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C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000407
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/MSIEGELMAN
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USFCS/OIO/MKESHISHIAN/BARTHUR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS EINV, PREL, ES
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MCDONALD’S CONTRACTUAL DISPUTE
REF: 05 SAN SALVADOR 3544
Classified By: Amb. H. Douglas Barclay. Reason 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. On December 7, 2005, an appeals court ruled that McDonald’s had illegally terminated its contract with a local franchisee on July 1, 1996, and therefore owed him $24 million in losses and damages. McDonald’s is appealing the decision, but the composition of the chamber that will hear the case makes it unlikely that justice will be served. On February 10, McDonald’s corporate representatives outlined for the Ambassador the company’s strategy to pressure the Salvadorans to ensure a fair hearing by linking the case to CAFTA-DR implementation--an approach the Ambassador suggested would be counterproductive. They also outlined efforts to convince Salvadoran government officials of the importance that the case get a fair hearing, which the Ambassador agreed to support vigorously. End summary.
¶2. (C) Since 1996, Post has supported McDonald’s in resolving its licensing dispute and related intellectual property rights dispute with a former franchisee, Roberto Bukele. The latest twist in this ten-year legal battle, described below in paras. 6-10, is an appeals court’s ruling on December 7, 2005, that McDonald’s had illegally terminated its contract with Bukele on July 1, 1996, and therefore owed him $24 million in losses and damages, a figure claimed by Bukele based on a projection of lost future earnings. On December 27, 2005, McDonald’s General Counsel for Latin America and Canada Maria Leggett briefed Ambassador Barclay on the case, expressing frustration with the legal system, but indicating that her firm would go forward with an appeal to the Supreme Court’s Civil Chamber--McDonald’s local counsel has told us that an appeal was filed on January 4, 2006. She suggested that a fair resolution of the case was unlikely given the current composition of the Civil Chamber. Two neutral judges have recused themselves based on previous involvement in the case. Judging from her case record on the bench, the third judge, an FMLN partisan, will rule against McDonald’s regardless of the merits of the case. McDonald’s is seeking to have this judge removed, and three substitute judges named. McDonald’s has filed a motion to have the FMLN-linked judge recused from the proceedings on the grounds that her well-documented anti-Americanism will prevent her from hearing the case impartially. Local counsel do not believe Supreme Court Chief Justice Agustin Calderon will decide on the recusal or name replacement justices until after March 12 elections.
¶3. (C) On February 10, McDonald’s Vice President for Government Relations Dick Crawford and Maria Legett briefed the Ambassador on the company’s efforts to see a fair resolution of the case. They explained that the company has engaged in a Washington-focused advocacy effort to put pressure on the Salvadorans to resolve the case according to the rule of law, suggesting that CAFTA-DR implementation should be delayed pending resolution of the case. The Ambassador, however, voiced concern that McDonald’s strategy ran directly counter to U.S. interests in seeing CAFTA-DR implemented as soon as possible. Emboffs also noted that McDonald’s invocation of CAFTA-DR in the lead-up to legislative elections would play into the hands of those who have resisted CAFTA-DR by alienating senior government officials who are already working to see that the case is resolved according to the rule of law and by complicating efforts to get additional CAFTA-related reforms through the Legislative Assembly. It would also unnecessarily thrust the case into the public spotlight, creating just the kind of negative publicity that McDonald’s representatives have said they seek to avoid. Crawford acknowledged these concerns and agreed to tone down, but not cease, his company’s efforts on this issue.
¶4. (C) Through local counsel, McDonald’s representative also said they would continue to pursue all available legal means to see that the case is decided according to the rule of law. Emboffs suggested that this is essentially a political issue--getting a fair hearing for McDonald’s means finding a way to exclude judges known to follow FMLN instructions in their rulings from the process. This is an especially delicate issue at anytime, but especially in the run-up to elections and a lame-duck legislative session that provides an excellent opportunity to push through constitutional reforms to strengthen the judicial system. McDonald’s local counsel outlined a strategy it is pursuing to pressure Chief Justice Agustin Calderon to name three impartial judges to the Civil Chamber to hear the McDonald’s case. In particular, they are meeting with local business associations, think tanks, and government officials to ask them to press Calderon on naming judges who will ensure the rule of law is carried out. McDonald’s representatives also suggested they might participate in some of those meetings through a “road show†in El Salvador that would also include other corporate outreach activities.
¶5. (C) The Ambassador told Crawford and Leggett that he believes the Salvadoran Government is extremely interested in seeing the case decided fairly, and that on February 7 Foreign Minister Lainez raised the issue with the Ambassador and advised him to speak to President Saca and impress upon him the importance of the case. The Ambassador said that on February 8, he did raise the issue with Saca, emphasizing the stakes at play for a government in desperate need of foreign investment. The Ambassador emphasized that he would continue pressing this issue as appropriate to encourage resolution of McDonald’s investment dispute according to the rule of law. However, he asked McDonald’s representatives to consider beefing-up their presence in El Salvador to more actively work on the case to compliment his efforts here--a point that Crawford and Leggett took on board.
Background
----------
¶6. (SBU) In 1972, Roberto Bukele, a licensed franchisee of McDonald’s, opened the first McDonald’s restaurant in El Salvador. By 1992, Bukele operated three McDonald’s restaurants in El Salvador, and on June 9 of that year, McDonald’s Corporation agreed to extend Bukele’s licenses to operate all three restaurants until December 19, 1995. On April 27, 1994, McDonald’s wrote Bukele outlining the terms under which the corporation would consider renewing Bukele’s licenses and extending licenses for new restaurants. Terms included remodeling of existing restaurants (to be financed by a loan from McDonald’s to Bukele), use of McDonald’s-approved sources for food products, establishment of a staff hiring and training plan, and corporate approval of new restaurant sites and new menu items. Although not in full compliance with the terms of the April 27 letter, in December 1995 McDonald’s agreed to extend Bukele’s existing licenses until June 30, 1996, and put forth specific actions Bukele must take to remain a McDonald’s franchisee. Correspondence between Bukele and Bukele provided by McDonald’s suggest that Bukele did not meet the terms of the April 27 letter.
¶7. (SBU) On July 1, 1996, McDonald’s wrote Bukele informing him that his licenses had expired, while offering him one last chance to remain a franchisee by closing unauthorized restaurants, using McDonald’s-approved food products, establishing a staff hiring and training program, and meeting other conditions--essentially, he was asked again to meet the terms established in the April 27 letter under which contract renewal would be considered. On July 10, 1996, McDonald’s notified Bukele that his right to be a McDonald’s licensee had expired and he no longer had the right to use McDonald’s trademarks or proprietary information. Bukele continued to use McDonald’s trademarks and proprietary information in his restaurants despite the expiration of the franchising agreement.
¶8. (SBU) Although there have been a number of court cases related to this dispute, the one in play now involves a suit Bukele filed against McDonald’s in the Fourth Mercantile Court in March 1997 claiming damages for an alleged breach of contract. The court ruled in favor of McDonald’s in 1999, and in 2000 the Second Appeals Court, at the time composed of two judges not linked to Bukele or the FMLN, affirmed the decision in response to an appeal Bukele had filed. Bukele then appealed to the Supreme Court’s Civil Chamber, which at the time included two pro-FMLN judges. In 2003, the Civil Chamber remanded the case to the Second Appeals Court, requiring that the appeals court to hear additional evidence to be submitted by Bukele and annulling the 2000 verdict in favor of McDonald’s. On December 6, 2005, the appeals court, which now included two judges rumored to be friendly to Bukele--either through church links or through Bukele’s attorney--ruled in favor of Bukele, declaring that the April 27, 2004, letter was actually a 20-year contract renewal and that McDonald’s owed Bukele $24 million in damages and losses resulting from the unlawful termination of the contract.
¶9. (SBU) On January 4, 2006, McDonald’s appealed the decision to the Supreme Court’s Civil Chamber, which now includes two neutral judges who have recused themselves based on prior involvement in the case and one FMLN judge XXXXXXXXXXXX. McDonald’s has not been formally notified that the appeal has been accepted for consideration, nor has it been notified formally of the two recusals. However, the company has already filed a motion to have the FMLN-linked judge recused from the proceedings on the grounds that her well-documented anti-Americanism will prevent her from hearing the case impartially. Local counsel do not believe Supreme Court Chief Justice Agustin Calderon will forward the recusal to the entire 15-member Supreme Court for decision until after March 12 elections. Eight votes in favor of the motion would be enough to force recusal, at which point the Supreme Court en bloc would designate three judges from a pool of nine alternates to hear the case. Of the nine judges, four are linked to the FMLN. If XXXXXXXXXXXX is not recused, two will be named from this list. Either way, the reconstituted Civil Chamber would then decide on the case, with a decision ready by 2007. If McDonald’s loses, they plan to appeal to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, and to the International Court of Justice if need be.
¶10. (SBU) There have been several other court cases related to this dispute. McDonald’s sued Bukele in 1996 in the Second Mercantile Court seeking the closure of one unauthorized restaurant. The court ruled in favor of McDonald’s, but Bukele appealed the case to an appeals court and then to the Supreme Court’s Civil Chamber, which remanded the case back to the Second Mercantile Court. The case currently languishes in that court of first instance, but in 2000 the police and prosecutors enforced an injunction issued by the Second Mercantile Court to force the restaurant involved to discontinue using McDonald’s intellectual property. McDonald’s also filed suit in 1997 in the Fifth Mercantile Court to seek an injunction under an unfair competition provision in the Commercial Code to prevent Bukele from using McDonald’s trademarks without authorization in all his restaurants. That court ruled in favor of McDonald’s, and in 1999 the Third Court of Appeals confirmed the decision. The Supreme Court’s Civil Chamber confirmed the decision of the Appeals Court in 2003, and that same year the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court denied an extraordinary appeal filed by Bukele. In July 2003, the police and prosecutor’s office enforced an injunction to remove all intellectual property from Bukele’s restaurants; this case is closed. Separate criminal charges filed by McDonald’s in 1997 were dismissed, and that case is closed. Two other cases Bukele filed against McDonald’s alleging breech of contract--one in 1996 in the First Mercantile Court and another in the third Mercantile Court--were dismissed and are closed. Barclay
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torsdag 23 december 2010
lördag 18 december 2010
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Wednesday, 15 November 2006, 11:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2016
TAGS AJ, PGOV, PREL, EPET, ENRG, RU
SUBJECT: BP AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENT SAYS AZERBAIJAN MOVING
SLOWLY TO ADDRESS GAS PROBLEM
REF: ANKARA 006396
Classified By: Ambassador Anne. E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a November 10 Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing, outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward told the Ambassador that according to SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev, Turkey had not agreed to forego its contracted for 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries as a way of helping Azerbaijan and Georgia with their winter gas problems, although they were willing to defer delivery of some amounts if the contracted for price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meters remained the same. Woodward said that Turkey was declaring itself ready to receive Shah Deniz gas, although he himself had doubts. He said that a joint BP-SOCAR working group would start work soon to discuss ways of redressing possible GOAJ domestic gas shortages in winter 2007. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On November 10 the Ambassador attended an Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing headed by outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward. Other attendees were incoming BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader, BP Group Azerbaijan Director for Communications and External Affairs Clare Bebbington, UK Ambassador Laurie Bristow, UK EconOff, and Econoff as notetaker.
