Det blev ingen uppdatering igår tyvärr, men här är ett nytt dokument!
CABLE - Klicka här!
I am WikiLeaks!
-----------------
Wednesday, 15 November 2006, 11:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2016
TAGS AJ, PGOV, PREL, EPET, ENRG, RU
SUBJECT: BP AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENT SAYS AZERBAIJAN MOVING
SLOWLY TO ADDRESS GAS PROBLEM
REF: ANKARA 006396
Classified By: Ambassador Anne. E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a November 10 Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing, outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward told the Ambassador that according to SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev, Turkey had not agreed to forego its contracted for 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries as a way of helping Azerbaijan and Georgia with their winter gas problems, although they were willing to defer delivery of some amounts if the contracted for price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meters remained the same. Woodward said that Turkey was declaring itself ready to receive Shah Deniz gas, although he himself had doubts. He said that a joint BP-SOCAR working group would start work soon to discuss ways of redressing possible GOAJ domestic gas shortages in winter 2007. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On November 10 the Ambassador attended an Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing headed by outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward. Other attendees were incoming BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader, BP Group Azerbaijan Director for Communications and External Affairs Clare Bebbington, UK Ambassador Laurie Bristow, UK EconOff, and Econoff as notetaker.
READ-OUT OF TU-GOAJ MEETING
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (C) Woodward gave a read-out of his November 2 meeting with SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev. This meeting, prompted by the visit to Azerbaijan of BP Executive Vice-President and Deputy Chief Executive of Exploration and Production Andy Inglis, occurred right after Abdullayev had returned from Turkey with Deputy Prime Minister Abid Sharifov, where they had notified Turkey of intended delays in GOAJ 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries. Abdullayev, fresh off the plane, provided Woodward and Inglis a read-out of his Turkey meeting with Energy Minister Gular and Botas. Rovnaq told them that Botas would not sign the document he had brought, in which Turkey was asked to agree to GOAJ providing no Shah Deniz gas in 2007 and in which the GOAJ sought to re-open Shah Deniz price negotiations. Turkey insisted on receiving its contracted for 2007 three billion cubic meters (bcm) of Shah Deniz gas at the agreed upon price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meter (tcm), but said it did not have to receive it all in 2007. It proposed that it could take half (1.5 bcm) in winter 2007, with the rest to be received in 2008 or 2009, at the contracted price of USD 120/tcm. Abdullayev told Inglis that he had gotten Turkey to agree that it would be a transit country for Shah Deniz gas (vice a buyer-seller).
¶4. (C) During this November 2 meeting with Abdullayev and Sharifov, Energy Minister Gular also said that Turkey was ready to receive Shah Deniz gas. In this regard, Woodward said that he thinks that Botas will ask for commissioning gas during the week of November 13-17. As to how ready Turkey actually is to receive Shah Deniz gas, Woodward said that the BP opinion is that Botas still has a lot of work to do to complete the pipeline to include work on the valve stations, and that if the work were done in accordance with international standards then the pipeline might not be ready until spring 2007. However, he added that “it was not inconceivable†that Botas could “rush finish†the job so that it would be ready to receive gas shortly, although the pipeline would not meet international standards.
ACG PROBLEM RESOLUTION
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Woodward said that during the recent visit of BP Executive Inglis, BP had given both President Aliyev and SOCAR President Abdullayev a copy of a BP ‘white paper’ on the way forward for Azerbaijan in the energy sector, (a copy of which he gave to the Ambassador), with the focus on four main themes:
- ACG Maximum Development: Resolving current issues associated with ACG to maximize recovery - Short/medium/long term gas issues: Short-term - how to address this winter’s gas needs; Medium/Long-term: how best
BAKU 00001661 002 OF 003
to identify and exploit GOAJ gas reserves - SOCAR: how to help make SOCAR an energy company that meets international standards - BP Social Programs: putting a ‘harder edge’ on them, to help build capacity in Azerbaijan
¶6. (C) Woodward said that there were a series of outstanding ACG-related issues the resolution of which involved billions of dollars and which the AIOC partners were trying to resolve with SOCAR in a package, vice individually. In the November 2 meeting between SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and BP executive Inglis, Abdullayev said that he would head the SOCAR ACG steering group dealing with these problems, and that SOCAR VP Elshad Nassirov would be the SOCAR working level representative. Abdullayev also said he would head the SOCAR team on the BP-SOCAR gas working group, with Nassirov again the working-level representative. Woodward said that Abdullayev had an unrealistic expectation of how quickly these outstanding ACG issues could be resolved: whereas BP thinks that a framework within which to discuss the issues could be agreed upon by January, with actual negotiations over these issues lasting up to six months, Woodward said that Abdullayev told Inglis that the issues could be solved ‘within a few days.’
