http://brihed.blogspot.com/2010/12/%C3%A4r-ni-r%C3%A4dda-f%C3%B6r-calle-rehbinder.html
Det blir nästan skrattretande...
Citerar här Xenonexia's blogginlägg från ovan. "Det här är inte första gången. Även i januari i år stängdes Calles och Jennies konton ner. Den gången skrevs det en hel del på deras bloggar, samt i piratsfären. Något mindre tycker jag inte att vi ska kunna förvänta oss denna gången. Hjälp till att ta strid mot den amerikanska censurhysterin och den kristna högerns galenskaper som påverkar såväl Facebook som Apple och många andra stora amerikanska företag. Det kan även vara så att Calle varit väldigt frispråkig rörande Wikileaksaffären och att någon har lackat till på grund av detta. I så fall hoppas jag verkligen att där finns stöd att tillgå. En stark yttrandefrihet är den bästa skyddsmekanismen för att skapa och bevara ett öppet, fritt och demokratiskt samhälle. Utan yttrandefriheten är samhället förlorat."
VAD FAAN pysslar Facebook med?!
Visar inlägg med etikett libertarianer. Visa alla inlägg
Visar inlägg med etikett libertarianer. Visa alla inlägg
tisdag 14 december 2010
onsdag 8 december 2010
I am Spartacus - Jag är WikiLeaks
From "I am Spartacus" to "Jag är Wikileaks"
För att spegla WikiLeaks - Klicka på länken nedan och välj ett eget dokument att lägga upp:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
Här är mitt bidrag för idag:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIO DE JANEIRO 000357
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV ASEC BR
SUBJECT: (C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT"
REF: A. (A) RIO 329
¶B. (B) RIO 346 Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne for reasons 1.4 (b, d )
¶1. (C) Summary: Rio Principal Officer, accompanied by PAO, met on 23 October with XXXX (strictly protect), XXX for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. XXXX has long ICRC experience in conflict zones. It is his assessment that the situation in many Rio favelas today is, for all practical purposes, a full-blown internal armed conflict, and not simply an urban crime problem. While XXXX recognizes he can say nothing of the sort publicly, and that the de jure definition in International Humanitarian Law for "internal armed conflict" may not describe precisely the violence in Rio, he makes a compelling case. The corollary is that the ICRC is quietly working in Rio favelas in much the way it does in other war zones - attempting to establish "humanitarian spaces" for treating or evacuating the wounded,facilitating release of captives, getting services and supplies to civilians isolated by violence, and requesting access (not yet granted) to gang members in prison populations. The dichotomy of extensive armed conflict raging in a celebrated and highly developed megacity in an economically powerful democracy may be becoming more than Brazilians can absorb, and frustration and the focusing effect of the 2016 Olympics in Rio seem to be galvanizing the public and state and federal governments to seek decisive action. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a 23 October meeting with Principal Officer and PAO sought by ICRC XXXX in Rio de Janeiro, XXXX, XXXXX made a compelling argument that the continuing violence in Rio,s favelas constitutes, for all practical purposes, a full-blown "internal armed conflict." XXXX said he would never take such a position publicly, given Brazilian sensitivities, nor does he argue that Rio,s violence matches in every detail the de jure definition of "internal armed conflict" under International Humanitarian Law. (Note: The relevant definition is in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. End Note.) Nonetheless, in its main features -- i.e., organized factions holding the monopoly on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for ICRC to operate as though in a war zone to create "humanitarian spaces" -- the gang warfare in Rio,s favelas resembles other situations worldwide that are formally recognized by governments and international organizations as internal armed conflicts, XXX said. XXXX speaks with conviction, reflecting his long ICRC experience in conflict zones, including in Haiti, in Uganda and in Sierra Leone,s civil war. In the course of the discussion, XXX made the following specific observations: --Currently ICRC operates in 7 Rio favelas: Mare, Parada de Lucas, Cidade de Deus, Cantagalo, Pavao/Pavaozinho, Complexo de Alemao, and Vila Vintem. State Security Secretary Jose Beltrame is the ICRC,s senior interlocutor in Rio. ICRC also has asked for access to the state prison system, which has not yet been accepted (although he noted that there was support at federal level, including from Justice Minister Tarso Genro); --The ICRC works to create "humanitarian spaces" in favela conflict areas, proceeding cautiously, first using local NGOpartners such as AfroReggae and Luta Pela Paz. In concrete examples, this has meant trying to convince gang factions to recognize certain places -- e.g., schools, clinics -- as "safe areas," working to establish mechanisms to locate and negotiate release of hostages, bringing basic supplies (including food and water) to civilians who are regularly isolated by the most extreme violence inside areas XXX called "favelas within favelas." ICRC is also working with former staffers of Doctors Without Borders to address treatment and evacuation of wounded or deceased persons, XXXX said. He noted MSF closed its operation in the notorious Complexo de Alemao favela when it was not regularly able to fulfill its mandate of treating wounded citizens, owing to the grim fact that the lethality of the conflict in Rio,s favelas leaves mostly dead victims; --Now ICRC is building up its own network. Increasingly, its delegates speak directly with leaders of gangs and militias, as well as with police. Contact with gang members is not direct initially, but word of ICRC interest in contacting specific gang leaders is passed through mediators, and mutually acceptable conditions are set for a meeting. ICRC uses clearly marked vehicles and communicates its movements in advance to all sides, just as in other war zones where it operates; --ICRC also works on health initiatives as well as education, but XXXXX allowed that such activities were, in part, "cover" for ICRC,s efforts to protect civilians from violence; --In prisons, ICRC is concerned primarily with the human rights situation, and with violence driven by gang dynamics. There is also an opportunity to meet with imprisoned gang faction leaders to emphasize that ICRC,s work in favelas is not political, and is intended to alleviate suffering of citizens. And there is the humanitarian issue of facilitating contact with prisoners by family members who may not be able to visit prisons because of factional violence (e.g., A family member from a favela controlled by one gang may put themselves and their incarcerated relative at risk if they attempt to enter a prison dominated by a rival gang.); --XXXX applauds the state Favela Pacification Program (FPP) and the community-based Police Pacification Units (UPP) and sees their value in extending government control and reducing the stigma of living in favelas, but does not believe that the plan is sufficient to fundamentally change the security situation, at least not for several years (ref A); --ICRC must be sensitive and low-profile in its work, and XXXX pointed out his staff is "hidden" in the basement of the historical headquarters building of the Brazilian Red Cross national organization. The Brazilian Red Cross is increasingly engaged by ICRC to assist in its efforts in the favelas.