READ-OUT OF TU-GOAJ MEETING
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (C) Woodward gave a read-out of his November 2 meeting with SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev. This meeting, prompted by the visit to Azerbaijan of BP Executive Vice-President and Deputy Chief Executive of Exploration and Production Andy Inglis, occurred right after Abdullayev had returned from Turkey with Deputy Prime Minister Abid Sharifov, where they had notified Turkey of intended delays in GOAJ 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries. Abdullayev, fresh off the plane, provided Woodward and Inglis a read-out of his Turkey meeting with Energy Minister Gular and Botas. Rovnaq told them that Botas would not sign the document he had brought, in which Turkey was asked to agree to GOAJ providing no Shah Deniz gas in 2007 and in which the GOAJ sought to re-open Shah Deniz price negotiations. Turkey insisted on receiving its contracted for 2007 three billion cubic meters (bcm) of Shah Deniz gas at the agreed upon price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meter (tcm), but said it did not have to receive it all in 2007. It proposed that it could take half (1.5 bcm) in winter 2007, with the rest to be received in 2008 or 2009, at the contracted price of USD 120/tcm. Abdullayev told Inglis that he had gotten Turkey to agree that it would be a transit country for Shah Deniz gas (vice a buyer-seller).
¶4. (C) During this November 2 meeting with Abdullayev and Sharifov, Energy Minister Gular also said that Turkey was ready to receive Shah Deniz gas. In this regard, Woodward said that he thinks that Botas will ask for commissioning gas during the week of November 13-17. As to how ready Turkey actually is to receive Shah Deniz gas, Woodward said that the BP opinion is that Botas still has a lot of work to do to complete the pipeline to include work on the valve stations, and that if the work were done in accordance with international standards then the pipeline might not be ready until spring 2007. However, he added that “it was not inconceivable†that Botas could “rush finish†the job so that it would be ready to receive gas shortly, although the pipeline would not meet international standards.
ACG PROBLEM RESOLUTION
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Woodward said that during the recent visit of BP Executive Inglis, BP had given both President Aliyev and SOCAR President Abdullayev a copy of a BP ‘white paper’ on the way forward for Azerbaijan in the energy sector, (a copy of which he gave to the Ambassador), with the focus on four main themes:
- ACG Maximum Development: Resolving current issues associated with ACG to maximize recovery - Short/medium/long term gas issues: Short-term - how to address this winter’s gas needs; Medium/Long-term: how best
BAKU 00001661 002 OF 003
to identify and exploit GOAJ gas reserves - SOCAR: how to help make SOCAR an energy company that meets international standards - BP Social Programs: putting a ‘harder edge’ on them, to help build capacity in Azerbaijan
¶6. (C) Woodward said that there were a series of outstanding ACG-related issues the resolution of which involved billions of dollars and which the AIOC partners were trying to resolve with SOCAR in a package, vice individually. In the November 2 meeting between SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and BP executive Inglis, Abdullayev said that he would head the SOCAR ACG steering group dealing with these problems, and that SOCAR VP Elshad Nassirov would be the SOCAR working level representative. Abdullayev also said he would head the SOCAR team on the BP-SOCAR gas working group, with Nassirov again the working-level representative. Woodward said that Abdullayev had an unrealistic expectation of how quickly these outstanding ACG issues could be resolved: whereas BP thinks that a framework within which to discuss the issues could be agreed upon by January, with actual negotiations over these issues lasting up to six months, Woodward said that Abdullayev told Inglis that the issues could be solved ‘within a few days.’
¶7. (C) Woodward said that Abdullayev did not show much willingness to engage with BP re Azerbaijan’s short-term (Winter 07) gas problems, contending that AIOC giving SOCAR more associated ACG gas could solve the problem. (Note: AIOC is scheduled to give 1.4 bcm of associated ACG gas to SOCAR in 2007; SOCAR is arguing that AIOC does not need to re-inject any ACG associated gas back into the well, and wants 3 bcm). Woodward said that all sides seemed to be waiting for the results of the President Aliyev-President Putin meeting in Moscow, although he himself doubted whether the two would reach any definitive agreement, as everyone is waiting to see the results of the various CIS bilateral Gazprom negotiations, to see if the USD 230/tcm level will hold.
BP GEORGIA GAS READOUT
----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Woodward said he and his replacement Bill Schrader had just returned from Georgia, where they had met separately with the Georgian Energy Minister, Environment Minister and Prime Minister, among others. At these meetings the Georgian proposal of a November three-way gas-focused Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian ministerial-level meeting in Tblisi or Ankara was discussed, although nothing definite had been agreed to by all parties. In their meetings, the GOG interlocutors had referred to Turkey’s Summer 2007 ‘agreement in principle’ to supply Georgia from its own Shah Deniz gas, although Woodward said in his opinion all Turkey had agreed to at that time was a ‘bring us a proposal and we’ll have a look at it’ type agreement. Woodward said that the GOG Energy Minister had told him that GA would not buy gas from Gazprom at USD 230/tcm, and that Turkey would supply GOG with 1.5 bcm in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM was more realistic, saying that perhaps Georgia could get 0.8 to 1.2 bcm from Turkey in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM seemed more relaxed about the upcoming winter gas situation than did the Energy Minister, and more concerned about Shah Deniz Stage Two-related issues, stating that, inter alia, Georgia and Azerbaijan should look at gas storage issues together, vice separately. Woodward said he got the impression that GOG was more concerned about the economics of gas purchases from Gazprom than the supply itself, and he noted that despite the intense rhetoric flowing between Russia and Georgia, the energy continues to flow.
SD PRODUCTION
------------------------
¶9. (C) Woodward agreed that Shah Deniz was experiencing production delays, but said that other issues would play a more determinative role in deciding where Shah Deniz gas went, such as the GOG technical capacity to uptake Shah Deniz gas at its border with Azerbaijan. He said that the Gas Pressure Reduction and Metering Station at Pump Station One in Georgia has a maximum daily design throughput of 4.0 million cubic meters, equivalent to 1.46 bcm/a at one hundred percent load (note: this compares to currently contracted
BAKU 00001661 003 OF 003
quantities which build up to around 08. bcm/a by 2011). As such, he said that part of the work of the SOCAR-BP gas working group that would be meeting imminently would be to model how much gas Georgia could uptake from Azerbaijan from a technical viewpoint. He noted that in addition to the SCP (i.e. Shah Deniz) pipeline, there was also the possibility of transferring gas from Azerbaijan to Georgia through the Azerbaijani gas system. As for Shah Deniz gas itself, Woodward said that as soon as the first two of the four wells start flowing (mid-November and late December respectively), will it be clear how quickly and how much production will be available for winter 2007.
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Before determining what steps to take to redress any possible winter 07 gas shortages in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Azerbaijan first needs to assess its current gas balance and possible alternative supply options. In this regard it is encouraging to hear that the joint BP-SOCAR gas working group is scheduled to meet the week of November 12. Woodward however was disparaging of the selection of SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and Deputy Prime Minister Sharifov as the GOAJ officials sent to Ankara to deal with the Turkish government (indeed, a Statoil representative told the Ambassador that Abdullayev had taken the wrong version of the Shah Deniz contract to the discussions), and despaired of any solution to the short-term regional problem occurring if management of the issue stayed at the SOCAR level. As such, he requested USG help in convincing Turkey to meet with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Now that Turkey is doing so (see reftel), Embassy will seek to ensure that the GOAJ participates at the appropriate level. END COMMENT. DERSE
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-----------------
Wednesday, 15 November 2006, 11:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2016
TAGS AJ, PGOV, PREL, EPET, ENRG, RU
SUBJECT: BP AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENT SAYS AZERBAIJAN MOVING
SLOWLY TO ADDRESS GAS PROBLEM
REF: ANKARA 006396
Classified By: Ambassador Anne. E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a November 10 Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing, outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward told the Ambassador that according to SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev, Turkey had not agreed to forego its contracted for 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries as a way of helping Azerbaijan and Georgia with their winter gas problems, although they were willing to defer delivery of some amounts if the contracted for price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meters remained the same. Woodward said that Turkey was declaring itself ready to receive Shah Deniz gas, although he himself had doubts. He said that a joint BP-SOCAR working group would start work soon to discuss ways of redressing possible GOAJ domestic gas shortages in winter 2007. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On November 10 the Ambassador attended an Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing headed by outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward. Other attendees were incoming BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader, BP Group Azerbaijan Director for Communications and External Affairs Clare Bebbington, UK Ambassador Laurie Bristow, UK EconOff, and Econoff as notetaker.
READ-OUT OF TU-GOAJ MEETING
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (C) Woodward gave a read-out of his November 2 meeting with SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev. This meeting, prompted by the visit to Azerbaijan of BP Executive Vice-President and Deputy Chief Executive of Exploration and Production Andy Inglis, occurred right after Abdullayev had returned from Turkey with Deputy Prime Minister Abid Sharifov, where they had notified Turkey of intended delays in GOAJ 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries. Abdullayev, fresh off the plane, provided Woodward and Inglis a read-out of his Turkey meeting with Energy Minister Gular and Botas. Rovnaq told them that Botas would not sign the document he had brought, in which Turkey was asked to agree to GOAJ providing no Shah Deniz gas in 2007 and in which the GOAJ sought to re-open Shah Deniz price negotiations. Turkey insisted on receiving its contracted for 2007 three billion cubic meters (bcm) of Shah Deniz gas at the agreed upon price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meter (tcm), but said it did not have to receive it all in 2007. It proposed that it could take half (1.5 bcm) in winter 2007, with the rest to be received in 2008 or 2009, at the contracted price of USD 120/tcm. Abdullayev told Inglis that he had gotten Turkey to agree that it would be a transit country for Shah Deniz gas (vice a buyer-seller).
¶4. (C) During this November 2 meeting with Abdullayev and Sharifov, Energy Minister Gular also said that Turkey was ready to receive Shah Deniz gas. In this regard, Woodward said that he thinks that Botas will ask for commissioning gas during the week of November 13-17. As to how ready Turkey actually is to receive Shah Deniz gas, Woodward said that the BP opinion is that Botas still has a lot of work to do to complete the pipeline to include work on the valve stations, and that if the work were done in accordance with international standards then the pipeline might not be ready until spring 2007. However, he added that “it was not inconceivable†that Botas could “rush finish†the job so that it would be ready to receive gas shortly, although the pipeline would not meet international standards.