¶7. (C) Woodward said that Abdullayev did not show much willingness to engage with BP re Azerbaijan’s short-term (Winter 07) gas problems, contending that AIOC giving SOCAR more associated ACG gas could solve the problem. (Note: AIOC is scheduled to give 1.4 bcm of associated ACG gas to SOCAR in 2007; SOCAR is arguing that AIOC does not need to re-inject any ACG associated gas back into the well, and wants 3 bcm). Woodward said that all sides seemed to be waiting for the results of the President Aliyev-President Putin meeting in Moscow, although he himself doubted whether the two would reach any definitive agreement, as everyone is waiting to see the results of the various CIS bilateral Gazprom negotiations, to see if the USD 230/tcm level will hold.
BP GEORGIA GAS READOUT
----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Woodward said he and his replacement Bill Schrader had just returned from Georgia, where they had met separately with the Georgian Energy Minister, Environment Minister and Prime Minister, among others. At these meetings the Georgian proposal of a November three-way gas-focused Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian ministerial-level meeting in Tblisi or Ankara was discussed, although nothing definite had been agreed to by all parties. In their meetings, the GOG interlocutors had referred to Turkey’s Summer 2007 ‘agreement in principle’ to supply Georgia from its own Shah Deniz gas, although Woodward said in his opinion all Turkey had agreed to at that time was a ‘bring us a proposal and we’ll have a look at it’ type agreement. Woodward said that the GOG Energy Minister had told him that GA would not buy gas from Gazprom at USD 230/tcm, and that Turkey would supply GOG with 1.5 bcm in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM was more realistic, saying that perhaps Georgia could get 0.8 to 1.2 bcm from Turkey in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM seemed more relaxed about the upcoming winter gas situation than did the Energy Minister, and more concerned about Shah Deniz Stage Two-related issues, stating that, inter alia, Georgia and Azerbaijan should look at gas storage issues together, vice separately. Woodward said he got the impression that GOG was more concerned about the economics of gas purchases from Gazprom than the supply itself, and he noted that despite the intense rhetoric flowing between Russia and Georgia, the energy continues to flow.
SD PRODUCTION
------------------------
¶9. (C) Woodward agreed that Shah Deniz was experiencing production delays, but said that other issues would play a more determinative role in deciding where Shah Deniz gas went, such as the GOG technical capacity to uptake Shah Deniz gas at its border with Azerbaijan. He said that the Gas Pressure Reduction and Metering Station at Pump Station One in Georgia has a maximum daily design throughput of 4.0 million cubic meters, equivalent to 1.46 bcm/a at one hundred percent load (note: this compares to currently contracted
BAKU 00001661 003 OF 003
quantities which build up to around 08. bcm/a by 2011). As such, he said that part of the work of the SOCAR-BP gas working group that would be meeting imminently would be to model how much gas Georgia could uptake from Azerbaijan from a technical viewpoint. He noted that in addition to the SCP (i.e. Shah Deniz) pipeline, there was also the possibility of transferring gas from Azerbaijan to Georgia through the Azerbaijani gas system. As for Shah Deniz gas itself, Woodward said that as soon as the first two of the four wells start flowing (mid-November and late December respectively), will it be clear how quickly and how much production will be available for winter 2007.