¶3. (C) Comment: One does not have to completely agree with XXXX assessment to concede that this battle-hardened ICRC professional makes a cogent case for viewing the situation in many of Rio,s favelas as one of sustained internal armed conflict, as opposed to simply urban criminal violence. The Rio combatants are, of course, rival criminal gangs, militia groups, and the police, as opposed to political or ethnic factions. But in the gangs, complete control of geographic areas (Rio Governor Sergio Cabral recently referred to gang-dominated favelas as "occupied territories"), their relatively elaborate command and control structures, their powerful military weaponry, and in the horrendous body count they leave behind, Rio,s gangs do resemble combatants in recognized internal armed conflicts worldwide. A signal distinction is that Rio,s internal armed conflict is not generalized throughout a national or even regional theater. Instead, it is occurring within relatively discreet urban pockets (though violence can spill outside favelas), spread throughout a celebrated and highly developed megacity, one of two (with Sao Paulo) in a democratic country with one of the world,s largest economies. That cruel and decades-old dichotomy may have become, finally, more than Rio residents and Brazil,s leaders can absorb, and their frustration and the focusing energy of the 2016 Olympics seem to be galvanizing state, municipal and federal government. There is a growing consenus that now is the time to confront the plague of violence in Rio in a decisive manner, but it remains to be seen whether Rio,s Favela Pacification Program, possible new federal-level public security initiatives, and additional funding for public security will be sufficient to help Rio de Janeiro quell its long internal armed conflict. HEARNE
För att spegla WikiLeaks - Klicka på länken nedan och välj ett eget dokument att lägga upp:
http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html
--------------
Här är mitt bidrag för idag:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIO DE JANEIRO 000357
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV ASEC BR
SUBJECT: (C) WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME: RIO'S "INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT"
REF: A. (A) RIO 329
¶B. (B) RIO 346 Classified By: Principal Officer Dennis W. Hearne for reasons 1.4 (b, d )
¶1. (C) Summary: Rio Principal Officer, accompanied by PAO, met on 23 October with XXXX (strictly protect), XXX for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. XXXX has long ICRC experience in conflict zones. It is his assessment that the situation in many Rio favelas today is, for all practical purposes, a full-blown internal armed conflict, and not simply an urban crime problem. While XXXX recognizes he can say nothing of the sort publicly, and that the de jure definition in International Humanitarian Law for "internal armed conflict" may not describe precisely the violence in Rio, he makes a compelling case. The corollary is that the ICRC is quietly working in Rio favelas in much the way it does in other war zones - attempting to establish "humanitarian spaces" for treating or evacuating the wounded,facilitating release of captives, getting services and supplies to civilians isolated by violence, and requesting access (not yet granted) to gang members in prison populations. The dichotomy of extensive armed conflict raging in a celebrated and highly developed megacity in an economically powerful democracy may be becoming more than Brazilians can absorb, and frustration and the focusing effect of the 2016 Olympics in Rio seem to be galvanizing the public and state and federal governments to seek decisive action. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a 23 October meeting with Principal Officer and PAO sought by ICRC XXXX in Rio de Janeiro, XXXX, XXXXX made a compelling argument that the continuing violence in Rio,s favelas constitutes, for all practical purposes, a full-blown "internal armed conflict." XXXX said he would never take such a position publicly, given Brazilian sensitivities, nor does he argue that Rio,s violence matches in every detail the de jure definition of "internal armed conflict" under International Humanitarian Law. (Note: The relevant definition is in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. End Note.) Nonetheless, in its main features -- i.e., organized factions holding the monopoly on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for ICRC to operate as though in a war zone to create "humanitarian spaces" -- the gang warfare in Rio,s favelas resembles other situations worldwide that are formally recognized by governments and international organizations as internal armed conflicts, XXX said. XXXX speaks with conviction, reflecting his long ICRC experience in conflict zones, including in Haiti, in Uganda and in Sierra Leone,s civil war. In the course of the discussion, XXX made the following specific observations: --Currently ICRC operates in 7 Rio favelas: Mare, Parada de Lucas, Cidade de Deus, Cantagalo, Pavao/Pavaozinho, Complexo de Alemao, and Vila Vintem. State Security Secretary Jose Beltrame is the ICRC,s senior interlocutor in Rio. ICRC also has asked for access to the state prison system, which has not yet been accepted (although he noted that there was support at federal level, including from Justice Minister Tarso Genro); --The ICRC works to create "humanitarian spaces" in favela conflict areas, proceeding cautiously, first using local NGOpartners such as AfroReggae and Luta Pela Paz. In concrete examples, this has meant trying to convince gang factions to recognize certain places -- e.g., schools, clinics -- as "safe areas," working to establish mechanisms to locate and negotiate release of hostages, bringing basic supplies (including food and water) to civilians who are regularly isolated by the most extreme violence inside areas XXX called "favelas within favelas." ICRC is also working with former staffers of Doctors Without Borders to address treatment and evacuation of wounded