ACG PROBLEM RESOLUTION
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Woodward said that during the recent visit of BP Executive Inglis, BP had given both President Aliyev and SOCAR President Abdullayev a copy of a BP ‘white paper’ on the way forward for Azerbaijan in the energy sector, (a copy of which he gave to the Ambassador), with the focus on four main themes:
- ACG Maximum Development: Resolving current issues associated with ACG to maximize recovery - Short/medium/long term gas issues: Short-term - how to address this winter’s gas needs; Medium/Long-term: how best
BAKU 00001661 002 OF 003
to identify and exploit GOAJ gas reserves - SOCAR: how to help make SOCAR an energy company that meets international standards - BP Social Programs: putting a ‘harder edge’ on them, to help build capacity in Azerbaijan
¶6. (C) Woodward said that there were a series of outstanding ACG-related issues the resolution of which involved billions of dollars and which the AIOC partners were trying to resolve with SOCAR in a package, vice individually. In the November 2 meeting between SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and BP executive Inglis, Abdullayev said that he would head the SOCAR ACG steering group dealing with these problems, and that SOCAR VP Elshad Nassirov would be the SOCAR working level representative. Abdullayev also said he would head the SOCAR team on the BP-SOCAR gas working group, with Nassirov again the working-level representative. Woodward said that Abdullayev had an unrealistic expectation of how quickly these outstanding ACG issues could be resolved: whereas BP thinks that a framework within which to discuss the issues could be agreed upon by January, with actual negotiations over these issues lasting up to six months, Woodward said that Abdullayev told Inglis that the issues could be solved ‘within a few days.’
¶7. (C) Woodward said that Abdullayev did not show much willingness to engage with BP re Azerbaijan’s short-term (Winter 07) gas problems, contending that AIOC giving SOCAR more associated ACG gas could solve the problem. (Note: AIOC is scheduled to give 1.4 bcm of associated ACG gas to SOCAR in 2007; SOCAR is arguing that AIOC does not need to re-inject any ACG associated gas back into the well, and wants 3 bcm). Woodward said that all sides seemed to be waiting for the results of the President Aliyev-President Putin meeting in Moscow, although he himself doubted whether the two would reach any definitive agreement, as everyone is waiting to see the results of the various CIS bilateral Gazprom negotiations, to see if the USD 230/tcm level will hold.
BP GEORGIA GAS READOUT
----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Woodward said he and his replacement Bill Schrader had just returned from Georgia, where they had met separately with the Georgian Energy Minister, Environment Minister and Prime Minister, among others. At these meetings the Georgian proposal of a November three-way gas-focused Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian ministerial-level meeting in Tblisi or Ankara was discussed, although nothing definite had been agreed to by all parties. In their meetings, the GOG interlocutors had referred to Turkey’s Summer 2007 ‘agreement in principle’ to supply Georgia from its own Shah Deniz gas, although Woodward said in his opinion all Turkey had agreed to at that time was a ‘bring us a proposal and we’ll have a look at it’ type agreement. Woodward said that the GOG Energy Minister had told him that GA would not buy gas from Gazprom at USD 230/tcm, and that Turkey would supply GOG with 1.5 bcm in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM was more realistic, saying that perhaps Georgia could get 0.8 to 1.2 bcm from Turkey in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM seemed more relaxed about the upcoming winter gas situation than did the Energy Minister, and more concerned about Shah Deniz Stage Two-related issues, stating that, inter alia, Georgia and Azerbaijan should look at gas storage issues together, vice separately. Woodward said he got the impression that GOG was more concerned about the economics of gas purchases from Gazprom than the supply itself, and he noted that despite the intense rhetoric flowing between Russia and Georgia, the energy continues to flow.
SD PRODUCTION
------------------------
¶9. (C) Woodward agreed that Shah Deniz was experiencing production delays, but said that other issues would play a more determinative role in deciding where Shah Deniz gas went, such as the GOG technical capacity to uptake Shah Deniz gas at its border with Azerbaijan. He said that the Gas Pressure Reduction and Metering Station at Pump Station One in Georgia has a maximum daily design throughput of 4.0 million cubic meters, equivalent to 1.46 bcm/a at one hundred percent load (note: this compares to currently contracted
BAKU 00001661 003 OF 003
quantities which build up to around 08. bcm/a by 2011). As such, he said that part of the work of the SOCAR-BP gas working group that would be meeting imminently would be to model how much gas Georgia could uptake from Azerbaijan from a technical viewpoint. He noted that in addition to the SCP (i.e. Shah Deniz) pipeline, there was also the possibility of transferring gas from Azerbaijan to Georgia through the Azerbaijani gas system. As for Shah Deniz gas itself, Woodward said that as soon as the first two of the four wells start flowing (mid-November and late December respectively), will it be clear how quickly and how much production will be available for winter 2007.
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Before determining what steps to take to redress any possible winter 07 gas shortages in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Azerbaijan first needs to assess its current gas balance and possible alternative supply options. In this regard it is encouraging to hear that the joint BP-SOCAR gas working group is scheduled to meet the week of November 12. Woodward however was disparaging of the selection of SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and Deputy Prime Minister Sharifov as the GOAJ officials sent to Ankara to deal with the Turkish government (indeed, a Statoil representative told the Ambassador that Abdullayev had taken the wrong version of the Shah Deniz contract to the discussions), and despaired of any solution to the short-term regional problem occurring if management of the issue stayed at the SOCAR level. As such, he requested USG help in convincing Turkey to meet with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Now that Turkey is doing so (see reftel), Embassy will seek to ensure that the GOAJ participates at the appropriate level. END COMMENT. DERSE
onsdag 15 december 2010
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VZCZCXRO5952
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #3969 0481658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171655Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2923C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 013969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM CH EUN
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA
REF: USEU 133
Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is an action request for all Embassies
in EU countries to reiterate our position that the EU should
retain its arms embargo on China. Spanish officials,
including the Spanish Foreign Minister, signaled a possible
review of the arms embargo under Spain's Presidency of the
EU. Although USEU reports that there is no active discussion
of this in Brussels (reftel), we believe it is important to
reiterate that the U.S. remains firmly opposed to any lifting
of the embargo. END SUMMARY.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (U) Spanish Ambassador to China Carlos Blasco told Chinese
journalists on January 21 that "we hope to intensify talks on
lifting the (arms) embargo." Subsequently, when asked about
these comments at a January 26 press conference, Spanish
Foreign Minister Moratinos stated that his government would
be "reviewing the decision" on and "weighing the pros and
cons" of lifting the arms embargo.
¶3. (C) The EU imposed the arms embargo on China, alongside a
similar U.S. arms embargo, following the violent suppression
of protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The last major
push to lift the EU arms embargo came in late 2004/early
¶2005. France and Germany were strong proponents of lifting
the embargo at the time. In the end, a combination of our
public and private opposition, NGO pressure, and the passage
of a Chinese anti-secession law authorizing the use of force
against Taiwan persuaded EU governments to maintain the
embargo.
¶4. (C/REL EU MEMBER STATES) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are asked
to approach host government at the appropriate level to
reaffirm U.S. opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo,
and solicit host government views on the issues, using the
below talking points:
-- We are concerned by recent comments suggesting that the EU
may consider lifting its arms embargo on China.
-- The United States position on an arms embargo has not
changed since the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989 or since
the last time the EU considered lifting the ban in 2004: We
continue to believe that lifting the embargo is not
warranted, on either human rights or security grounds.
-- In terms of human rights, the Chinese Government's actions
over the last few months have ignored international concern
over specific human rights cases, including the harsh
sentencing of Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison and the
execution of British citizen Akmal Shaikh. Public comments
at this time from senior European officials suggesting that
the EU may seek to lift the arms embargo undercut these
international concerns regarding Beijing's human rights
practices.
-- We refer you to the Department of Defense's annual PLA
Military Power Report, which highlights the increased
capabilities of Chinese military forces. Lifting the arms
embargo would have serious implications for the security and
stability of the Pacific region.
-- (If the EU's Code of Conduct is brought up) We believe
that the Code of Conduct and 'toolbox' of export controls
cannot replace the embargo.
-- We should continue to discuss the requirements of security
and stability in East Asia in the context of the U.S.-EU
strategic dialogue on Asia.
¶5. (U) Please slug all responses for EUR/ERA, EAP/CM, PM/RSAT
and ISN/RA. Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
CLINTON
Don't forget to Mirror WikiLeaks
---------------
VZCZCXRO5952
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #3969 0481658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171655Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2923C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 013969
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM CH EUN
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA
REF: USEU 133
Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is an action request for all Embassies
in EU countries to reiterate our position that the EU should
retain its arms embargo on China. Spanish officials,
including the Spanish Foreign Minister, signaled a possible
review of the arms embargo under Spain's Presidency of the
EU. Although USEU reports that there is no active discussion
of this in Brussels (reftel), we believe it is important to
reiterate that the U.S. remains firmly opposed to any lifting
of the embargo. END SUMMARY.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (U) Spanish Ambassador to China Carlos Blasco told Chinese
journalists on January 21 that "we hope to intensify talks on
lifting the (arms) embargo." Subsequently, when asked about
these comments at a January 26 press conference, Spanish
Foreign Minister Moratinos stated that his government would
be "reviewing the decision" on and "weighing the pros and
cons" of lifting the arms embargo.
¶3. (C) The EU imposed the arms embargo on China, alongside a
similar U.S. arms embargo, following the violent suppression
of protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The last major
push to lift the EU arms embargo came in late 2004/early
¶2005. France and Germany were strong proponents of lifting
the embargo at the time. In the end, a combination of our
public and private opposition, NGO pressure, and the passage
of a Chinese anti-secession law authorizing the use of force
against Taiwan persuaded EU governments to maintain the
embargo.
¶4. (C/REL EU MEMBER STATES) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are asked
to approach host government at the appropriate level to
reaffirm U.S. opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo,
and solicit host government views on the issues, using the
below talking points:
-- We are concerned by recent comments suggesting that the EU
may consider lifting its arms embargo on China.
-- The United States position on an arms embargo has not
changed since the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989 or since
the last time the EU considered lifting the ban in 2004: We
continue to believe that lifting the embargo is not
warranted, on either human rights or security grounds.
-- In terms of human rights, the Chinese Government's actions
over the last few months have ignored international concern
over specific human rights cases, including the harsh
sentencing of Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison and the
execution of British citizen Akmal Shaikh. Public comments
at this time from senior European officials suggesting that
the EU may seek to lift the arms embargo undercut these
international concerns regarding Beijing's human rights
practices.
-- We refer you to the Department of Defense's annual PLA
Military Power Report, which highlights the increased
capabilities of Chinese military forces. Lifting the arms
embargo would have serious implications for the security and
stability of the Pacific region.
-- (If the EU's Code of Conduct is brought up) We believe
that the Code of Conduct and 'toolbox' of export controls
cannot replace the embargo.
-- We should continue to discuss the requirements of security
and stability in East Asia in the context of the U.S.-EU
strategic dialogue on Asia.