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Before determining what steps to take to redress any possible winter 07 gas shortages in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Azerbaijan first needs to assess its current gas balance and possible alternative supply options. In this regard it is encouraging to hear that the joint BP-SOCAR gas working group is scheduled to meet the week of November 12. Woodward however was disparaging of the selection of SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and Deputy Prime Minister Sharifov as the GOAJ officials sent to Ankara to deal with the Turkish government (indeed, a Statoil representative told the Ambassador that Abdullayev had taken the wrong version of the Shah Deniz contract to the discussions), and despaired of any solution to the short-term regional problem occurring if management of the issue stayed at the SOCAR level. As such, he requested USG help in convincing Turkey to meet with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Now that Turkey is doing so (see reftel), Embassy will seek to ensure that the GOAJ participates at the appropriate level. END COMMENT. DERSE
Visar inlägg med etikett Operation Payback. Visa alla inlägg
Visar inlägg med etikett Operation Payback. Visa alla inlägg
lördag 18 december 2010
onsdag 15 december 2010
I am WikiLeaks - the revolution goes on!
NEW DOCUMENT - I am WikiLeaks!
Don't forget to Mirror WikiLeaks
---------------
VZCZCXRO5952
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #3969 0481658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171655Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2923C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 013969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM CH EUN
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA
REF: USEU 133
Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is an action request for all Embassies
in EU countries to reiterate our position that the EU should
retain its arms embargo on China. Spanish officials,
including the Spanish Foreign Minister, signaled a possible
review of the arms embargo under Spain's Presidency of the
EU. Although USEU reports that there is no active discussion
of this in Brussels (reftel), we believe it is important to
reiterate that the U.S. remains firmly opposed to any lifting
of the embargo. END SUMMARY.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (U) Spanish Ambassador to China Carlos Blasco told Chinese
journalists on January 21 that "we hope to intensify talks on
lifting the (arms) embargo." Subsequently, when asked about
these comments at a January 26 press conference, Spanish
Foreign Minister Moratinos stated that his government would
be "reviewing the decision" on and "weighing the pros and
cons" of lifting the arms embargo.
¶3. (C) The EU imposed the arms embargo on China, alongside a
similar U.S. arms embargo, following the violent suppression
of protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The last major
push to lift the EU arms embargo came in late 2004/early
¶2005. France and Germany were strong proponents of lifting
the embargo at the time. In the end, a combination of our
public and private opposition, NGO pressure, and the passage
of a Chinese anti-secession law authorizing the use of force
against Taiwan persuaded EU governments to maintain the
embargo.
¶4. (C/REL EU MEMBER STATES) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are asked
to approach host government at the appropriate level to
reaffirm U.S. opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo,
and solicit host government views on the issues, using the
below talking points:
-- We are concerned by recent comments suggesting that the EU
may consider lifting its arms embargo on China.
-- The United States position on an arms embargo has not
changed since the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989 or since
the last time the EU considered lifting the ban in 2004: We
continue to believe that lifting the embargo is not
warranted, on either human rights or security grounds.
-- In terms of human rights, the Chinese Government's actions
over the last few months have ignored international concern
over specific human rights cases, including the harsh
sentencing of Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison and the
execution of British citizen Akmal Shaikh. Public comments
at this time from senior European officials suggesting that
the EU may seek to lift the arms embargo undercut these
international concerns regarding Beijing's human rights
practices.
-- We refer you to the Department of Defense's annual PLA
Military Power Report, which highlights the increased
capabilities of Chinese military forces. Lifting the arms
embargo would have serious implications for the security and
stability of the Pacific region.
-- (If the EU's Code of Conduct is brought up) We believe
that the Code of Conduct and 'toolbox' of export controls
cannot replace the embargo.
-- We should continue to discuss the requirements of security
and stability in East Asia in the context of the U.S.-EU
strategic dialogue on Asia.