or deceased persons, XXXX said. He noted MSF closed its operation in the notorious Complexo de Alemao favela when it was not regularly able to fulfill its mandate of treating wounded citizens, owing to the grim fact that the lethality of the conflict in Rio,s favelas leaves mostly dead victims; --Now ICRC is building up its own network. Increasingly, its delegates speak directly with leaders of gangs and militias, as well as with police. Contact with gang members is not direct initially, but word of ICRC interest in contacting specific gang leaders is passed through mediators, and mutually acceptable conditions are set for a meeting. ICRC uses clearly marked vehicles and communicates its movements in advance to all sides, just as in other war zones where it operates; --ICRC also works on health initiatives as well as education, but XXXXX allowed that such activities were, in part, "cover" for ICRC,s efforts to protect civilians from violence; --In prisons, ICRC is concerned primarily with the human rights situation, and with violence driven by gang dynamics. There is also an opportunity to meet with imprisoned gang faction leaders to emphasize that ICRC,s work in favelas is not political, and is intended to alleviate suffering of citizens. And there is the humanitarian issue of facilitating contact with prisoners by family members who may not be able to visit prisons because of factional violence (e.g., A family member from a favela controlled by one gang may put themselves and their incarcerated relative at risk if they attempt to enter a prison dominated by a rival gang.); --XXXX applauds the state Favela Pacification Program (FPP) and the community-based Police Pacification Units (UPP) and sees their value in extending government control and reducing the stigma of living in favelas, but does not believe that the plan is sufficient to fundamentally change the security situation, at least not for several years (ref A); --ICRC must be sensitive and low-profile in its work, and XXXX pointed out his staff is "hidden" in the basement of the historical headquarters building of the Brazilian Red Cross national organization. The Brazilian Red Cross is increasingly engaged by ICRC to assist in its efforts in the favelas.
¶3. (C) Comment: One does not have to completely agree with XXXX assessment to concede that this battle-hardened ICRC professional makes a cogent case for viewing the situation in many of Rio,s favelas as one of sustained internal armed conflict, as opposed to simply urban criminal violence. The Rio combatants are, of course, rival criminal gangs, militia groups, and the police, as opposed to political or ethnic factions. But in the gangs, complete control of geographic areas (Rio Governor Sergio Cabral recently referred to gang-dominated favelas as "occupied territories"), their relatively elaborate command and control structures, their powerful military weaponry, and in the horrendous body count they leave behind, Rio,s gangs do resemble combatants in recognized internal armed conflicts worldwide. A signal distinction is that Rio,s internal armed conflict is not generalized throughout a national or even regional theater. Instead, it is occurring within relatively discreet urban pockets (though violence can spill outside favelas), spread throughout a celebrated and highly developed megacity, one of two (with Sao Paulo) in a democratic country with one of the world,s largest economies. That cruel and decades-old dichotomy may have become, finally, more than Rio residents and Brazil,s leaders can absorb, and their frustration and the focusing energy of the 2016 Olympics seem to be galvanizing state, municipal and federal government. There is a growing consenus that now is the time to confront the plague of violence in Rio in a decisive manner, but it remains to be seen whether Rio,s Favela Pacification Program, possible new federal-level public security initiatives, and additional funding for public security will be sufficient to help Rio de Janeiro quell its long internal armed conflict. HEARNE
tisdag 7 december 2010
NYTT DOKUMENT från Wikileaks/Cable Viewer
JAG ÄR WIKILEAKS (Jag är Spartacus-kampanjen går vidare!)
Fick under dagen veta att Mastercard och Visa dragit in möjligheterna att skicka pengar till Wikileaks via deras "nät".... Man blir stum, men inte förvånad.
Här följer ett av dokumenten ur Cable Viewer (random):
-------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04MADRID1187 2004-04-07 18:06 2010-12-06 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001187
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: ZAPATERO AND SPANISH TROOPS IN IRAQ: POLITICAL
PRESSURES FOR WITHDRAWAL
Classified By: Charge J. Robert Manzanares per 1.5 (b) and (d).
Summary
¶1. (C) Political pressure is high on incoming Socialist
President Rodriguez Zapatero to fulfill his campaign promise
to pull the 1300 Spanish troops out of Iraq absent a new UN
mandate giving the UN the lead role. Zapatero is on the hook
to demonstrate to his supporters that his surprise election
March 14 ushered in a significant change from the Aznar
years. Zapatero, who vehemently opposed the Iraq war, has
repeatedly emphasized, publicly and privately, that he will
comply with his campaign promises. The clearest way to
manifest this would be to pull the troops out. Nonetheless,
the Socialists are sensitive to charges a Spanish withdrawal
following the March 11 Madrid terror attacks would appear to
be cutting and running in the face of terror. A new UNSCR
giving the UN a lead role might provide Zapatero with cover
to keep the troops in, but what exactly Zapatero can accept
remains vague since he has not defined it. We expect him to
take his cues from France and Germany. Public opinion in
the wake of March 11 regards Spain as being in the line of
Jihadist fire because of the Aznar government's Iraq policy
and favors withdrawal. Recent fighting in Najaf between
Spanish forces and Shiite extremists has heightened concerns
about the Iraq deployment. Significant Spanish losses there
could clinch the decision to pull out. End Summary.
