 talks in Beijing. China views the June meetings between the Burmese delegation and State Department officials as a “bilateral confidence building measure,†Yang said.
Continued Support for Gambari
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Yang said China will continue to support UN Special Advisor Gambari’s mission, though she noted that the Burmese Government is unhappy with Gambari because Burmese leaders believe they followed Gambari’s suggestions during his first visit but then received only further opprobrium. Yang said Burmese leaders are unhappy about the UN “Group of Friends†on Burma. While China is open to multilateral means to address the situation in Burma, China believes Burma’s acceptance of these means is the key to success. For example, China would like ASEAN to play a more constructive role, Yang said, but ASEAN is divided over how to address Burma. Older ASEAN member countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, favor a hard-line approach. Newer ASEAN members, such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, support a more moderate stance towards Burma.
No Sanctions
------------
¶9. (C) MFA’s Yang reiterated that China remains opposed to additional sanctions, which she said will not spur further dialogue, but instead make the regime look further inward and give it an excuse for hard-line polices. Despite China’s opposition to sanctions, Yang stressed that the United States and China have similar goals for Burma, including stability, democracy and development. Therefore, China and the United States should show unity, particularly in the UN, in addressing the situation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said that because China foremost values stability in Burma, China does not wish to see a sudden change in the Burmese regime. In that light, China fears the pressure of more sanctions may only bring further civil unrest.
China’s attention drawn away from Burma
---------------------------------------
¶10. (C) CICIR’s Zhai said China would like to see ASEAN play a larger role on Burma partly because domestic events in China, including the National People’s Congress in March and the Olympics in August, are increasingly consuming China’s attention. Zhai said recent protests in Vietnam over the South China Sea and the turmoil in Pakistan have also drawn China’s and international attention away from Burma.
Including democracy supporters slows down roadmap
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶11. (C) Zhai said that including the democratic opposition and ethnic groups in the so-called roadmap to democracy at this stage would slow down the process, yet Zhai asserted that “if Senior General Than Shwe is rational,†he will include the democratic opposition to increase the legitimacy of the current regime.
USG should assure safe future for Burmese generals
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶12. (C) CICIR’s Zhang said that the United States should “play two hands†with the Burmese Government. Zhang said the United States has been sufficiently critical of the regime and now should send messages, via China if necessary, to reassure Burmese military leaders that their personal security would not be imperiled in a democratic transition. Zhang said that guaranteeing the safe future of the current military leadership is the key to “unlocking the deadlock.â€
¶13. (U) HFAC and SFRC staff members did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.
BEIJING 00000125 003 OF 003
RANDT
torsdag 9 december 2010
Operation Payback - I am WikiLeaks
Fortsätt kampen för ett fritt internet, en fri samtid och den fria tanken! Spegla WikiLeaks arbete på din blogg, hemsida, på insändare och länkar på Facebook!
Mejla din lokala politiker, ta kontakt med likasinnade på nätet/i verkligheten, diskutera och låt detta 1a Nätkrig :-) inte tystna!
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
Jag ställer mig positiv till den hackerattack (Operation Payback) som skedde under natten mot justitieminister Beatrice Ask, Claes Borgström med flera, därför att de förspråkar inte det fria och genomlysta samhället.
Här är dagens bidrag:
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell’s current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than “co-opt†the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell’s oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell’s oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell’s Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
¶3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF’s performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, “Boyloaf†was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been “settledâ€. End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell’s Concessions in Nigeria?
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM’s interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON’s prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister’s office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting “from Russia.†(Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn’t clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria’s ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of “surface to air missiles (SAMs)†to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has “intelligence†that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is “leaky.†She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
Mejla din lokala politiker, ta kontakt med likasinnade på nätet/i verkligheten, diskutera och låt detta 1a Nätkrig :-) inte tystna!
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
Jag ställer mig positiv till den hackerattack (Operation Payback) som skedde under natten mot justitieminister Beatrice Ask, Claes Borgström med flera, därför att de förspråkar inte det fria och genomlysta samhället.
Här är dagens bidrag:
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell’s current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than “co-opt†the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell’s oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell’s oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell’s Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
¶3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF’s performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
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¶4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, “Boyloaf†was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been “settledâ€. End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell’s Concessions in Nigeria?
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¶5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM’s interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON’s prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister’s office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting “from Russia.†(Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn’t clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria’s ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
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¶6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of “surface to air missiles (SAMs)†to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has “intelligence†that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is “leaky.†She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
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