¶5. (U) Please slug all responses for EUR/ERA, EAP/CM, PM/RSAT
and ISN/RA. Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
CLINTON
Don't forget to Mirror WikiLeaks
---------------
VZCZCXRO5952
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #3969 0481658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171655Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2923C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 013969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM CH EUN
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA
REF: USEU 133
Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is an action request for all Embassies
in EU countries to reiterate our position that the EU should
retain its arms embargo on China. Spanish officials,
including the Spanish Foreign Minister, signaled a possible
review of the arms embargo under Spain's Presidency of the
EU. Although USEU reports that there is no active discussion
of this in Brussels (reftel), we believe it is important to
reiterate that the U.S. remains firmly opposed to any lifting
of the embargo. END SUMMARY.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (U) Spanish Ambassador to China Carlos Blasco told Chinese
journalists on January 21 that "we hope to intensify talks on
lifting the (arms) embargo." Subsequently, when asked about
these comments at a January 26 press conference, Spanish
Foreign Minister Moratinos stated that his government would
be "reviewing the decision" on and "weighing the pros and
cons" of lifting the arms embargo.
¶3. (C) The EU imposed the arms embargo on China, alongside a
similar U.S. arms embargo, following the violent suppression
of protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The last major
push to lift the EU arms embargo came in late 2004/early
¶2005. France and Germany were strong proponents of lifting
the embargo at the time. In the end, a combination of our
public and private opposition, NGO pressure, and the passage
of a Chinese anti-secession law authorizing the use of force
against Taiwan persuaded EU governments to maintain the
embargo.
¶4. (C/REL EU MEMBER STATES) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are asked
to approach host government at the appropriate level to
reaffirm U.S. opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo,
and solicit host government views on the issues, using the
below talking points:
-- We are concerned by recent comments suggesting that the EU
may consider lifting its arms embargo on China.
-- The United States position on an arms embargo has not
changed since the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989 or since
the last time the EU considered lifting the ban in 2004: We
continue to believe that lifting the embargo is not
warranted, on either human rights or security grounds.
-- In terms of human rights, the Chinese Government's actions
over the last few months have ignored international concern
over specific human rights cases, including the harsh
sentencing of Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison and the
execution of British citizen Akmal Shaikh. Public comments
at this time from senior European officials suggesting that
the EU may seek to lift the arms embargo undercut these
international concerns regarding Beijing's human rights
practices.
-- We refer you to the Department of Defense's annual PLA
Military Power Report, which highlights the increased
capabilities of Chinese military forces. Lifting the arms
embargo would have serious implications for the security and
stability of the Pacific region.
-- (If the EU's Code of Conduct is brought up) We believe
that the Code of Conduct and 'toolbox' of export controls
cannot replace the embargo.
-- We should continue to discuss the requirements of security
and stability in East Asia in the context of the U.S.-EU
strategic dialogue on Asia.
¶5. (U) Please slug all responses for EUR/ERA, EAP/CM, PM/RSAT
and ISN/RA. Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
CLINTON
tisdag 14 december 2010
Godtyckligheten råder!
Min vän och politiske medkämpe, Carl Johan Rehbinder, har fått sitt konto på Facebook avaktiverat utan förklaring.
http://tantrikblog.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/avstangd-fran-failbookfuckbook-igen/
Det är fullständigt orimligt att agera så! En förklaring är på sin plats!
Här kan du läsa vilka som står bakom Facebook i Sverige och vår uppmaning till dig lyder: TA KONTAKT MED DESSA PERSONER! Ring dem, mejla dem - och sprid därefter deras kontaktuppgifter vidare på din blogg eller andras! Kräv att Calle Rehbinders Facebook-konto ska återaktiveras/återskapas i det befintliga skick det var när avstängningen inträffade!
http://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/facebooks-e-post-och-telefonnummer-sokes/
Men vad vet vi egentligen? Det kanske börjar bli dags att se sig om efter en annan kontaktyta? En annan mer öppen och tolerant community? Det är ju trots allt så att det är vi användare av de sociala medierna, bloggarna, cyber världen här - DET ÄR VI SOM ÄGER!!! Och bestämmer vi oss för att förändra våra "internetvanor" så gör vi det och då kan Facebook stå där och stampa...
VI KRÄVER ETT ÖPPET, TOLERANT OCH FRITT INTERNET!