¶5. (U) Please slug all responses for EUR/ERA, EAP/CM, PM/RSAT
and ISN/RA. Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
CLINTON
tisdag 14 december 2010
Godtyckligheten råder!
Min vän och politiske medkämpe, Carl Johan Rehbinder, har fått sitt konto på Facebook avaktiverat utan förklaring.
http://tantrikblog.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/avstangd-fran-failbookfuckbook-igen/
Det är fullständigt orimligt att agera så! En förklaring är på sin plats!
Här kan du läsa vilka som står bakom Facebook i Sverige och vår uppmaning till dig lyder: TA KONTAKT MED DESSA PERSONER! Ring dem, mejla dem - och sprid därefter deras kontaktuppgifter vidare på din blogg eller andras! Kräv att Calle Rehbinders Facebook-konto ska återaktiveras/återskapas i det befintliga skick det var när avstängningen inträffade!
http://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/facebooks-e-post-och-telefonnummer-sokes/
Men vad vet vi egentligen? Det kanske börjar bli dags att se sig om efter en annan kontaktyta? En annan mer öppen och tolerant community? Det är ju trots allt så att det är vi användare av de sociala medierna, bloggarna, cyber världen här - DET ÄR VI SOM ÄGER!!! Och bestämmer vi oss för att förändra våra "internetvanor" så gör vi det och då kan Facebook stå där och stampa...
VI KRÄVER ETT ÖPPET, TOLERANT OCH FRITT INTERNET!
Ett rum där det är högt i tak och där godtyckligheten inte råder!
---------------------
Dagens dokument från WikiLeaks: I AM WIKILEAKS/Jag är Spartacus - glöm inte bort att fortsätta spegla WikiLeaks på alla upptänkliga vis!
VZCZCXRO6809
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #2159 3311416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271416Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3857
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5302
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0602
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0372
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1260
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 1305
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RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0266
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0660
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1008
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2779
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1396
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0353
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 1489
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0506
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0238C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM VE SP
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. STATE 154674
¶B. MADRID 2123
¶C. MADRID 2077
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4B AND D.
¶1. (C) Charge d'Affaires delivered ref a demarche November 23
to MFA Secretary of State for Iberoamerica Trinidad Jimenez
and the Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo.
Drawing also on information provided by WHA/AND concerning
Chavez' ties to Iran and increased narcotics trafficking from
Venezuela, the Charge urged that Spain continue to speak out
publicly in support of democracy in Venezuela, as FM
Moratinos did when Chavez threatened RCTV.
¶2. (C) Jimenez demurred, saying Spain was trying to avoid
being drawn into more public controversy with Chavez
following the King's rebuke (ref b) and despite Chavez'
continued rhetorical provocation. Jimenez said public
opposition from Spain would only help Chavez whip up his
supporters for the constitutional referendum. Pressed by the
Charge to help the EU develop a constructive position,
Jimenez said that Spain would try to do something, but would
want to avoid an appearance of directly interfering in
Venezuela's internal affairs. She said a possibility was to
get a statement at the EU or European Parliament level.
Jimenez also said the Spanish Government was working behind
the scenes, feeding information to journalists on the threat
to democracy in Venezuela.
¶3. (C) Jimenez noted that post-Santiago Spain had received
messages of solidarity from virtually every government in
Latin America. She said Chavez (whom she described as a
"clown") was isolated. Alluding to the "Kings' Club" Jimenez
said the Saudis had given Chavez the cold shoulder at the
recent OPEC meeting because of his rudeness to Juan Carlos.
She said even Evo Morales was signaling by his body language
in Santiago that Chavez was embarrassing him.
¶4. (C) Jimenez agreed the proposed constitutional reforms
would be a severe setback for democracy and noted that recent
polls suggested that opposition was growing in Venezuelan
society against the proposed changes to the constitution.
She added, however, that it was tough for a government to
lose a referendum and predicted a close vote. Sandomingo
said fraud was a real possibility. Jimenez mentioned she had
met with the opposition during her recent visit to Caracas
(ref c), and although disorganized it was getting better and
finally trying to articulate a position. She also said even
high oil prices could not sustain Chavez' fiscal
irresponsibility; Spanish businessmen and independent
analysts told her an economic collapse was a high possibility
with 24 months.
LLORENS
http://tantrikblog.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/avstangd-fran-failbookfuckbook-igen/
Det är fullständigt orimligt att agera så! En förklaring är på sin plats!
Här kan du läsa vilka som står bakom Facebook i Sverige och vår uppmaning till dig lyder: TA KONTAKT MED DESSA PERSONER! Ring dem, mejla dem - och sprid därefter deras kontaktuppgifter vidare på din blogg eller andras! Kräv att Calle Rehbinders Facebook-konto ska återaktiveras/återskapas i det befintliga skick det var när avstängningen inträffade!
http://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/12/14/facebooks-e-post-och-telefonnummer-sokes/
Men vad vet vi egentligen? Det kanske börjar bli dags att se sig om efter en annan kontaktyta? En annan mer öppen och tolerant community? Det är ju trots allt så att det är vi användare av de sociala medierna, bloggarna, cyber världen här - DET ÄR VI SOM ÄGER!!! Och bestämmer vi oss för att förändra våra "internetvanor" så gör vi det och då kan Facebook stå där och stampa...
VI KRÄVER ETT ÖPPET, TOLERANT OCH FRITT INTERNET!
Ett rum där det är högt i tak och där godtyckligheten inte råder!
---------------------
Dagens dokument från WikiLeaks: I AM WIKILEAKS/Jag är Spartacus - glöm inte bort att fortsätta spegla WikiLeaks på alla upptänkliga vis!
VZCZCXRO6809
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #2159 3311416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271416Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3857
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5302
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0602
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0372
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1260
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 1305
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1900
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0266
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0660
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1008
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2779
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1396
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0353
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 1489
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0506
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0238C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM VE SP
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. STATE 154674
¶B. MADRID 2123
¶C. MADRID 2077
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4B AND D.
¶1. (C) Charge d'Affaires delivered ref a demarche November 23
to MFA Secretary of State for Iberoamerica Trinidad Jimenez
and the Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo.
Drawing also on information provided by WHA/AND concerning
Chavez' ties to Iran and increased narcotics trafficking from
Venezuela, the Charge urged that Spain continue to speak out
publicly in support of democracy in Venezuela, as FM
Moratinos did when Chavez threatened RCTV.
¶2. (C) Jimenez demurred, saying Spain was trying to avoid
being drawn into more public controversy with Chavez
following the King's rebuke (ref b) and despite Chavez'
continued rhetorical provocation. Jimenez said public
opposition from Spain would only help Chavez whip up his
supporters for the constitutional referendum. Pressed by the
Charge to help the EU develop a constructive position,
Jimenez said that Spain would try to do something, but would
want to avoid an appearance of directly interfering in
Venezuela's internal affairs. She said a possibility was to
get a statement at the EU or European Parliament level.
Jimenez also said the Spanish Government was working behind
the scenes, feeding information to journalists on the threat
to democracy in Venezuela.
¶3. (C) Jimenez noted that post-Santiago Spain had received
messages of solidarity from virtually every government in
Latin America. She said Chavez (whom she described as a
"clown") was isolated. Alluding to the "Kings' Club" Jimenez
said the Saudis had given Chavez the cold shoulder at the
recent OPEC meeting because of his rudeness to Juan Carlos.
She said even Evo Morales was signaling by his body language
in Santiago that Chavez was embarrassing him.
¶4. (C) Jimenez agreed the proposed constitutional reforms
would be a severe setback for democracy and noted that recent
polls suggested that opposition was growing in Venezuelan
society against the proposed changes to the constitution.
She added, however, that it was tough for a government to
lose a referendum and predicted a close vote. Sandomingo
said fraud was a real possibility. Jimenez mentioned she had
met with the opposition during her recent visit to Caracas
(ref c), and although disorganized it was getting better and
finally trying to articulate a position. She also said even
high oil prices could not sustain Chavez' fiscal
irresponsibility; Spanish businessmen and independent
analysts told her an economic collapse was a high possibility
with 24 months.
LLORENS
måndag 13 december 2010
I am WikiLeaks
Revolutionen fortsätter :-)
New document from WikiLeaks!
It's found that last weeks shut down of the domain name in WikiLeaks generated more than 1500 mirrors in 24 hours! 1500!
Keep up the good struggle and continue to mirror WikiLeaks different documents.
Here's the address to where you might find your own document to spread:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000090
SIPDIS
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON
HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KIRF VE
SUBJECT: ARCHBISHOP URGES MORE USG CRITICISM OF CHAVEZ
Classified By: Mark Wells, Acting Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4(b).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Venezuelan Archbishop Baltazar Porras, head of the
council of Catholic bishops of Venezuela, told Ambassador
January 6 the USG ought to be more outspoken in its criticism
of Hugo Chavez. Porras urged more international community
involvement to contain Chavez's regional aspirations, though
he admitted that political will to do so is minimal. He
asserted that Chavez will continue to dismantle democratic
civil society such as organized labor, the business sector,
and the church. The Archbishop lamented the GOV's subtle
campaign to sideline the church from its traditional work in
poor neighborhoods, the educational system, and the military.
End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Senior Church Leader Urges Engagement, Containment
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C) At the invitation of the Papal Nuncio, the Ambassador
attended a lunch on January 6 with Baltazar Porras,
Archbishop of Merida and head of the Venezuela Council of
Bishops (CEV). Porras, one of President Hugo Chavez's
strongest public critics, told the Ambassador that there is
widespread perception among the opposition that the USG
softened its message against Chavez after the August 2004
referendum because of energy interests. Porras suggested
that the USG be more clear and public in its criticism of the
Chavez administration.
¶3. (C) Porras said the international community also needs to
work and speak out more to contain Chavez and the export of
his revolution. Porras said most regional governments have
deferred to Brazilian President Ignacio "Lula" da Silva to
handle Chavez because the two share leftist ideologies. Lula
has been unwilling to engage, however, which has stymied
regional efforts to contain Chavez, the Archbishop asserted.
Porras said the Europeans have been just as weak on Chavez,
especially since the departure of Spanish President Jose
Maria Aznar. The Archbishop said that both Latin America and
Europe need strong leadership from the USG.
-------------------------
Fighting Chavez Long Term
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Porras described Chavez as a "long-term problem." He
said Chavez will continue to dismantle civil society groups
necessary to foster democratic rule: organized labor, the
independent press, the business community, and the church.
The Archbishop cited as an example the GOV efforts to
penetrate the Catholic school system in Merida. GOV
officials insisted that the Catholics accept "community
representatives" on their school boards, and once accepted
these individuals began to push revolutionary "reforms."
Porras also noted reduced contacts with the military, which
had traditionally invited him to change of command ceremonies
but had not done so in more than three years.