The Case for Withdrawal
¶2. (C) Zapatero has been vehemently against the Iraq war
from the beginning. He has consistently maintained that the
war was founded on lies, and is immoral and illegal. Many
of the 11 million Spaniards who voted for the Socialists on
March 14 share his view. Many Socialists, especially those
on the left, want the troops out now regardless of a UN
resolution. As far as Spanish opinion as a whole, according
to a radio (Cadena Ser) poll last week, 38% of respondents
favored Spanish troops staying in Iraq if there were a new UN
mandate while 42% favor pulling the troops out even if the UN
takes control of Iraq. Only a small percentage favor the
troops staying under the current mandate. Many Socialists
are uncomfortable with the assertive international role for
Spain that Aznar espoused and, since the March 11 attacks,
believe Aznar's alliance with the US put Spain in the direct
line of fire for Islamist terrorists.
Caving in to Terrorists?
¶3. (C) The Socialists are, however, sensitive to the charge
that withdrawal from Iraq means caving in to terrorist
blackmail following March 11. They note that Zapatero's
pledge to withdraw long predated March 11 (though the
Socialists would not have been elected had the March 11
attacks not taken place). Jose Blanco, Socialist Party
National Coordinator, noted on April 6: "Let's not mix apples
and oranges. One thing is terrorism which has to be fought
on all fronts. Another thing is our politics concerning the
war in Iraq. Politically we shouldn't link one thing with
the other." Popular sentiment, however, does link them.
Many believe Spain is now exposed to jihadist terrorism as a
result of a military deployment in Iraq that most Spaniards
oppose.
¶4. (C) Antiterrorism marchers numbering 25,000 turned out
April 5 in Leganes, the site of the April 3 shootout and
suicide of the suspected leaders of the March 11 Madrid
terror attacks. The march underlined that many Spaniards do
link the March 11 terror attacks to Spain's presence in Iraq.
The communique for the march, at the urging of the Socialist
mayor of Leganes, included an explicit call for Spain to
withdraw its troops from Iraq. (This prompted Aznar's
Popular Party to boycott the march and organize its own on
April 6). The message that came out of the April 5 rally
was that since Spaniards never wanted to be in Iraq in the
first place, Spain should withdraw, lower its profile, and
thereby remove itself as a target. Images of the Shiite
riots in Najaf and elsewhere further agitated Spanish opinion
against Spain's presence in Iraq, as did reports that Spanish
troops returned fire on rioters in Najaf April 4, killing
about 20.
UN Resolution Giving UN a Lead Role
¶5. (C) FM designate Moratinos has been in the lead in
holding up the possibility that a new UNSCR giving the UN the
leading role in the Iraq could satisfy Zapatero's electoral
pledge. However, Zapatero and his key political advisors
such as Jose Blanco and Jesus Caldera, have been less forward
leaning than Moratinos. The posture of France and Germany
on a new resolution should be important, since Zapatero has
made it clear that he wants to follow their lead. If France
and Germany are on board, Zapatero will feel pressure to
follow suit. One prominent commentator, well connected in
the PSOE, noted to us that if, for example, France were
willing to commit troops to Iraq under a new UNSCR, Zapatero
would be able to show that the situation had fundamentally
changed and keep Spanish troops there.
Comment
¶6. (C) Indications are that Zapatero has not made a final
decision on what to do about the troops. The "pull the
troops out" sentiment from his base, and which his key
political advisors share, will be a critical factor weighing
on him. For Zapatero, the easiest scenario would be no new
UN resolution, which would mean he would have no choice but
to pull the troops out. A UN resolution expanding the UN
role will force him to make a choice. In this case,
Zapatero's allies in the all important Prisa media group
might be able to help him sell the line that he had won by
successfully pushing for an increased UN role and give him
cover to keep the troops in. Zapatero may also be
susceptible to the argument that, whatever the rationale or
lack thereof for the war, undercutting the coalition now
could prove disastrous. Nonetheless, escalation of fighting
in Southern Iraq, particularly if Spanish forces suffer
significant losses, may clinch the decision in favor of
withdrawal.
MANZANARES
Fick under dagen veta att Mastercard och Visa dragit in möjligheterna att skicka pengar till Wikileaks via deras "nät".... Man blir stum, men inte förvånad.
Här följer ett av dokumenten ur Cable Viewer (random):
-------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04MADRID1187 2004-04-07 18:06 2010-12-06 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001187
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: ZAPATERO AND SPANISH TROOPS IN IRAQ: POLITICAL
PRESSURES FOR WITHDRAWAL
Classified By: Charge J. Robert Manzanares per 1.5 (b) and (d).
Summary
¶1. (C) Political pressure is high on incoming Socialist
President Rodriguez Zapatero to fulfill his campaign promise
to pull the 1300 Spanish troops out of Iraq absent a new UN
mandate giving the UN the lead role. Zapatero is on the hook
to demonstrate to his supporters that his surprise election
March 14 ushered in a significant change from the Aznar
years. Zapatero, who vehemently opposed the Iraq war, has
repeatedly emphasized, publicly and privately, that he will
comply with his campaign promises. The clearest way to
manifest this would be to pull the troops out. Nonetheless,
the Socialists are sensitive to charges a Spanish withdrawal
following the March 11 Madrid terror attacks would appear to
be cutting and running in the face of terror. A new UNSCR
giving the UN a lead role might provide Zapatero with cover
to keep the troops in, but what exactly Zapatero can accept
remains vague since he has not defined it. We expect him to
take his cues from France and Germany. Public opinion in
the wake of March 11 regards Spain as being in the line of
Jihadist fire because of the Aznar government's Iraq policy
and favors withdrawal. Recent fighting in Najaf between
Spanish forces and Shiite extremists has heightened concerns
about the Iraq deployment. Significant Spanish losses there
could clinch the decision to pull out. End Summary.