Ett rum där det är högt i tak och där godtyckligheten inte råder!
---------------------
Dagens dokument från WikiLeaks: I AM WIKILEAKS/Jag är Spartacus - glöm inte bort att fortsätta spegla WikiLeaks på alla upptänkliga vis!
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RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #2159 3311416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271416Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3857
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5302
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0602
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0372
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1260
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RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0506
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0238C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM VE SP
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. STATE 154674
¶B. MADRID 2123
¶C. MADRID 2077
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4B AND D.
¶1. (C) Charge d'Affaires delivered ref a demarche November 23
to MFA Secretary of State for Iberoamerica Trinidad Jimenez
and the Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo.
Drawing also on information provided by WHA/AND concerning
Chavez' ties to Iran and increased narcotics trafficking from
Venezuela, the Charge urged that Spain continue to speak out
publicly in support of democracy in Venezuela, as FM
Moratinos did when Chavez threatened RCTV.
¶2. (C) Jimenez demurred, saying Spain was trying to avoid
being drawn into more public controversy with Chavez
following the King's rebuke (ref b) and despite Chavez'
continued rhetorical provocation. Jimenez said public
opposition from Spain would only help Chavez whip up his
supporters for the constitutional referendum. Pressed by the
Charge to help the EU develop a constructive position,
Jimenez said that Spain would try to do something, but would
want to avoid an appearance of directly interfering in
Venezuela's internal affairs. She said a possibility was to
get a statement at the EU or European Parliament level.
Jimenez also said the Spanish Government was working behind
the scenes, feeding information to journalists on the threat
to democracy in Venezuela.
¶3. (C) Jimenez noted that post-Santiago Spain had received
messages of solidarity from virtually every government in
Latin America. She said Chavez (whom she described as a
"clown") was isolated. Alluding to the "Kings' Club" Jimenez
said the Saudis had given Chavez the cold shoulder at the
recent OPEC meeting because of his rudeness to Juan Carlos.
She said even Evo Morales was signaling by his body language
in Santiago that Chavez was embarrassing him.
¶4. (C) Jimenez agreed the proposed constitutional reforms
would be a severe setback for democracy and noted that recent
polls suggested that opposition was growing in Venezuelan
society against the proposed changes to the constitution.
She added, however, that it was tough for a government to
lose a referendum and predicted a close vote. Sandomingo
said fraud was a real possibility. Jimenez mentioned she had
met with the opposition during her recent visit to Caracas
(ref c), and although disorganized it was getting better and
finally trying to articulate a position. She also said even
high oil prices could not sustain Chavez' fiscal
irresponsibility; Spanish businessmen and independent
analysts told her an economic collapse was a high possibility
with 24 months.
LLORENS
http://tantrikblog.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/avstangd-fran-failbookfuckbook-igen/
Det är fullständigt orimligt att agera så! En förklaring är på sin plats!
Här kan du läsa vilka som står bakom Facebook i Sverige och vår uppmaning till dig lyder: TA KONTAKT MED DESSA PERSONER! Ring dem, mejla dem - och sprid därefter deras kontaktuppgifter vidare på din blogg eller andras! Kräv att Calle Rehbinders Facebook-konto ska återaktiveras/återskapas i det befintliga skick det var när avstängningen inträffade!
http://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/facebooks-e-post-och-telefonnummer-sokes/
Men vad vet vi egentligen? Det kanske börjar bli dags att se sig om efter en annan kontaktyta? En annan mer öppen och tolerant community? Det är ju trots allt så att det är vi användare av de sociala medierna, bloggarna, cyber världen här - DET ÄR VI SOM ÄGER!!! Och bestämmer vi oss för att förändra våra "internetvanor" så gör vi det och då kan Facebook stå där och stampa...
VI KRÄVER ETT ÖPPET, TOLERANT OCH FRITT INTERNET!
Ett rum där det är högt i tak och där godtyckligheten inte råder!
---------------------
Dagens dokument från WikiLeaks: I AM WIKILEAKS/Jag är Spartacus - glöm inte bort att fortsätta spegla WikiLeaks på alla upptänkliga vis!