¶5. (C) Porras offered to facilitate any USG efforts at the
community level to demonstrate that non-GOV entities -- the
church, the private sector, etc. -- can have a positive
impact on Venezuela's poor. He welcomed USG visits to church
social programs in poor neighborhoods. Porras warned that
the longer the USG waits, the more successful GOV will be at
undermining traditional democratic organizations. He
acknowledged an inherent conflict in his own analysis:
Chavez is a long-term problem but the longer it takes to
address, the stronger he becomes.
-------
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) Porras and the rest of the Catholic leadership have
kept low profiles since the referendum, the results of which
they grudgingly accepted. Chavez has targeted the church,
especially its leadership, which he sees as an ally of the
previous political regime. Chavez has a long-running
conflict as well with Porras, who was among the first to
accuse Chavez of authoritarian tendencies. Rivalries aside,
Porras is in touch with current domestic and international
thought on Venezuela. The Catholic social projects Porras
seeks to promote, while not on the scale of the GOV's
"missions," do have a history of solidarity with Venezuela's
poor that is not so easily undone, despite Chavez's efforts.
Brownfield
HAVEZ...
New document from WikiLeaks!
It's found that last weeks shut down of the domain name in WikiLeaks generated more than 1500 mirrors in 24 hours! 1500!
Keep up the good struggle and continue to mirror WikiLeaks different documents.
Here's the address to where you might find your own document to spread:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000090
SIPDIS
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON
HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KIRF VE
SUBJECT: ARCHBISHOP URGES MORE USG CRITICISM OF CHAVEZ
Classified By: Mark Wells, Acting Political Counselor,
for Reasons 1.4(b).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Venezuelan Archbishop Baltazar Porras, head of the
council of Catholic bishops of Venezuela, told Ambassador
January 6 the USG ought to be more outspoken in its criticism
of Hugo Chavez. Porras urged more international community
involvement to contain Chavez's regional aspirations, though
he admitted that political will to do so is minimal. He
asserted that Chavez will continue to dismantle democratic
civil society such as organized labor, the business sector,
and the church. The Archbishop lamented the GOV's subtle
campaign to sideline the church from its traditional work in
poor neighborhoods, the educational system, and the military.
End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Senior Church Leader Urges Engagement, Containment
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C) At the invitation of the Papal Nuncio, the Ambassador
attended a lunch on January 6 with Baltazar Porras,
Archbishop of Merida and head of the Venezuela Council of
Bishops (CEV). Porras, one of President Hugo Chavez's
strongest public critics, told the Ambassador that there is
widespread perception among the opposition that the USG
softened its message against Chavez after the August 2004
referendum because of energy interests. Porras suggested
that the USG be more clear and public in its criticism of the
Chavez administration.
¶3. (C) Porras said the international community also needs to
work and speak out more to contain Chavez and the export of
his revolution. Porras said most regional governments have
deferred to Brazilian President Ignacio "Lula" da Silva to
handle Chavez because the two share leftist ideologies. Lula
has been unwilling to engage, however, which has stymied
regional efforts to contain Chavez, the Archbishop asserted.
Porras said the Europeans have been just as weak on Chavez,
especially since the departure of Spanish President Jose
Maria Aznar. The Archbishop said that both Latin America and
Europe need strong leadership from the USG.
-------------------------
Fighting Chavez Long Term
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Porras described Chavez as a "long-term problem." He
said Chavez will continue to dismantle civil society groups
necessary to foster democratic rule: organized labor, the
independent press, the business community, and the church.
The Archbishop cited as an example the GOV efforts to
penetrate the Catholic school system in Merida. GOV
officials insisted that the Catholics accept "community
representatives" on their school boards, and once accepted
these individuals began to push revolutionary "reforms."
Porras also noted reduced contacts with the military, which
had traditionally invited him to change of command ceremonies
but had not done so in more than three years.
¶5. (C) Porras offered to facilitate any USG efforts at the
community level to demonstrate that non-GOV entities -- the
church, the private sector, etc. -- can have a positive
impact on Venezuela's poor. He welcomed USG visits to church
social programs in poor neighborhoods. Porras warned that
the longer the USG waits, the more successful GOV will be at
undermining traditional democratic organizations. He
acknowledged an inherent conflict in his own analysis:
Chavez is a long-term problem but the longer it takes to
address, the stronger he becomes.
-------
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) Porras and the rest of the Catholic leadership have
kept low profiles since the referendum, the results of which
they grudgingly accepted. Chavez has targeted the church,
especially its leadership, which he sees as an ally of the
previous political regime. Chavez has a long-running
conflict as well with Porras, who was among the first to
accuse Chavez of authoritarian tendencies. Rivalries aside,
Porras is in touch with current domestic and international
thought on Venezuela. The Catholic social projects Porras
seeks to promote, while not on the scale of the GOV's
"missions," do have a history of solidarity with Venezuela's
poor that is not so easily undone, despite Chavez's efforts.
Brownfield
HAVEZ...
fredag 10 december 2010
A cyber war? I am WikiLeaks!
Yes, there is something really big going on. I would rather call these current events a revolution. A revolution of freedom of speach, freedom of expression and freedom of mind. So, keep up the good work here, and spread the mirrors anywhere you possible can!
And by the way, to me it seems very strange organizing this Openleaks. And why doesn't the source in this article from SvD
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/wikileaks-far-konkurrens_5799861.svd
openly tell us his/hers namn? It smells all funny gags here...
This is my contribution today!
----------------
Friday, 11 January 2008, 11:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000125
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/MLS, P, DRL
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2028
TAGS PREL, PHUM, CH, BM
SUBJECT: MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA’S EFFORTS ON BURMA
REF: 07 BEIJING 7197
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) Summary: China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current “standstill†in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw China’s attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) MFA Asia Department Counselor Yang Jian and Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Asia scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang met HFAC professional staff members Eric Richardson and Dennis Halpin and SFRC professional staff member Frank Januzzi on January 10-11.
“Bold Measures†Necessary to Prevent Further Turmoil
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶3. (C) Counselor Yang Jian told the HFAC and SFRC staff members January 11 that China would like to see the Burmese Government take “bold measures†to improve the livelihood of the Burmese people and achieve national reconciliation through dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy supporters as well as ethnic minority groups. Counselor Yang stated that the Chinese accept the Burmese regime’s so-called “roadmap†to democracy as the best route to democracy and national reconciliation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said the Burmese government exerts control over society only on the surface and the potential for “lots of trouble†persists. Zhai said the regime’s inept handling of the economy costs it legitimacy. Even if the Burmese generals and Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a healthy dialogue, economic problems could throw the country into turmoil.
Encouraging Signs but Current Standstill
----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Yang said despite the potential for further trouble, the Chinese government is encouraged by a number of developments since the disturbances in August and September, including the visits of UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, the appointment of Labor Minister Aung Kyi (who Yang believes is “close to the core†of the Burmese regime) as a liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, and the release of detainees. Yang said that during VFM Wang Yi’s November 2007 visit to Burma (reftel), Wang shared with senior Burmese leaders China’s analysis, again suggesting more attention to the livelihood of the Burmese people, dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, and more interaction with ASEAN. Yang said that, based on the regime’s positive language about the dialogue, China had been optimistic it would succeed. In light of the current “standstill†in Burma, however, China is thinking about what other steps now to take with the regime.
China’s “Extraordinary†Efforts
-------------------------------
¶5. (C) Yang recounted China’s efforts to improve the situation in Burma. She said that after China and Russia in January 2007 vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan traveled to Burma in February to hold “extraordinary†discussions with the regime’s senior leaders. Tang suggested that Senior General Than Shwe and other Burmese leaders improve Burma’s domestic and international situation. Yang said lower level Burmese officials, hesitant to approach senior leaders with critical advice, were pleased with China’s approach to Than Shwe.
¶6. (C) Scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang January 10 separately echoed the view that China is making great efforts to influence Burma positively while adhering to its policy of non-interference. Zhai said China has delivered indirect but clear signals to Asian countries and the United States on the need for greater openness in Burma. Zhai highlighted Premier Wen Jiabao’s November 19 speech at the National University of Singapore. (Note: Wen’s speech included the following: “Only an open and inclusive nation can be strong and
BEIJING 00000125 002 OF 003
prosperous; cutting off contacts with the outside world can make a country backward.â€)
Direct U.S.-Burma Dialogue
--------------------------
¶7. (C) During the Wang Yi visit, Burmese leaders expressed interest in more discussions with the United States. Noting that USG officials have suggested Burmese officials contact our Embassy in Rangoon, Yang said Burma preferred the format of the June 2007 talks in Beijing. China views the June meetings between the Burmese delegation and State Department officials as a “bilateral confidence building measure,†Yang said.
Continued Support for Gambari
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Yang said China will continue to support UN Special Advisor Gambari’s mission, though she noted that the Burmese Government is unhappy with Gambari because Burmese leaders believe they followed Gambari’s suggestions during his first visit but then received only further opprobrium. Yang said Burmese leaders are unhappy about the UN “Group of Friends†on Burma. While China is open to multilateral means to address the situation in Burma, China believes Burma’s acceptance of these means is the key to success. For example, China would like ASEAN to play a more constructive role, Yang said, but ASEAN is divided over how to address Burma. Older ASEAN member countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, favor a hard-line approach. Newer ASEAN members, such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, support a more moderate stance towards Burma.
No Sanctions
------------
¶9. (C) MFA’s Yang reiterated that China remains opposed to additional sanctions, which she said will not spur further dialogue, but instead make the regime look further inward and give it an excuse for hard-line polices. Despite China’s opposition to sanctions, Yang stressed that the United States and China have similar goals for Burma, including stability, democracy and development. Therefore, China and the United States should show unity, particularly in the UN, in addressing the situation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said that because China foremost values stability in Burma, China does not wish to see a sudden change in the Burmese regime. In that light, China fears the pressure of more sanctions may only bring further civil unrest.
China’s attention drawn away from Burma
---------------------------------------
¶10. (C) CICIR’s Zhai said China would like to see ASEAN play a larger role on Burma partly because domestic events in China, including the National People’s Congress in March and the Olympics in August, are increasingly consuming China’s attention. Zhai said recent protests in Vietnam over the South China Sea and the turmoil in Pakistan have also drawn China’s and international attention away from Burma.
Including democracy supporters slows down roadmap
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶11. (C) Zhai said that including the democratic opposition and ethnic groups in the so-called roadmap to democracy at this stage would slow down the process, yet Zhai asserted that “if Senior General Than Shwe is rational,†he will include the democratic opposition to increase the legitimacy of the current regime.
USG should assure safe future for Burmese generals
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶12. (C) CICIR’s Zhang said that the United States should “play two hands†with the Burmese Government. Zhang said the United States has been sufficiently critical of the regime and now should send messages, via China if necessary, to reassure Burmese military leaders that their personal security would not be imperiled in a democratic transition. Zhang said that guaranteeing the safe future of the current military leadership is the key to “unlocking the deadlock.â€
¶13. (U) HFAC and SFRC staff members did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.