The Case for Withdrawal
¶2. (C) Zapatero has been vehemently against the Iraq war
from the beginning. He has consistently maintained that the
war was founded on lies, and is immoral and illegal. Many
of the 11 million Spaniards who voted for the Socialists on
March 14 share his view. Many Socialists, especially those
on the left, want the troops out now regardless of a UN
resolution. As far as Spanish opinion as a whole, according
to a radio (Cadena Ser) poll last week, 38% of respondents
favored Spanish troops staying in Iraq if there were a new UN
mandate while 42% favor pulling the troops out even if the UN
takes control of Iraq. Only a small percentage favor the
troops staying under the current mandate. Many Socialists
are uncomfortable with the assertive international role for
Spain that Aznar espoused and, since the March 11 attacks,
believe Aznar's alliance with the US put Spain in the direct
line of fire for Islamist terrorists.
Caving in to Terrorists?
¶3. (C) The Socialists are, however, sensitive to the charge
that withdrawal from Iraq means caving in to terrorist
blackmail following March 11. They note that Zapatero's
pledge to withdraw long predated March 11 (though the
Socialists would not have been elected had the March 11
attacks not taken place). Jose Blanco, Socialist Party
National Coordinator, noted on April 6: "Let's not mix apples
and oranges. One thing is terrorism which has to be fought
on all fronts. Another thing is our politics concerning the
war in Iraq. Politically we shouldn't link one thing with
the other." Popular sentiment, however, does link them.
Many believe Spain is now exposed to jihadist terrorism as a
result of a military deployment in Iraq that most Spaniards
oppose.
¶4. (C) Antiterrorism marchers numbering 25,000 turned out
April 5 in Leganes, the site of the April 3 shootout and
suicide of the suspected leaders of the March 11 Madrid
terror attacks. The march underlined that many Spaniards do
link the March 11 terror attacks to Spain's presence in Iraq.
The communique for the march, at the urging of the Socialist
mayor of Leganes, included an explicit call for Spain to
withdraw its troops from Iraq. (This prompted Aznar's
Popular Party to boycott the march and organize its own on
April 6). The message that came out of the April 5 rally
was that since Spaniards never wanted to be in Iraq in the
first place, Spain should withdraw, lower its profile, and
thereby remove itself as a target. Images of the Shiite
riots in Najaf and elsewhere further agitated Spanish opinion
against Spain's presence in Iraq, as did reports that Spanish
troops returned fire on rioters in Najaf April 4, killing
about 20.
UN Resolution Giving UN a Lead Role
¶5. (C) FM designate Moratinos has been in the lead in
holding up the possibility that a new UNSCR giving the UN the
leading role in the Iraq could satisfy Zapatero's electoral
pledge. However, Zapatero and his key political advisors
such as Jose Blanco and Jesus Caldera, have been less forward
leaning than Moratinos. The posture of France and Germany
on a new resolution should be important, since Zapatero has
made it clear that he wants to follow their lead. If France
and Germany are on board, Zapatero will feel pressure to
follow suit. One prominent commentator, well connected in
the PSOE, noted to us that if, for example, France were
willing to commit troops to Iraq under a new UNSCR, Zapatero
would be able to show that the situation had fundamentally
changed and keep Spanish troops there.
Comment
¶6. (C) Indications are that Zapatero has not made a final
decision on what to do about the troops. The "pull the
troops out" sentiment from his base, and which his key
political advisors share, will be a critical factor weighing
on him. For Zapatero, the easiest scenario would be no new
UN resolution, which would mean he would have no choice but
to pull the troops out. A UN resolution expanding the UN
role will force him to make a choice. In this case,
Zapatero's allies in the all important Prisa media group
might be able to help him sell the line that he had won by
successfully pushing for an increased UN role and give him
cover to keep the troops in. Zapatero may also be
susceptible to the argument that, whatever the rationale or
lack thereof for the war, undercutting the coalition now
could prove disastrous. Nonetheless, escalation of fighting
in Southern Iraq, particularly if Spanish forces suffer
significant losses, may clinch the decision in favor of
withdrawal.
MANZANARES
måndag 6 december 2010
JAG ÄR WIKILEAKS - Every human is free!
“In any civilized society, it is every citizen’s responsibility to obey just laws. But at the same time, it is every citizen’s responsibility to disobey unjust laws” Dr. Martin Luther King
Den här bloggen finns enbart till för att förklara för världens makthavare och världens folk att MÄNNISKAN ÄR FÖDD FRI.
Därför väljer jag att publicera Wikileaks dokument här. Jag hoppas kunna publicera minst ett dokument per dag, i syfte att spegla Wikileaks, så att Wikileaks aldrig upphör existera!
TA DEL AV REVOLUTIONEN - sätt upp en blogg, hemsida och publicera dessa dokument! Vi är alla fria och ingen makthavare ska ta den friheten från oss!
Själv tillhör jag Liberaldemokraterna i Sverige och det vi sätter främst på schemat är individens rätt till FRIHET!
www.liberaldemokraterna.com
-------
Här följer kopierad text av ett (1) dokument:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002561
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SY KU IR TU
SUBJECT: THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS
NEIGHBORS, PART II
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (U) This is the second of two cables reviewing Iraq's
relations with key neighboring countries. this cable focuses
on Iraq's relations with Syria, in the wake of the August 19
bombings.