VZCZCXRO6809
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #2159 3311416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271416Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3857
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5302
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0602
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0372
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1260
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 1305
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1900
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0266
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0660
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1008
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2779
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1396
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0353
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 1489
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0506
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0238C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM VE SP
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. STATE 154674
¶B. MADRID 2123
¶C. MADRID 2077
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4B AND D.
¶1. (C) Charge d'Affaires delivered ref a demarche November 23
to MFA Secretary of State for Iberoamerica Trinidad Jimenez
and the Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo.
Drawing also on information provided by WHA/AND concerning
Chavez' ties to Iran and increased narcotics trafficking from
Venezuela, the Charge urged that Spain continue to speak out
publicly in support of democracy in Venezuela, as FM
Moratinos did when Chavez threatened RCTV.
¶2. (C) Jimenez demurred, saying Spain was trying to avoid
being drawn into more public controversy with Chavez
following the King's rebuke (ref b) and despite Chavez'
continued rhetorical provocation. Jimenez said public
opposition from Spain would only help Chavez whip up his
supporters for the constitutional referendum. Pressed by the
Charge to help the EU develop a constructive position,
Jimenez said that Spain would try to do something, but would
want to avoid an appearance of directly interfering in
Venezuela's internal affairs. She said a possibility was to
get a statement at the EU or European Parliament level.
Jimenez also said the Spanish Government was working behind
the scenes, feeding information to journalists on the threat
to democracy in Venezuela.
¶3. (C) Jimenez noted that post-Santiago Spain had received
messages of solidarity from virtually every government in
Latin America. She said Chavez (whom she described as a
"clown") was isolated. Alluding to the "Kings' Club" Jimenez
said the Saudis had given Chavez the cold shoulder at the
recent OPEC meeting because of his rudeness to Juan Carlos.
She said even Evo Morales was signaling by his body language
in Santiago that Chavez was embarrassing him.
¶4. (C) Jimenez agreed the proposed constitutional reforms
would be a severe setback for democracy and noted that recent
polls suggested that opposition was growing in Venezuelan
society against the proposed changes to the constitution.
She added, however, that it was tough for a government to
lose a referendum and predicted a close vote. Sandomingo
said fraud was a real possibility. Jimenez mentioned she had
met with the opposition during her recent visit to Caracas
(ref c), and although disorganized it was getting better and
finally trying to articulate a position. She also said even
high oil prices could not sustain Chavez' fiscal
irresponsibility; Spanish businessmen and independent
analysts told her an economic collapse was a high possibility
with 24 months.
LLORENS
måndag 13 december 2010
I am WikiLeaks
Revolutionen fortsätter :-)
New document from WikiLeaks!
It's found that last weeks shut down of the domain name in WikiLeaks generated more than 1500 mirrors in 24 hours! 1500!
Keep up the good struggle and continue to mirror WikiLeaks different documents.
Here's the address to where you might find your own document to spread:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000090
SIPDIS
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON
HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KIRF VE
SUBJECT: ARCHBISHOP URGES MORE USG CRITICISM OF CHAVEZ
Classified By: Mark Wells, Acting Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4(b).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Venezuelan Archbishop Baltazar Porras, head of the
council of Catholic bishops of Venezuela, told Ambassador
January 6 the USG ought to be more outspoken in its criticism
of Hugo Chavez. Porras urged more international community
involvement to contain Chavez's regional aspirations, though
he admitted that political will to do so is minimal. He
asserted that Chavez will continue to dismantle democratic
civil society such as organized labor, the business sector,
and the church. The Archbishop lamented the GOV's subtle
campaign to sideline the church from its traditional work in
poor neighborhoods, the educational system, and the military.
End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Senior Church Leader Urges Engagement, Containment
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C) At the invitation of the Papal Nuncio, the Ambassador
attended a lunch on January 6 with Baltazar Porras,
Archbishop of Merida and head of the Venezuela Council of
Bishops (CEV). Porras, one of President Hugo Chavez's
strongest public critics, told the Ambassador that there is
widespread perception among the opposition that the USG
softened its message against Chavez after the August 2004
referendum because of energy interests. Porras suggested
that the USG be more clear and public in its criticism of the
Chavez administration.