BEIJING 00000125 003 OF 003
RANDT
And by the way, to me it seems very strange organizing this Openleaks. And why doesn't the source in this article from SvD
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/wikileaks-far-konkurrens_5799861.svd
openly tell us his/hers namn? It smells all funny gags here...
This is my contribution today!
----------------
Friday, 11 January 2008, 11:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000125
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/MLS, P, DRL
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2028
TAGS PREL, PHUM, CH, BM
SUBJECT: MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA’S EFFORTS ON BURMA
REF: 07 BEIJING 7197
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) Summary: China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current “standstill†in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw China’s attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) MFA Asia Department Counselor Yang Jian and Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Asia scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang met HFAC professional staff members Eric Richardson and Dennis Halpin and SFRC professional staff member Frank Januzzi on January 10-11.
“Bold Measures†Necessary to Prevent Further Turmoil
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶3. (C) Counselor Yang Jian told the HFAC and SFRC staff members January 11 that China would like to see the Burmese Government take “bold measures†to improve the livelihood of the Burmese people and achieve national reconciliation through dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy supporters as well as ethnic minority groups. Counselor Yang stated that the Chinese accept the Burmese regime’s so-called “roadmap†to democracy as the best route to democracy and national reconciliation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said the Burmese government exerts control over society only on the surface and the potential for “lots of trouble†persists. Zhai said the regime’s inept handling of the economy costs it legitimacy. Even if the Burmese generals and Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a healthy dialogue, economic problems could throw the country into turmoil.
Encouraging Signs but Current Standstill
----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Yang said despite the potential for further trouble, the Chinese government is encouraged by a number of developments since the disturbances in August and September, including the visits of UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, the appointment of Labor Minister Aung Kyi (who Yang believes is “close to the core†of the Burmese regime) as a liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, and the release of detainees. Yang said that during VFM Wang Yi’s November 2007 visit to Burma (reftel), Wang shared with senior Burmese leaders China’s analysis, again suggesting more attention to the livelihood of the Burmese people, dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, and more interaction with ASEAN. Yang said that, based on the regime’s positive language about the dialogue, China had been optimistic it would succeed. In light of the current “standstill†in Burma, however, China is thinking about what other steps now to take with the regime.
China’s “Extraordinary†Efforts
-------------------------------
¶5. (C) Yang recounted China’s efforts to improve the situation in Burma. She said that after China and Russia in January 2007 vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan traveled to Burma in February to hold “extraordinary†discussions with the regime’s senior leaders. Tang suggested that Senior General Than Shwe and other Burmese leaders improve Burma’s domestic and international situation. Yang said lower level Burmese officials, hesitant to approach senior leaders with critical advice, were pleased with China’s approach to Than Shwe.
¶6. (C) Scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang January 10 separately echoed the view that China is making great efforts to influence Burma positively while adhering to its policy of non-interference. Zhai said China has delivered indirect but clear signals to Asian countries and the United States on the need for greater openness in Burma. Zhai highlighted Premier Wen Jiabao’s November 19 speech at the National University of Singapore. (Note: Wen’s speech included the following: “Only an open and inclusive nation can be strong and
BEIJING 00000125 002 OF 003
prosperous; cutting off contacts with the outside world can make a country backward.â€)
Direct U.S.-Burma Dialogue
--------------------------
¶7. (C) During the Wang Yi visit, Burmese leaders expressed interest in more discussions with the United States. Noting that USG officials have suggested Burmese officials contact our Embassy in Rangoon, Yang said Burma preferred the format of the June 2007 talks in Beijing. China views the June meetings between the Burmese delegation and State Department officials as a “bilateral confidence building measure,†Yang said.
Continued Support for Gambari
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Yang said China will continue to support UN Special Advisor Gambari’s mission, though she noted that the Burmese Government is unhappy with Gambari because Burmese leaders believe they followed Gambari’s suggestions during his first visit but then received only further opprobrium. Yang said Burmese leaders are unhappy about the UN “Group of Friends†on Burma. While China is open to multilateral means to address the situation in Burma, China believes Burma’s acceptance of these means is the key to success. For example, China would like ASEAN to play a more constructive role, Yang said, but ASEAN is divided over how to address Burma. Older ASEAN member countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, favor a hard-line approach. Newer ASEAN members, such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, support a more moderate stance towards Burma.
No Sanctions
------------
¶9. (C) MFA’s Yang reiterated that China remains opposed to additional sanctions, which she said will not spur further dialogue, but instead make the regime look further inward and give it an excuse for hard-line polices. Despite China’s opposition to sanctions, Yang stressed that the United States and China have similar goals for Burma, including stability, democracy and development. Therefore, China and the United States should show unity, particularly in the UN, in addressing the situation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said that because China foremost values stability in Burma, China does not wish to see a sudden change in the Burmese regime. In that light, China fears the pressure of more sanctions may only bring further civil unrest.
China’s attention drawn away from Burma
---------------------------------------
¶10. (C) CICIR’s Zhai said China would like to see ASEAN play a larger role on Burma partly because domestic events in China, including the National People’s Congress in March and the Olympics in August, are increasingly consuming China’s attention. Zhai said recent protests in Vietnam over the South China Sea and the turmoil in Pakistan have also drawn China’s and international attention away from Burma.
Including democracy supporters slows down roadmap
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶11. (C) Zhai said that including the democratic opposition and ethnic groups in the so-called roadmap to democracy at this stage would slow down the process, yet Zhai asserted that “if Senior General Than Shwe is rational,†he will include the democratic opposition to increase the legitimacy of the current regime.
USG should assure safe future for Burmese generals
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶12. (C) CICIR’s Zhang said that the United States should “play two hands†with the Burmese Government. Zhang said the United States has been sufficiently critical of the regime and now should send messages, via China if necessary, to reassure Burmese military leaders that their personal security would not be imperiled in a democratic transition. Zhang said that guaranteeing the safe future of the current military leadership is the key to “unlocking the deadlock.â€
¶13. (U) HFAC and SFRC staff members did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.
BEIJING 00000125 003 OF 003
RANDT
torsdag 9 december 2010
Operation Payback - I am WikiLeaks
Fortsätt kampen för ett fritt internet, en fri samtid och den fria tanken! Spegla WikiLeaks arbete på din blogg, hemsida, på insändare och länkar på Facebook!
Mejla din lokala politiker, ta kontakt med likasinnade på nätet/i verkligheten, diskutera och låt detta 1a Nätkrig :-) inte tystna!
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
Jag ställer mig positiv till den hackerattack (Operation Payback) som skedde under natten mot justitieminister Beatrice Ask, Claes Borgström med flera, därför att de förspråkar inte det fria och genomlysta samhället.
Här är dagens bidrag:
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell’s current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than “co-opt†the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell’s oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell’s oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell’s Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
¶3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF’s performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, “Boyloaf†was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been “settledâ€. End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell’s Concessions in Nigeria?
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM’s interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON’s prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister’s office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting “from Russia.†(Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn’t clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria’s ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of “surface to air missiles (SAMs)†to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has “intelligence†that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is “leaky.†She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
Mejla din lokala politiker, ta kontakt med likasinnade på nätet/i verkligheten, diskutera och låt detta 1a Nätkrig :-) inte tystna!
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
Jag ställer mig positiv till den hackerattack (Operation Payback) som skedde under natten mot justitieminister Beatrice Ask, Claes Borgström med flera, därför att de förspråkar inte det fria och genomlysta samhället.
Här är dagens bidrag:
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell’s current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi’s lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than “co-opt†the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell’s oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell’s Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell’s oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell’s Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
¶3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF’s performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, “Boyloaf†was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been “settledâ€. End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell’s Concessions in Nigeria?
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM’s interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON’s prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister’s office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting “from Russia.†(Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn’t clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria’s ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
--------------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of “surface to air missiles (SAMs)†to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has “intelligence†that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is “leaky.†She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
onsdag 8 december 2010
I am Spartacus - Jag är WikiLeaks
From "I am Spartacus" to "Jag är Wikileaks"
För att spegla WikiLeaks - Klicka på länken nedan och välj ett eget dokument att lägga upp:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
Här är mitt bidrag för idag:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIO DE JANEIRO 000357
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV ASEC BR
SUBJECT: (C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT"
REF: A. (A) RIO 329
¶B. (B) RIO 346 Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne for reasons 1.4 (b, d )
¶1. (C) Summary: Rio Principal Officer, accompanied by PAO, met on 23 October with XXXX (strictly protect), XXX for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. XXXX has long ICRC experience in conflict zones. It is his assessment that the situation in many Rio favelas today is, for all practical purposes, a full-blown internal armed conflict, and not simply an urban crime problem. While XXXX recognizes he can say nothing of the sort publicly, and that the de jure definition in International Humanitarian Law for "internal armed conflict" may not describe precisely the violence in Rio, he makes a compelling case. The corollary is that the ICRC is quietly working in Rio favelas in much the way it does in other war zones - attempting to establish "humanitarian spaces" for treating or evacuating the wounded,facilitating release of captives, getting services and supplies to civilians isolated by violence, and requesting access (not yet granted) to gang members in prison populations. The dichotomy of extensive armed conflict raging in a celebrated and highly developed megacity in an economically powerful democracy may be becoming more than Brazilians can absorb, and frustration and the focusing effect of the 2016 Olympics in Rio seem to be galvanizing the public and state and federal governments to seek decisive action. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a 23 October meeting with Principal Officer and PAO sought by ICRC XXXX in Rio de Janeiro, XXXX, XXXXX made a compelling argument that the continuing violence in Rio,s favelas constitutes, for all practical purposes, a full-blown "internal armed conflict." XXXX said he would never take such a position publicly, given Brazilian sensitivities, nor does he argue that Rio,s violence matches in every detail the de jure definition of "internal armed conflict" under International Humanitarian Law. (Note: The relevant definition is in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. End Note.) Nonetheless, in its main features -- i.e., organized factions holding the monopoly on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for ICRC to operate as though in a war zone to create "humanitarian spaces" -- the gang warfare in Rio,s favelas resembles other situations worldwide that are formally recognized by governments and international organizations as internal armed conflicts, XXX said. XXXX speaks with conviction, reflecting his long ICRC experience in conflict zones, including in Haiti, in Uganda and in Sierra Leone,s civil war. In the course of the discussion, XXX made the following specific observations: --Currently ICRC operates in 7 Rio favelas: Mare, Parada de Lucas, Cidade de Deus, Cantagalo, Pavao/Pavaozinho, Complexo de Alemao, and Vila Vintem. State Security Secretary Jose Beltrame is the ICRC,s senior interlocutor in Rio. ICRC also has asked for access to the state prison system, which has not yet been accepted (although he noted that there was support at federal level, including from Justice Minister Tarso Genro); --The ICRC works to create "humanitarian spaces" in favela conflict areas, proceeding cautiously, first using local NGOpartners such as AfroReggae and Luta Pela Paz. In concrete examples, this has meant trying to convince gang factions to recognize certain places -- e.g., schools, clinics -- as "safe areas," working to establish mechanisms to locate and negotiate release of hostages, bringing basic supplies (including food and water) to civilians who are regularly isolated by the most extreme violence inside areas XXX called "favelas within favelas." ICRC is also working with former staffers of Doctors Without Borders to address treatment and evacuation of wounded or deceased persons, XXXX said. He noted MSF closed its operation in the notorious Complexo de Alemao favela when it was not regularly able to fulfill its mandate of treating wounded citizens, owing to the grim fact that the lethality of the conflict in Rio,s favelas leaves mostly dead victims; --Now ICRC is building up its own network. Increasingly, its delegates speak directly with leaders of gangs and militias, as well as with police. Contact with gang members is not direct initially, but word of ICRC interest in contacting specific gang leaders is passed through mediators, and mutually acceptable conditions are set for a meeting. ICRC uses clearly marked vehicles and communicates its movements in advance to all sides, just as in other war zones where it operates; --ICRC also works on health initiatives as well as education, but XXXXX allowed that such activities were, in part, "cover" for ICRC,s efforts to protect civilians from violence; --In prisons, ICRC is concerned primarily with the human rights situation, and with violence driven by gang dynamics. There is also an opportunity to meet with imprisoned gang faction leaders to emphasize that ICRC,s work in favelas is not political, and is intended to alleviate suffering of citizens. And there is the humanitarian issue of facilitating contact with prisoners by family members who may not be able to visit prisons because of factional violence (e.g., A family member from a favela controlled by one gang may put themselves and their incarcerated relative at risk if they attempt to enter a prison dominated by a rival gang.); --XXXX applauds the state Favela Pacification Program (FPP) and the community-based Police Pacification Units (UPP) and sees their value in extending government control and reducing the stigma of living in favelas, but does not believe that the plan is sufficient to fundamentally change the security situation, at least not for several years (ref A); --ICRC must be sensitive and low-profile in its work, and XXXX pointed out his staff is "hidden" in the basement of the historical headquarters building of the Brazilian Red Cross national organization. The Brazilian Red Cross is increasingly engaged by ICRC to assist in its efforts in the favelas.