¶2. (C) Summary: Iraq's improving relations with its
neighbors in 2008 and early 2009 represented a critical
element in its efforts to maintain security and stability and
normalize its position in the Gulf and the broader region.
The August 19 bombings -- targeting the MFA, and by extension
Iraq's improving relations with its neighbors -- represent a
serious setback and have alarmed senior Iraqi officials,
suggesting that Iraqi Sunni Arab neighbors in particular now
view those earlier gains as "reversible." These fears help
explain the rapid deterioration in relations with Syria and
the GOI's demand that the UN intervene to investigate the
August 19 bombings, so as to put Syria on notice that the
international community is scrutinizing its use of Iraqi
Ba'athist proxies to interfere in Iraq. Iraq's relations
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey are covered in Part I
of this message. End Summary.
PROGRESS WITH THE NEIGHBORS, 2008-09
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) From 2008 through much of the summer, Iraq's
relations with its neighbors were on a positive trajectory
overall. The breakthroughs in regional engagement began in
the fall of 2008 (following sustained USG pressure), with the
UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait all sending ambassadors to Baghdad,
along with Jordan, the Arab League, and Syria. Iraq also
began its regular participation in the GCC 3 in 2008. While
there was less formal movement in 2009, the positive trend
continued, as the GOI named 58 new ambassadors and the
Egyptian government took steps to return its ambassador. The
continuing signs of improvement in security in Iraq in 2008
and the first half of 2009 provided a growing sense that Iraq
was becoming a much more secure place and getting strong
enough to ward off, or at least better control, neighbors'
meddling in its internal affairs.
¶4. (C) However, not all the trendlines were positive during
this period. Despite pressure from us, the Saudis refused to
send an ambassador (although they received Iraq's ambassador
in Riyadh), reflecting Riyadh's and King Abdullah's, in
particular, deep-seated doubts about a Shia-led democracy in
Iraq. Relations with other key countries in the region,
including Syria, Kuwait, and even Turkey, also experienced
varying degrees of drag on positive movement, ranging from
foreign fighters issues in Syria to Chapter VII issues in
Kuwait and water shortfalls from Turkey. The perception
among many Iraqis during this period was that despite the
gains in normalization and regional integration, Iraq was a
pitiful (former) regional giant, preyed upon and held back in
various ways by neighbors intent on keeping it weak and
taking advantage of it.
AUGUST 19: A THREAT TO NORMALIZATION TRENDS
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The August 19 bombings which severely damaged the MFA
and the Ministry of Finance buildings and Baghdad's
residents' sense of improving security, brought these
negative trendlines into sharp relief. The bombings undercut
the perception of normalization that had become a commonplace
over the past eighteen months (and undercut PM Maliki's
platform of having delivered on security). Iraqis, both
official and unofficial, believe it was no accident that one
of the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
Qof the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
damage, is the MFA, symbol of Iraq's efforts to build
relations with its neighbors and normalize its position in
the region.
¶6. (C) In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, FM Zebari
made accusations that one or more of the neighboring
countries had conspired with al-Qaeda, possibly using
proxies, to support the bombings. In a meeting with the
Ambassador, PM Maliki referred to a "momentum of
interference" that was building in the lead-up to the January
national elections. Zebari described the next 5-6 month
time-frame as "a period of maximum danger" for Iraq. The
bombings were meant to convey the perception -- welcomed by
some neighbors, he insisted -- that the security and
normalization in Iraq of the past two years were "reversible."
DO THE NEIGHBORS HAVE IT IN FOR IRAQ?
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Iraqi contacts speculated that regional unease about
BAGHDAD 00002561 002 OF 002
a Shia-led Iraqi government, and about the democratic
character of that government, a model that could eventually
undermine the legitimacy of more autocratic regimes in the
region, helped explain why some neighbors would prefer a weak
and unstable Iraq, where security and political gains of the
past two years are rolled back. Acting NSC Advisor Dr. Safa
al-Sheikh described the neighbors as bent on intervening in
Iraq, especially in the months leading up to the January 2010
elections. While some used proxies to foment violence,
others restricted themselves to money, media (propaganda),
and meddling, all designed to help shape electoral
coalitions, and block or further individual political
careers, in order to better control Iraq and keep it weak,
politically fractured, and pliable, insisted al-Sheikh. PM
Maliki told the Ambassador that neighbors feared a resurgent
Iraq that would capture too much of "the limelight."
According to Maliki, neighbors also feared Iraq's "golden
connection between Shia and Sunni Islam," a legacy that gives
Iraq special precedence in the region. His argument is based
on a well-acknowledged fact that Iraq is the grand junction
of Shia and Sunni Islam as well as of the Arab world and
Persia, making it, therefore, both strategically vital but
also vulnerable. The view of key contacts here is that some
of Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors have concluded that in a
stable, peaceful Iraqi democracy, Sunni political power in
Iraq would be finished. These Arab neighbors, therefore,
conclude that the only way the Sunnis will ever come back
into power in Iraq is in the wake of a period of sustained
instability and violence that de-legitimizes democratic
governance and the Shia as Iraqi political leaders.
RELATIONS WITH SYRIA IN CRISIS
------------------------------
¶8. (C) Relations with Syria suffered the most precipitous
decline in the wake of the attacks, with mutual recalls of
Ambassadors and public statements making clear the GOI felt
Syria was complicit. While Syrian support for Iraqi
Ba'athists has long been a significant bilateral irritant,
the GOI's public claim that Syrian-based insurgents were
responsible for August 19 represented a significant shift.