¶3. (C) Porras said the international community also needs to
work and speak out more to contain Chavez and the export of
his revolution. Porras said most regional governments have
deferred to Brazilian President Ignacio "Lula" da Silva to
handle Chavez because the two share leftist ideologies. Lula
has been unwilling to engage, however, which has stymied
regional efforts to contain Chavez, the Archbishop asserted.
Porras said the Europeans have been just as weak on Chavez,
especially since the departure of Spanish President Jose
Maria Aznar. The Archbishop said that both Latin America and
Europe need strong leadership from the USG.
-------------------------
Fighting Chavez Long Term
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Porras described Chavez as a "long-term problem." He
said Chavez will continue to dismantle civil society groups
necessary to foster democratic rule: organized labor, the
independent press, the business community, and the church.
The Archbishop cited as an example the GOV efforts to
penetrate the Catholic school system in Merida. GOV
officials insisted that the Catholics accept "community
representatives" on their school boards, and once accepted
these individuals began to push revolutionary "reforms."
Porras also noted reduced contacts with the military, which
had traditionally invited him to change of command ceremonies
but had not done so in more than three years.
¶5. (C) Porras offered to facilitate any USG efforts at the
community level to demonstrate that non-GOV entities -- the
church, the private sector, etc. -- can have a positive
impact on Venezuela's poor. He welcomed USG visits to church
social programs in poor neighborhoods. Porras warned that
the longer the USG waits, the more successful GOV will be at
undermining traditional democratic organizations. He
acknowledged an inherent conflict in his own analysis:
Chavez is a long-term problem but the longer it takes to
address, the stronger he becomes.
-------
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) Porras and the rest of the Catholic leadership have
kept low profiles since the referendum, the results of which
they grudgingly accepted. Chavez has targeted the church,
especially its leadership, which he sees as an ally of the
previous political regime. Chavez has a long-running
conflict as well with Porras, who was among the first to
accuse Chavez of authoritarian tendencies. Rivalries aside,
Porras is in touch with current domestic and international
thought on Venezuela. The Catholic social projects Porras
seeks to promote, while not on the scale of the GOV's
"missions," do have a history of solidarity with Venezuela's
poor that is not so easily undone, despite Chavez's efforts.
Brownfield
HAVEZ...
New document from WikiLeaks!
It's found that last weeks shut down of the domain name in WikiLeaks generated more than 1500 mirrors in 24 hours! 1500!
Keep up the good struggle and continue to mirror WikiLeaks different documents.
Here's the address to where you might find your own document to spread:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000090
SIPDIS
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON
HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KIRF VE
SUBJECT: ARCHBISHOP URGES MORE USG CRITICISM OF CHAVEZ
Classified By: Mark Wells, Acting Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4(b).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Venezuelan Archbishop Baltazar Porras, head of the
council of Catholic bishops of Venezuela, told Ambassador
January 6 the USG ought to be more outspoken in its criticism
of Hugo Chavez. Porras urged more international community
involvement to contain Chavez's regional aspirations, though
he admitted that political will to do so is minimal. He
asserted that Chavez will continue to dismantle democratic
civil society such as organized labor, the business sector,
and the church. The Archbishop lamented the GOV's subtle
campaign to sideline the church from its traditional work in
poor neighborhoods, the educational system, and the military.
End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Senior Church Leader Urges Engagement, Containment
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C) At the invitation of the Papal Nuncio, the Ambassador
attended a lunch on January 6 with Baltazar Porras,
Archbishop of Merida and head of the Venezuela Council of
Bishops (CEV). Porras, one of President Hugo Chavez's
strongest public critics, told the Ambassador that there is
widespread perception among the opposition that the USG
softened its message against Chavez after the August 2004
referendum because of energy interests. Porras suggested
that the USG be more clear and public in its criticism of the
Chavez administration.