¶3. (C) Comment: One does not have to completely agree with XXXX assessment to concede that this battle-hardened ICRC professional makes a cogent case for viewing the situation in many of Rio,s favelas as one of sustained internal armed conflict, as opposed to simply urban criminal violence. The Rio combatants are, of course, rival criminal gangs, militia groups, and the police, as opposed to political or ethnic factions. But in the gangs, complete control of geographic areas (Rio Governor Sergio Cabral recently referred to gang-dominated favelas as "occupied territories"), their relatively elaborate command and control structures, their powerful military weaponry, and in the horrendous body count they leave behind, Rio,s gangs do resemble combatants in recognized internal armed conflicts worldwide. A signal distinction is that Rio,s internal armed conflict is not generalized throughout a national or even regional theater. Instead, it is occurring within relatively discreet urban pockets (though violence can spill outside favelas), spread throughout a celebrated and highly developed megacity, one of two (with Sao Paulo) in a democratic country with one of the world,s largest economies. That cruel and decades-old dichotomy may have become, finally, more than Rio residents and Brazil,s leaders can absorb, and their frustration and the focusing energy of the 2016 Olympics seem to be galvanizing state, municipal and federal government. There is a growing consenus that now is the time to confront the plague of violence in Rio in a decisive manner, but it remains to be seen whether Rio,s Favela Pacification Program, possible new federal-level public security initiatives, and additional funding for public security will be sufficient to help Rio de Janeiro quell its long internal armed conflict. HEARNE
För att spegla WikiLeaks - Klicka på länken nedan och välj ett eget dokument att lägga upp:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
Här är mitt bidrag för idag:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIO DE JANEIRO 000357
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV ASEC BR
SUBJECT: (C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT"
REF: A. (A) RIO 329
¶B. (B) RIO 346 Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne for reasons 1.4 (b, d )
¶1. (C) Summary: Rio Principal Officer, accompanied by PAO, met on 23 October with XXXX (strictly protect), XXX for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. XXXX has long ICRC experience in conflict zones. It is his assessment that the situation in many Rio favelas today is, for all practical purposes, a full-blown internal armed conflict, and not simply an urban crime problem. While XXXX recognizes he can say nothing of the sort publicly, and that the de jure definition in International Humanitarian Law for "internal armed conflict" may not describe precisely the violence in Rio, he makes a compelling case. The corollary is that the ICRC is quietly working in Rio favelas in much the way it does in other war zones - attempting to establish "humanitarian spaces" for treating or evacuating the wounded,facilitating release of captives, getting services and supplies to civilians isolated by violence, and requesting access (not yet granted) to gang members in prison populations. The dichotomy of extensive armed conflict raging in a celebrated and highly developed megacity in an economically powerful democracy may be becoming more than Brazilians can absorb, and frustration and the focusing effect of the 2016 Olympics in Rio seem to be galvanizing the public and state and federal governments to seek decisive action. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a 23 October meeting with Principal Officer and PAO sought by ICRC XXXX in Rio de Janeiro, XXXX, XXXXX made a compelling argument that the continuing violence in Rio,s favelas constitutes, for all practical purposes, a full-blown "internal armed conflict." XXXX said he would never take such a position publicly, given Brazilian sensitivities, nor does he argue that Rio,s violence matches in every detail the de jure definition of "internal armed conflict" under International Humanitarian Law. (Note: The relevant definition is in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. End Note.) Nonetheless, in its main features -- i.e., organized factions holding the monopoly on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for ICRC to operate as though in a war zone to create "humanitarian spaces" -- the gang warfare in Rio,s favelas resembles other situations worldwide that are formally recognized by governments and international organizations as internal armed conflicts, XXX said. XXXX speaks with conviction, reflecting his long ICRC experience in conflict zones, including in Haiti, in Uganda and in Sierra Leone,s civil war. In the course of the discussion, XXX made the following specific observations: --Currently ICRC operates in 7 Rio favelas: Mare, Parada de Lucas, Cidade de Deus, Cantagalo, Pavao/Pavaozinho, Complexo de Alemao, and Vila Vintem. State Security Secretary Jose Beltrame is the ICRC,s senior interlocutor in Rio. ICRC also has asked for access to the state prison system, which has not yet been accepted (although he noted that there was support at federal level, including from Justice Minister Tarso Genro); --The ICRC works to create "humanitarian spaces" in favela conflict areas, proceeding cautiously, first using local NGOpartners such as AfroReggae and Luta Pela Paz. In concrete examples, this has meant trying to convince gang factions to recognize certain places -- e.g., schools, clinics -- as "safe areas," working to establish mechanisms to locate and negotiate release of hostages, bringing basic supplies (including food and water) to civilians who are regularly isolated by the most extreme violence inside areas XXX called "favelas within favelas." ICRC is also working with former staffers of Doctors Without Borders to address treatment and evacuation of wounded or deceased persons, XXXX said. He noted MSF closed its operation in the notorious Complexo de Alemao favela when it was not regularly able to fulfill its mandate of treating wounded citizens, owing to the grim fact that the lethality of the conflict in Rio,s favelas leaves mostly dead victims; --Now ICRC is building up its own network. Increasingly, its delegates speak directly with leaders of gangs and militias, as well as with police. Contact with gang members is not direct initially, but word of ICRC interest in contacting specific gang leaders is passed through mediators, and mutually acceptable conditions are set for a meeting. ICRC uses clearly marked vehicles and communicates its movements in advance to all sides, just as in other war zones where it operates; --ICRC also works on health initiatives as well as education, but XXXXX allowed that such activities were, in part, "cover" for ICRC,s efforts to protect civilians from violence; --In prisons, ICRC is concerned primarily with the human rights situation, and with violence driven by gang dynamics. There is also an opportunity to meet with imprisoned gang faction leaders to emphasize that ICRC,s work in favelas is not political, and is intended to alleviate suffering of citizens. And there is the humanitarian issue of facilitating contact with prisoners by family members who may not be able to visit prisons because of factional violence (e.g., A family member from a favela controlled by one gang may put themselves and their incarcerated relative at risk if they attempt to enter a prison dominated by a rival gang.); --XXXX applauds the state Favela Pacification Program (FPP) and the community-based Police Pacification Units (UPP) and sees their value in extending government control and reducing the stigma of living in favelas, but does not believe that the plan is sufficient to fundamentally change the security situation, at least not for several years (ref A); --ICRC must be sensitive and low-profile in its work, and XXXX pointed out his staff is "hidden" in the basement of the historical headquarters building of the Brazilian Red Cross national organization. The Brazilian Red Cross is increasingly engaged by ICRC to assist in its efforts in the favelas.
¶3. (C) Comment: One does not have to completely agree with XXXX assessment to concede that this battle-hardened ICRC professional makes a cogent case for viewing the situation in many of Rio,s favelas as one of sustained internal armed conflict, as opposed to simply urban criminal violence. The Rio combatants are, of course, rival criminal gangs, militia groups, and the police, as opposed to political or ethnic factions. But in the gangs, complete control of geographic areas (Rio Governor Sergio Cabral recently referred to gang-dominated favelas as "occupied territories"), their relatively elaborate command and control structures, their powerful military weaponry, and in the horrendous body count they leave behind, Rio,s gangs do resemble combatants in recognized internal armed conflicts worldwide. A signal distinction is that Rio,s internal armed conflict is not generalized throughout a national or even regional theater. Instead, it is occurring within relatively discreet urban pockets (though violence can spill outside favelas), spread throughout a celebrated and highly developed megacity, one of two (with Sao Paulo) in a democratic country with one of the world,s largest economies. That cruel and decades-old dichotomy may have become, finally, more than Rio residents and Brazil,s leaders can absorb, and their frustration and the focusing energy of the 2016 Olympics seem to be galvanizing state, municipal and federal government. There is a growing consenus that now is the time to confront the plague of violence in Rio in a decisive manner, but it remains to be seen whether Rio,s Favela Pacification Program, possible new federal-level public security initiatives, and additional funding for public security will be sufficient to help Rio de Janeiro quell its long internal armed conflict. HEARNE
tisdag 7 december 2010
NYTT DOKUMENT från Wikileaks/Cable Viewer
JAG ÄR WIKILEAKS (Jag är Spartacus-kampanjen går vidare!)
Fick under dagen veta att Mastercard och Visa dragit in möjligheterna att skicka pengar till Wikileaks via deras "nät".... Man blir stum, men inte förvånad.
Här följer ett av dokumenten ur Cable Viewer (random):
-------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04MADRID1187 2004-04-07 18:06 2010-12-06 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001187
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: ZAPATERO AND SPANISH TROOPS IN IRAQ: POLITICAL
PRESSURES FOR WITHDRAWAL
Classified By: Charge J. Robert Manzanares per 1.5 (b) and (d).