To the al-Maliki government, the problem was now seen as an
existential threat to the state and the GOI could no longer
treat the issue with routine diplomacy, especially given
fears these attacks were only the first wave. According to
Maliki and al-Sheikh, senior Iraqi security officers had seen
a growing body of intelligence in the months leading up to
attacks indicating significant cooperation between Iraqi
Ba'athists and al-Qaeda, although Sheikh acknowledged that
the proof for Iraqi Ba'athist involvement in the August 19
bombings had been assembled "somewhat quickly." He explained
that at the cell level, Ba'athists participate with some
al-Qaida groups -- usually disguising their Baathist
sympathies -- and often dominate the local groups because
they have highly prized skills such as experience handling
weapons and explosives.
¶9. (C) Iraqi officials make clear that despite the current
problems with Syria, they foresee the possibility of improved
relations in the future. PM Maliki recently stated that Iraq
wanted a harder-line USG policy toward Syria only to the
extent it would help compel Syria to stop misbehaving and be
a better neighbor. The problem, according to Maliki and
others, is that Syria is a neighborhood menace with a history
of fomenting violence and inciting instability in the region
-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
Q-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
of diplomacy. Iraq's problem is that it is too weak on its
own to intimidate Syria into behaving. With no troops "to
mass on the border" as a threat, as Turkey had once done, and
taking his cue from Lebanon's experience following the Hariri
assassination, Maliki felt he had no recourse but to take the
issue to the UNSC, hoping this diplomatic "stick" might
persuade Bashar and his regime to back off. Iraq is looking
to the United States and other members of the P-5 to endorse
the appointment by the UNSYG of a senior official to
investigate the August 19 bombings and external support for
terrorism in Iraq. (NOTE: Not all Iraqi officials agreed
with the PM's approach. On September 5, Iraq's three
presidents -- Talabani, Hashimi and Abd al-Mahdi -- issued a
statement calling for containing tension between Iraq and
Syria through diplomatic channels, an obvious rejection of
Maliki's insistence on UN involvement. END NOTE.)
¶10. (U) Iraq's relations Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and
Turkey are covered in Part I of this message.
HILL
Den här bloggen finns enbart till för att förklara för världens makthavare och världens folk att MÄNNISKAN ÄR FÖDD FRI.
Därför väljer jag att publicera Wikileaks dokument här. Jag hoppas kunna publicera minst ett dokument per dag, i syfte att spegla Wikileaks, så att Wikileaks aldrig upphör existera!
TA DEL AV REVOLUTIONEN - sätt upp en blogg, hemsida och publicera dessa dokument! Vi är alla fria och ingen makthavare ska ta den friheten från oss!
Själv tillhör jag Liberaldemokraterna i Sverige och det vi sätter främst på schemat är individens rätt till FRIHET!
www.liberaldemokraterna.com
-------
Här följer kopierad text av ett (1) dokument:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002561
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SY KU IR TU
SUBJECT: THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS
NEIGHBORS, PART II
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (U) This is the second of two cables reviewing Iraq's
relations with key neighboring countries. this cable focuses
on Iraq's relations with Syria, in the wake of the August 19
bombings.
¶2. (C) Summary: Iraq's improving relations with its
neighbors in 2008 and early 2009 represented a critical
element in its efforts to maintain security and stability and
normalize its position in the Gulf and the broader region.
The August 19 bombings -- targeting the MFA, and by extension
Iraq's improving relations with its neighbors -- represent a
serious setback and have alarmed senior Iraqi officials,
suggesting that Iraqi Sunni Arab neighbors in particular now
view those earlier gains as "reversible." These fears help
explain the rapid deterioration in relations with Syria and
the GOI's demand that the UN intervene to investigate the
August 19 bombings, so as to put Syria on notice that the
international community is scrutinizing its use of Iraqi
Ba'athist proxies to interfere in Iraq. Iraq's relations
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey are covered in Part I
of this message. End Summary.
PROGRESS WITH THE NEIGHBORS, 2008-09
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) From 2008 through much of the summer, Iraq's
relations with its neighbors were on a positive trajectory
overall. The breakthroughs in regional engagement began in
the fall of 2008 (following sustained USG pressure), with the
UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait all sending ambassadors to Baghdad,
along with Jordan, the Arab League, and Syria. Iraq also
began its regular participation in the GCC 3 in 2008. While
there was less formal movement in 2009, the positive trend
continued, as the GOI named 58 new ambassadors and the
Egyptian government took steps to return its ambassador. The
continuing signs of improvement in security in Iraq in 2008
and the first half of 2009 provided a growing sense that Iraq
was becoming a much more secure place and getting strong
enough to ward off, or at least better control, neighbors'
meddling in its internal affairs.
¶4. (C) However, not all the trendlines were positive during
this period. Despite pressure from us, the Saudis refused to
send an ambassador (although they received Iraq's ambassador
in Riyadh), reflecting Riyadh's and King Abdullah's, in
particular, deep-seated doubts about a Shia-led democracy in
Iraq. Relations with other key countries in the region,
including Syria, Kuwait, and even Turkey, also experienced
varying degrees of drag on positive movement, ranging from
foreign fighters issues in Syria to Chapter VII issues in
Kuwait and water shortfalls from Turkey. The perception
among many Iraqis during this period was that despite the
gains in normalization and regional integration, Iraq was a
pitiful (former) regional giant, preyed upon and held back in
various ways by neighbors intent on keeping it weak and
taking advantage of it.