¶3. (C) Porras said the international community also needs to
work and speak out more to contain Chavez and the export of
his revolution. Porras said most regional governments have
deferred to Brazilian President Ignacio "Lula" da Silva to
handle Chavez because the two share leftist ideologies. Lula
has been unwilling to engage, however, which has stymied
regional efforts to contain Chavez, the Archbishop asserted.
Porras said the Europeans have been just as weak on Chavez,
especially since the departure of Spanish President Jose
Maria Aznar. The Archbishop said that both Latin America and
Europe need strong leadership from the USG.
-------------------------
Fighting Chavez Long Term
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Porras described Chavez as a "long-term problem." He
said Chavez will continue to dismantle civil society groups
necessary to foster democratic rule: organized labor, the
independent press, the business community, and the church.
The Archbishop cited as an example the GOV efforts to
penetrate the Catholic school system in Merida. GOV
officials insisted that the Catholics accept "community
representatives" on their school boards, and once accepted
these individuals began to push revolutionary "reforms."
Porras also noted reduced contacts with the military, which
had traditionally invited him to change of command ceremonies
but had not done so in more than three years.
¶5. (C) Porras offered to facilitate any USG efforts at the
community level to demonstrate that non-GOV entities -- the
church, the private sector, etc. -- can have a positive
impact on Venezuela's poor. He welcomed USG visits to church
social programs in poor neighborhoods. Porras warned that
the longer the USG waits, the more successful GOV will be at
undermining traditional democratic organizations. He
acknowledged an inherent conflict in his own analysis:
Chavez is a long-term problem but the longer it takes to
address, the stronger he becomes.
-------
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) Porras and the rest of the Catholic leadership have
kept low profiles since the referendum, the results of which
they grudgingly accepted. Chavez has targeted the church,
especially its leadership, which he sees as an ally of the
previous political regime. Chavez has a long-running
conflict as well with Porras, who was among the first to
accuse Chavez of authoritarian tendencies. Rivalries aside,
Porras is in touch with current domestic and international
thought on Venezuela. The Catholic social projects Porras
seeks to promote, while not on the scale of the GOV's
"missions," do have a history of solidarity with Venezuela's
poor that is not so easily undone, despite Chavez's efforts.
Brownfield
HAVEZ...
torsdag 9 december 2010
Operation Payback - I am WikiLeaks
Fortsätt kampen för ett fritt internet, en fri samtid och den fria tanken! Spegla WikiLeaks arbete på din blogg, hemsida, på insändare och länkar på Facebook!
Mejla din lokala politiker, ta kontakt med likasinnade på nätet/i verkligheten, diskutera och låt detta 1a Nätkrig :-) inte tystna!
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
Jag ställer mig positiv till den hackerattack (Operation Payback) som skedde under natten mot justitieminister Beatrice Ask, Claes Borgström med flera, därför att de förspråkar inte det fria och genomlysta samhället.
Här är dagens bidrag:
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell’s current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than “co-opt†the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell’s oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell’s oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell’s Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
¶3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF’s performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, “Boyloaf†was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been “settledâ€. End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell’s Concessions in Nigeria?
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM’s interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON’s prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister’s office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting “from Russia.†(Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn’t clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria’s ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of “surface to air missiles (SAMs)†to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has “intelligence†that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is “leaky.†She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
Mejla din lokala politiker, ta kontakt med likasinnade på nätet/i verkligheten, diskutera och låt detta 1a Nätkrig :-) inte tystna!
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
Jag ställer mig positiv till den hackerattack (Operation Payback) som skedde under natten mot justitieminister Beatrice Ask, Claes Borgström med flera, därför att de förspråkar inte det fria och genomlysta samhället.
Här är dagens bidrag:
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell’s current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than “co-opt†the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell’s oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell’s oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell’s Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
¶3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF’s performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, “Boyloaf†was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been “settledâ€. End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell’s Concessions in Nigeria?
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM’s interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON’s prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister’s office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting “from Russia.†(Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn’t clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria’s ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of “surface to air missiles (SAMs)†to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has “intelligence†that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is “leaky.†She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
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