Summary
¶1. (C) Political pressure is high on incoming Socialist
President Rodriguez Zapatero to fulfill his campaign promise
to pull the 1300 Spanish troops out of Iraq absent a new UN
mandate giving the UN the lead role. Zapatero is on the hook
to demonstrate to his supporters that his surprise election
March 14 ushered in a significant change from the Aznar
years. Zapatero, who vehemently opposed the Iraq war, has
repeatedly emphasized, publicly and privately, that he will
comply with his campaign promises. The clearest way to
manifest this would be to pull the troops out. Nonetheless,
the Socialists are sensitive to charges a Spanish withdrawal
following the March 11 Madrid terror attacks would appear to
be cutting and running in the face of terror. A new UNSCR
giving the UN a lead role might provide Zapatero with cover
to keep the troops in, but what exactly Zapatero can accept
remains vague since he has not defined it. We expect him to
take his cues from France and Germany. Public opinion in
the wake of March 11 regards Spain as being in the line of
Jihadist fire because of the Aznar government's Iraq policy
and favors withdrawal. Recent fighting in Najaf between
Spanish forces and Shiite extremists has heightened concerns
about the Iraq deployment. Significant Spanish losses there
could clinch the decision to pull out. End Summary.
The Case for Withdrawal
¶2. (C) Zapatero has been vehemently against the Iraq war
from the beginning. He has consistently maintained that the
war was founded on lies, and is immoral and illegal. Many
of the 11 million Spaniards who voted for the Socialists on
March 14 share his view. Many Socialists, especially those
on the left, want the troops out now regardless of a UN
resolution. As far as Spanish opinion as a whole, according
to a radio (Cadena Ser) poll last week, 38% of respondents
favored Spanish troops staying in Iraq if there were a new UN
mandate while 42% favor pulling the troops out even if the UN
takes control of Iraq. Only a small percentage favor the
troops staying under the current mandate. Many Socialists
are uncomfortable with the assertive international role for
Spain that Aznar espoused and, since the March 11 attacks,
believe Aznar's alliance with the US put Spain in the direct
line of fire for Islamist terrorists.
Caving in to Terrorists?
¶3. (C) The Socialists are, however, sensitive to the charge
that withdrawal from Iraq means caving in to terrorist
blackmail following March 11. They note that Zapatero's
pledge to withdraw long predated March 11 (though the
Socialists would not have been elected had the March 11
attacks not taken place). Jose Blanco, Socialist Party
National Coordinator, noted on April 6: "Let's not mix apples
and oranges. One thing is terrorism which has to be fought
on all fronts. Another thing is our politics concerning the
war in Iraq. Politically we shouldn't link one thing with
the other." Popular sentiment, however, does link them.
Many believe Spain is now exposed to jihadist terrorism as a
result of a military deployment in Iraq that most Spaniards
oppose.
¶4. (C) Antiterrorism marchers numbering 25,000 turned out
April 5 in Leganes, the site of the April 3 shootout and
suicide of the suspected leaders of the March 11 Madrid
terror attacks. The march underlined that many Spaniards do
link the March 11 terror attacks to Spain's presence in Iraq.
The communique for the march, at the urging of the Socialist
mayor of Leganes, included an explicit call for Spain to
withdraw its troops from Iraq. (This prompted Aznar's
Popular Party to boycott the march and organize its own on
April 6). The message that came out of the April 5 rally
was that since Spaniards never wanted to be in Iraq in the
first place, Spain should withdraw, lower its profile, and
thereby remove itself as a target. Images of the Shiite
riots in Najaf and elsewhere further agitated Spanish opinion
against Spain's presence in Iraq, as did reports that Spanish
troops returned fire on rioters in Najaf April 4, killing
about 20.
UN Resolution Giving UN a Lead Role
¶5. (C) FM designate Moratinos has been in the lead in
holding up the possibility that a new UNSCR giving the UN the
leading role in the Iraq could satisfy Zapatero's electoral
pledge. However, Zapatero and his key political advisors
such as Jose Blanco and Jesus Caldera, have been less forward
leaning than Moratinos. The posture of France and Germany
on a new resolution should be important, since Zapatero has
made it clear that he wants to follow their lead. If France
and Germany are on board, Zapatero will feel pressure to
follow suit. One prominent commentator, well connected in
the PSOE, noted to us that if, for example, France were
willing to commit troops to Iraq under a new UNSCR, Zapatero
would be able to show that the situation had fundamentally
changed and keep Spanish troops there.
Comment
¶6. (C) Indications are that Zapatero has not made a final
decision on what to do about the troops. The "pull the
troops out" sentiment from his base, and which his key
political advisors share, will be a critical factor weighing
on him. For Zapatero, the easiest scenario would be no new
UN resolution, which would mean he would have no choice but
to pull the troops out. A UN resolution expanding the UN
role will force him to make a choice. In this case,
Zapatero's allies in the all important Prisa media group
might be able to help him sell the line that he had won by
successfully pushing for an increased UN role and give him
cover to keep the troops in. Zapatero may also be
susceptible to the argument that, whatever the rationale or
lack thereof for the war, undercutting the coalition now
could prove disastrous. Nonetheless, escalation of fighting
in Southern Iraq, particularly if Spanish forces suffer
significant losses, may clinch the decision in favor of
withdrawal.
MANZANARES
Fick under dagen veta att Mastercard och Visa dragit in möjligheterna att skicka pengar till Wikileaks via deras "nät".... Man blir stum, men inte förvånad.
Här följer ett av dokumenten ur Cable Viewer (random):
-------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04MADRID1187 2004-04-07 18:06 2010-12-06 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001187
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: ZAPATERO AND SPANISH TROOPS IN IRAQ: POLITICAL
PRESSURES FOR WITHDRAWAL
Classified By: Charge J. Robert Manzanares per 1.5 (b) and (d).
Summary
¶1. (C) Political pressure is high on incoming Socialist
President Rodriguez Zapatero to fulfill his campaign promise
to pull the 1300 Spanish troops out of Iraq absent a new UN
mandate giving the UN the lead role. Zapatero is on the hook
to demonstrate to his supporters that his surprise election
March 14 ushered in a significant change from the Aznar
years. Zapatero, who vehemently opposed the Iraq war, has
repeatedly emphasized, publicly and privately, that he will
comply with his campaign promises. The clearest way to
manifest this would be to pull the troops out. Nonetheless,
the Socialists are sensitive to charges a Spanish withdrawal
following the March 11 Madrid terror attacks would appear to
be cutting and running in the face of terror. A new UNSCR
giving the UN a lead role might provide Zapatero with cover
to keep the troops in, but what exactly Zapatero can accept
remains vague since he has not defined it. We expect him to
take his cues from France and Germany. Public opinion in
the wake of March 11 regards Spain as being in the line of
Jihadist fire because of the Aznar government's Iraq policy
and favors withdrawal. Recent fighting in Najaf between
Spanish forces and Shiite extremists has heightened concerns
about the Iraq deployment. Significant Spanish losses there
could clinch the decision to pull out. End Summary.
The Case for Withdrawal
¶2. (C) Zapatero has been vehemently against the Iraq war
from the beginning. He has consistently maintained that the
war was founded on lies, and is immoral and illegal. Many
of the 11 million Spaniards who voted for the Socialists on
March 14 share his view. Many Socialists, especially those
on the left, want the troops out now regardless of a UN
resolution. As far as Spanish opinion as a whole, according
to a radio (Cadena Ser) poll last week, 38% of respondents
favored Spanish troops staying in Iraq if there were a new UN
mandate while 42% favor pulling the troops out even if the UN
takes control of Iraq. Only a small percentage favor the
troops staying under the current mandate. Many Socialists
are uncomfortable with the assertive international role for
Spain that Aznar espoused and, since the March 11 attacks,
believe Aznar's alliance with the US put Spain in the direct
line of fire for Islamist terrorists.
Caving in to Terrorists?
¶3. (C) The Socialists are, however, sensitive to the charge
that withdrawal from Iraq means caving in to terrorist
blackmail following March 11. They note that Zapatero's
pledge to withdraw long predated March 11 (though the
Socialists would not have been elected had the March 11
attacks not taken place). Jose Blanco, Socialist Party
National Coordinator, noted on April 6: "Let's not mix apples
and oranges. One thing is terrorism which has to be fought
on all fronts. Another thing is our politics concerning the
war in Iraq. Politically we shouldn't link one thing with
the other." Popular sentiment, however, does link them.
Many believe Spain is now exposed to jihadist terrorism as a
result of a military deployment in Iraq that most Spaniards
oppose.
¶4. (C) Antiterrorism marchers numbering 25,000 turned out
April 5 in Leganes, the site of the April 3 shootout and
suicide of the suspected leaders of the March 11 Madrid
terror attacks. The march underlined that many Spaniards do
link the March 11 terror attacks to Spain's presence in Iraq.
The communique for the march, at the urging of the Socialist
mayor of Leganes, included an explicit call for Spain to
withdraw its troops from Iraq. (This prompted Aznar's
Popular Party to boycott the march and organize its own on
April 6). The message that came out of the April 5 rally
was that since Spaniards never wanted to be in Iraq in the
first place, Spain should withdraw, lower its profile, and
thereby remove itself as a target. Images of the Shiite
riots in Najaf and elsewhere further agitated Spanish opinion
against Spain's presence in Iraq, as did reports that Spanish
troops returned fire on rioters in Najaf April 4, killing
about 20.
UN Resolution Giving UN a Lead Role
¶5. (C) FM designate Moratinos has been in the lead in
holding up the possibility that a new UNSCR giving the UN the
leading role in the Iraq could satisfy Zapatero's electoral
pledge. However, Zapatero and his key political advisors
such as Jose Blanco and Jesus Caldera, have been less forward
leaning than Moratinos. The posture of France and Germany
on a new resolution should be important, since Zapatero has
made it clear that he wants to follow their lead. If France
and Germany are on board, Zapatero will feel pressure to
follow suit. One prominent commentator, well connected in
the PSOE, noted to us that if, for example, France were
willing to commit troops to Iraq under a new UNSCR, Zapatero
would be able to show that the situation had fundamentally
changed and keep Spanish troops there.
Comment
¶6. (C) Indications are that Zapatero has not made a final
decision on what to do about the troops. The "pull the
troops out" sentiment from his base, and which his key
political advisors share, will be a critical factor weighing
on him. For Zapatero, the easiest scenario would be no new
UN resolution, which would mean he would have no choice but
to pull the troops out. A UN resolution expanding the UN
role will force him to make a choice. In this case,
Zapatero's allies in the all important Prisa media group
might be able to help him sell the line that he had won by
successfully pushing for an increased UN role and give him
cover to keep the troops in. Zapatero may also be
susceptible to the argument that, whatever the rationale or
lack thereof for the war, undercutting the coalition now
could prove disastrous. Nonetheless, escalation of fighting
in Southern Iraq, particularly if Spanish forces suffer
significant losses, may clinch the decision in favor of
withdrawal.
MANZANARES
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