AUGUST 19: A THREAT TO NORMALIZATION TRENDS
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The August 19 bombings which severely damaged the MFA
and the Ministry of Finance buildings and Baghdad's
residents' sense of improving security, brought these
negative trendlines into sharp relief. The bombings undercut
the perception of normalization that had become a commonplace
over the past eighteen months (and undercut PM Maliki's
platform of having delivered on security). Iraqis, both
official and unofficial, believe it was no accident that one
of the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
Qof the main targets, and the one that suffered the most
damage, is the MFA, symbol of Iraq's efforts to build
relations with its neighbors and normalize its position in
the region.
¶6. (C) In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, FM Zebari
made accusations that one or more of the neighboring
countries had conspired with al-Qaeda, possibly using
proxies, to support the bombings. In a meeting with the
Ambassador, PM Maliki referred to a "momentum of
interference" that was building in the lead-up to the January
national elections. Zebari described the next 5-6 month
time-frame as "a period of maximum danger" for Iraq. The
bombings were meant to convey the perception -- welcomed by
some neighbors, he insisted -- that the security and
normalization in Iraq of the past two years were "reversible."
DO THE NEIGHBORS HAVE IT IN FOR IRAQ?
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Iraqi contacts speculated that regional unease about
BAGHDAD 00002561 002 OF 002
a Shia-led Iraqi government, and about the democratic
character of that government, a model that could eventually
undermine the legitimacy of more autocratic regimes in the
region, helped explain why some neighbors would prefer a weak
and unstable Iraq, where security and political gains of the
past two years are rolled back. Acting NSC Advisor Dr. Safa
al-Sheikh described the neighbors as bent on intervening in
Iraq, especially in the months leading up to the January 2010
elections. While some used proxies to foment violence,
others restricted themselves to money, media (propaganda),
and meddling, all designed to help shape electoral
coalitions, and block or further individual political
careers, in order to better control Iraq and keep it weak,
politically fractured, and pliable, insisted al-Sheikh. PM
Maliki told the Ambassador that neighbors feared a resurgent
Iraq that would capture too much of "the limelight."
According to Maliki, neighbors also feared Iraq's "golden
connection between Shia and Sunni Islam," a legacy that gives
Iraq special precedence in the region. His argument is based
on a well-acknowledged fact that Iraq is the grand junction
of Shia and Sunni Islam as well as of the Arab world and
Persia, making it, therefore, both strategically vital but
also vulnerable. The view of key contacts here is that some
of Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors have concluded that in a
stable, peaceful Iraqi democracy, Sunni political power in
Iraq would be finished. These Arab neighbors, therefore,
conclude that the only way the Sunnis will ever come back
into power in Iraq is in the wake of a period of sustained
instability and violence that de-legitimizes democratic
governance and the Shia as Iraqi political leaders.
RELATIONS WITH SYRIA IN CRISIS
------------------------------
¶8. (C) Relations with Syria suffered the most precipitous
decline in the wake of the attacks, with mutual recalls of
Ambassadors and public statements making clear the GOI felt
Syria was complicit. While Syrian support for Iraqi
Ba'athists has long been a significant bilateral irritant,
the GOI's public claim that Syrian-based insurgents were
responsible for August 19 represented a significant shift.
To the al-Maliki government, the problem was now seen as an
existential threat to the state and the GOI could no longer
treat the issue with routine diplomacy, especially given
fears these attacks were only the first wave. According to
Maliki and al-Sheikh, senior Iraqi security officers had seen
a growing body of intelligence in the months leading up to
attacks indicating significant cooperation between Iraqi
Ba'athists and al-Qaeda, although Sheikh acknowledged that
the proof for Iraqi Ba'athist involvement in the August 19
bombings had been assembled "somewhat quickly." He explained
that at the cell level, Ba'athists participate with some
al-Qaida groups -- usually disguising their Baathist
sympathies -- and often dominate the local groups because
they have highly prized skills such as experience handling
weapons and explosives.
¶9. (C) Iraqi officials make clear that despite the current
problems with Syria, they foresee the possibility of improved
relations in the future. PM Maliki recently stated that Iraq
wanted a harder-line USG policy toward Syria only to the
extent it would help compel Syria to stop misbehaving and be
a better neighbor. The problem, according to Maliki and
others, is that Syria is a neighborhood menace with a history
of fomenting violence and inciting instability in the region
-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
Q-- and it viewed these tactics as part of the standard tools
of diplomacy. Iraq's problem is that it is too weak on its
own to intimidate Syria into behaving. With no troops "to
mass on the border" as a threat, as Turkey had once done, and
taking his cue from Lebanon's experience following the Hariri
assassination, Maliki felt he had no recourse but to take the
issue to the UNSC, hoping this diplomatic "stick" might
persuade Bashar and his regime to back off. Iraq is looking
to the United States and other members of the P-5 to endorse
the appointment by the UNSYG of a senior official to
investigate the August 19 bombings and external support for
terrorism in Iraq. (NOTE: Not all Iraqi officials agreed
with the PM's approach. On September 5, Iraq's three
presidents -- Talabani, Hashimi and Abd al-Mahdi -- issued a
statement calling for containing tension between Iraq and
Syria through diplomatic channels, an obvious rejection of
Maliki's insistence on UN involvement. END NOTE.)
¶10. (U) Iraq's relations Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and
Turkey are covered in Part I of this message.
HILL
Prenumerera på:
Inlägg (Atom)